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Message-ID: <ZZRD66ilLsX53Vj_@google.com> Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 09:12:11 -0800 From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> Cc: Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@...eweavers.com>, x86@...nel.org, Linux Kernel <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@...ux.intel.com>, wine-devel@...ehq.org Subject: Re: x86 SGDT emulation for Wine On Wed, Dec 27, 2023, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > On December 27, 2023 2:20:37 PM PST, Elizabeth Figura <zfigura@...eweavers.com> wrote: > >Hello all, > > > >There is a Windows 98 program, a game called Nuclear Strike, which wants to do > >some amount of direct VGA access. Part of this is port I/O, which naturally > >throws SIGILL that we can trivially catch and emulate in Wine. The other part > >is direct access to the video memory at 0xa0000, which in general isn't a > >problem to catch and virtualize as well. > > > >However, this program is a bit creative about how it accesses that memory; > >instead of just writing to 0xa0000 directly, it looks up a segment descriptor > >whose base is at 0xa0000 and then uses the %es override to write bytes. In > >pseudo-C, what it does is: ... > >Currently we emulate IDT access. On a read fault, we execute sidt ourselves, > >check if the read address falls within the IDT, and return some dummy data > >from the exception handler if it does [1]. We can easily enough implement GDT > >access as well this way, and there is even an out-of-tree patch written some > >years ago that does this, and helps the game run. > > > >However, there are two problems that I have observed or anticipated: > > > >(1) On systems with UMIP, the kernel emulates sgdt instructions and returns a > >consistent address which we can guarantee is invalid. However, it also returns > >a size of zero. The program doesn't expect this (cf. the way the loop is > >written above) and I believe will effectively loop forever in that case, or > >until it finds the VGA selector or hits invalid memory. > > > > I see two obvious ways to fix this: either adjust the size of the fake > >kernel GDT, or provide a switch to stop emulating and let Wine handle it. The > >latter may very well a more sustainable option in the long term (although I'll > >admit I can't immediately come up with a reason why, other than "we might need > >to raise the size yet again".) > > > > Does anyone have opinions on this particular topic? I can look into > >writing a patch but I'm not sure what the best approach is. > > > >(2) On 64-bit systems without UMIP, sgdt returns a truncated address when in > >32-bit mode. This truncated address in practice might point anywhere in the > >address space, including to valid memory. > > > > In order to fix this, we would need the kernel to guarantee that the GDT > >base points to an address whose bottom 32 bits we can guarantee are > >inaccessible. This is relatively easy to achieve ourselves by simply mapping > >those pages as noaccess, but it also means that those pages can't overlap > >something we need; we already go to pains to make sure that certain parts of > >the address space are free. Broadly anything above the 2G boundary *should* be > >okay though. Is this feasible? > > > > We could also just decide we don't care about systems without UMIP, but > >that seems a bit unfortunate; it's not that old of a feature. But I also have > >no idea how hard it would be to make this kind of a guarantee on the kernel > >side. > > > > This is also, theoretically, a problem for the IDT, except that on the > >machines I've tested, the IDT is always at 0xfffffe0000000000. That's not > >great either (it's certainly caused some weirdness and confusion when > >debugging, when we unexpectedly catch an unrelated null pointer access) but it > >seems to work in practice. > > > >--Zeb > > > >[1] https://source.winehq.org/git/wine.git/blob/HEAD:/dlls/krnl386.exe16/ > >instr.c#l702 > > > > > > A prctl() to set the UMIP-emulated return values or disable it (giving > SIGILL) would be easy enough. > > For the non-UMIP case, and probably for a lot of other corner cases like > relying on certain magic selector values and what not, the best option really > would be to wrap the code in a lightweight KVM container. I do *not* mean > running the Qemu user space part of KVM; instead have Wine interface with > /dev/kvm directly. +1. Pivoting to KVM would require quite a bit of work up front, but I suspect the payoff would be worthwhile in the end. See also https://github.com/dosemu2/dosemu2/tree/devel/src/base/emu-i386.
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