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Message-ID: <864b9717-46d2-4c1d-a84c-0784caf952f3@amd.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 15:22:51 -0600
From: "Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: pbonzini@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
thomas.lendacky@....com, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
joro@...tes.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/sev: Add support for allowing zero SEV ASIDs.
On 1/3/2024 3:10 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 03, 2024, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>> Hello Sean,
>>
>> On 1/2/2024 6:30 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jan 02, 2024, Ashish Kalra wrote:
>>>> @@ -2172,8 +2176,10 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
>>>> void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
>>>> {
>>>> - if (!sev_enabled)
>>>> + if (!sev_guests_enabled) {
>>> Ugh, what a mess. The module param will show sev_enabled=false, but the caps
>>> and CPUID will show SEV=true.
>>>
>>> And this is doubly silly because "sev_enabled" is never actually checked, e.g.
>>> if misc cgroup support is disabled, KVM_SEV_INIT will try to reclaim ASIDs and
>>> eventually fail with -EBUSY, which is super confusing to users.
>> But this is what we expect that KVM_SEV_INIT will fail. In this case,
>> sev_asid_new() will not actually try to reclaim any ASIDs as sev_misc_cg_try_charge()
>> will fail before any ASID bitmap walking/reclamation and return an error which
>> will eventually return -EBUSY to the user.
> Please read what I wrote. "if misc cgroup support is disabled", i.e. if
> CONFIG_CGROUP_MISC=n, then sev_misc_cg_try_charge() is a nop.
>
>>> The other weirdness is that KVM can cause sev_enabled=false && sev_es_enabled=true,
>>> but if *userspace* sets sev_enabled=false then sev_es_enabled is also forced off.
>> But that is already the behavior without this patch applied.
>>> In other words, the least awful option seems to be to keep sev_enabled true :-(
>>>
>>>> kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
>>>> + return;
>>> This is blatantly wrong, as it can result in KVM advertising SEV-ES if SEV is
>>> disabled by the user.
>> No, this ensures that we don't advertise any SEV capability if neither
>> SEV/SEV-ES or in future SNP is enabled.
> No, it does not. There is an early return statement here that prevents KVM from
> invoking kvm_cpu_cap_clear() for X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES. Do I think userspace will
> actually be tripped up by seeing SEV_ES without SEV? No. Is it unnecessarily
> confusing? Yes.
>
>>>> + }
>>>> if (!sev_es_enabled)
>>>> kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
>>>> }
>>>> @@ -2229,9 +2235,11 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>>>> goto out;
>>>> }
>>>> - sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
>>>> - WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count));
>>>> - sev_supported = true;
>>>> + if (min_sev_asid <= max_sev_asid) {
>>>> + sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count));
>>>> + sev_supported = true;
>>>> + }
>>>> /* SEV-ES support requested? */
>>>> if (!sev_es_enabled)
>>>> @@ -2262,7 +2270,8 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>>>> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
>>>> pr_info("SEV %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
>>>> sev_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
>>>> - min_sev_asid, max_sev_asid);
>>>> + sev_supported ? min_sev_asid : 0,
>>>> + sev_supported ? max_sev_asid : 0);
>>> I honestly think we should print the "garbage" values. The whole point of
>>> printing the min/max SEV ASIDs was to help users understand why SEV is disabled,
>>> i.e. printing zeroes is counterproductive.
>>>
>>>> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
>>>> pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
>>>> sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
>>> It's all a bit gross, but I think we want something like this (I'm definitely
>>> open to suggestions though):
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>> index d0c580607f00..bfac6d17462a 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>> @@ -143,8 +143,20 @@ static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
>>> static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
>>> {
>>> - int asid, min_asid, max_asid, ret;
>>> + /*
>>> + * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
>>> + * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1. Note, the
>>> + * min ASID can end up larger than the max if basic SEV support is
>>> + * effectively disabled by disallowing use of ASIDs for SEV guests.
>>> + */
>>> + unsigned int min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid;
>>> + unsigned int max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
>>> + unsigned int asid;
>>> bool retry = true;
>>> + int ret;
>>> +
>>> + if (min_asid > max_asid)
>>> + return -ENOTTY;
>> This will still return -EBUSY to user.
> Huh? The above is obviously -ENOTTY, and I don't see anything in the call stack
> that will convert it to -EBUSY.
Actually, sev_asid_new() returning failure to sev_guest_init() will
cause it to return -EBUSY to user.
Thanks, Ashish
>> This check here or the failure return from sev_misc_cg_try_charge() are quite
>> similar in that sense.
>>
>> My point is that the same is achieved quite cleanly with
>> sev_misc_cg_try_charge() too.
> "Without additional effort" is not synonymous with "cleanly". Relying on an
> accounting restriction that is completely orthogonal to basic functionality is
> not "clean".
>
>>> WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg);
>>> sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
>>> @@ -157,12 +169,6 @@ static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
>>> mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
>>> - /*
>>> - * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
>>> - * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
>>> - */
>>> - min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid;
>>> - max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
>>> again:
>>> asid = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_asid + 1, min_asid);
>>> if (asid > max_asid) {
>>> @@ -2232,8 +2238,10 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>>> goto out;
>>> }
>>> - sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
>>> - WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count));
>>> + if (min_sev_asid <= max_sev_asid) {
>>> + sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count));
>>> + }
>>> sev_supported = true;
>>> /* SEV-ES support requested? */
>>> @@ -2264,8 +2272,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>>> out:
>>> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
>>> pr_info("SEV %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
>>> - sev_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
>>> - min_sev_asid, max_sev_asid);
>>> + sev_supported ? (min_sev_asid <= max_sev_asid ? "enabled" : "unusable") : "disabled",
>>> + sev_supported ? min_sev_asid : 0,
>>> + sev_supported ? max_sev_asid : 0);
>> We are not showing min and max ASIDs for SEV as {0,0} with this patch as
>> sev_supported is true ?
> Yes, and that is deliberate. See this from above:
>
> : I honestly think we should print the "garbage" values. The whole point of
> : printing the min/max SEV ASIDs was to help users understand why SEV is disabled,
> : i.e. printing zeroes is counterproductive.
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