linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization

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Message-ID: <ZZgsipXoXTKyvCZT@google.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 08:21:30 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@...el.com>
Cc: Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>, 
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>, 
	"john.allen@....com" <john.allen@....com>, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>, 
	"kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, "mlevitsk@...hat.com" <mlevitsk@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization

On Fri, Jan 05, 2024, Weijiang Yang wrote:
> On 1/5/2024 8:54 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2024, Rick P Edgecombe wrote:
> > > > For CALL/RET (and presumably any branch instructions with IBT?) other
> > > > instructions that are directly affected by CET, the simplest thing would
> > > > probably be to disable those in KVM's emulator if shadow stacks and/or IBT
> > > > are enabled, and let KVM's failure paths take it from there.
> > > Right, that is what I was wondering might be the normal solution for
> > > situations like this.
> > If KVM can't emulate something, it either retries the instruction (with some
> > decent logic to guard against infinite retries) or punts to userspace.
> 
> What kind of error is proper if KVM has to punt to userspace?

KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION.  See prepare_emulation_failure_exit().

> Or just inject #UD into guest on detecting this case?

No, do not inject #UD or do anything else that deviates from architecturally
defined behavior.