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Message-ID: <c6c2d413f340d858e43aa3837abdf80cb8be9d84.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2023 13:14:52 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
brauner@...nel.org, chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org,
neilb@...e.de, kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
casey@...aufler-ca.com, shuah@...nel.org, mic@...ikod.net
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu
<roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 19/24] ima: Move to LSM infrastructure
On Thu, 2023-12-14 at 18:08 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>
> Move hardcoded IMA function calls (not appraisal-specific functions) from
> various places in the kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a
> new LSM named 'ima' (at the end of the LSM list and always enabled like
> 'integrity').
>
> Having IMA before EVM in the Makefile is sufficient to preserve the
> relative order of the new 'ima' LSM in respect to the upcoming 'evm' LSM,
> and thus the order of IMA and EVM function calls as when they were
> hardcoded.
>
> Make moved functions as static (except ima_post_key_create_or_update(),
> which is not in ima_main.c), and register them as implementation of the
> respective hooks in the new function init_ima_lsm().
>
> A slight difference is that IMA and EVM functions registered for the
> inode_post_setattr, inode_post_removexattr, path_post_mknod,
> inode_post_create_tmpfile, inode_post_set_acl and inode_post_remove_acl
> won't be executed for private inodes. Since those inodes are supposed to be
> fs-internal, they should not be of interest of IMA or EVM. The S_PRIVATE
> flag is used for anonymous inodes, hugetlbfs, reiserfs xattrs, XFS scrub
> and kernel-internal tmpfs files.
>
> Conditionally register ima_post_path_mknod() if CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is
> enabled, otherwise the path_post_mknod hook won't be available.
Up to this point, enabling CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH was not required. By
making it conditional on CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, anyone enabling IMA will
also need to enable CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH. Without it, new files will
not be tagged as a "new" file.
Casey, Paul, how common is it today not to enable CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH?
Will enabling it just for IMA be a problem?
>
> Also, conditionally register ima_post_key_create_or_update() if
> CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled.
>
> Move integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA and name it
> ima_kernel_module_request(), as only appraisal is affected by the crypto
> subsystem trying to load kernel modules. Conditionally register
> ima_kernel_module_request() if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is
> enabled.
The previous version was so clean.
Moving integrity_kernel_module_request() to IMA should be a separate
patch, probably a prereq. Then like the other functions convert it to
an LSM hook.
Please include a line explaning why the original EVM signature is not
affected.
>
> Finally, add the LSM_ID_IMA case in lsm_list_modules_test.c.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@...cle.com>
--
thanks,
Mimi
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