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Message-ID: <96f82924cd2fda95f0c89341215e128419bf77fd.camel@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2023 14:21:18 -0500 From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk, brauner@...nel.org, chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org, neilb@...e.de, kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com, dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org, stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org, casey@...aufler-ca.com, shuah@...nel.org, mic@...ikod.net Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 23/24] ima: Make it independent from 'integrity' LSM On Wed, 2023-12-27 at 17:39 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > On 12/27/2023 2:22 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Thu, 2023-12-14 at 18:08 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote: > >> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com> > >> > >> Make the 'ima' LSM independent from the 'integrity' LSM by introducing IMA > >> own integrity metadata (ima_iint_cache structure, with IMA-specific fields > >> from the integrity_iint_cache structure), and by managing it directly from > >> the 'ima' LSM. > >> > >> Move the remaining IMA-specific flags to security/integrity/ima/ima.h, > >> since they are now unnecessary in the common integrity layer. > >> > >> Replace integrity_iint_cache with ima_iint_cache in various places > >> of the IMA code. > >> > >> Then, reserve space in the security blob for the entire ima_iint_cache > >> structure, so that it is available for all inodes having the security blob > >> allocated (those for which security_inode_alloc() was called). Adjust the > >> IMA code accordingly, call ima_iint_inode() to retrieve the ima_iint_cache > >> structure. Keep the non-NULL checks since there can be inodes without > >> security blob. > > > > Previously the 'iint' memory was only allocated for regular files in > > policy and were tagged S_IMA. This patch totally changes when and how > > memory is being allocated. Does it make sense to allocate memory at > > security_inode_alloc()? Is this change really necessary for making IMA > > a full fledged LSM? > > Good question. I think it wouldn't be necessary, we can reuse the same > approach as in the patch 'integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed > blob for integrity_iint_cache'. Going forward with the v8 proposed solution would require some real memory usage analysis for different types of policies. To me the "integrity: Switch from rbtree to LSM-managed blob for integrity_iint_cache" makes a lot more sense. Looking back at the original thread, your reasons back then for not directly allocating the integrity_iint_cache are still valid for the ima_iint_cache structure. Mimi > > > >> > >> Don't include the inode pointer as field in the ima_iint_cache structure, > >> since the association with the inode is clear. Since the inode field is > >> missing in ima_iint_cache, pass the extra inode parameter to > >> ima_get_verity_digest(). > >> > >> Finally, register ima_inode_alloc_security/ima_inode_free_security() to > >> initialize/deinitialize the new ima_iint_cache structure (before this task > >> was done by iint_init_always() and iint_free()). Also, duplicate > >> iint_lockdep_annotate() for the ima_iint_cache structure, and name it > >> ima_iint_lockdep_annotate(). > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com> >
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