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Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 12:53:42 +0200
From: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
 Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
 x86@...nel.org
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@...nel.org>,
 Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
 Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
 Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
 Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
 Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@...el.com>,
 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, "Kalra, Ashish"
 <ashish.kalra@....com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
 "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
 kexec@...ts.infradead.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 10/16] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on
 kexec



On 23.12.23 г. 1:52 ч., Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> TDX guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by
> allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them
> to shared with set_memory_decrypted().
> 
> The second kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only
> sees E820_TYPE_RAM.
> 
> Accessing shared memory via private mapping is fatal. It leads to
> unrecoverable TD exit.
> 
> On kexec walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to
> private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it
> normally.
> 
> The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and
> unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of
> conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This
> allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The
> second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and
> interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may
> access shared memory.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c         | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h |   2 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/crash.c         |   6 ++
>   arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c        |  13 ++++
>   4 files changed, 138 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> index 8a49484a2917..5c64db168edd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
> @@ -6,8 +6,10 @@
>   
>   #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
>   #include <linux/debugfs.h>
> +#include <linux/delay.h>
>   #include <linux/export.h>
>   #include <linux/io.h>
> +#include <linux/kexec.h>
>   #include <asm/coco.h>
>   #include <asm/tdx.h>
>   #include <asm/vmx.h>
> @@ -15,6 +17,7 @@
>   #include <asm/insn.h>
>   #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
>   #include <asm/pgtable.h>
> +#include <asm/set_memory.h>
>   
>   /* MMIO direction */
>   #define EPT_READ	0
> @@ -41,6 +44,9 @@
>   
>   static atomic_long_t nr_shared;
>   
> +static atomic_t conversions_in_progress;
> +static bool conversion_allowed = true;

Given the usage model of this variable, shouldn't it be simply accessed 
via READ/WRITE_ONCE macros?

> +
>   static inline bool pte_decrypted(pte_t pte)
>   {
>   	return cc_mkdec(pte_val(pte)) == pte_val(pte);
> @@ -726,6 +732,14 @@ static bool tdx_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
>   
>   static bool tdx_cache_flush_required(void)
>   {
> +	/*
> +	 * Avoid issuing CLFLUSH on set_memory_decrypted() if conversions
> +	 * stopped. Otherwise it can race with unshare_all_memory() and trigger
> +	 * implicit conversion to shared.
> +	 */
> +	if (!conversion_allowed)
> +		return false;
> +
>   	/*
>   	 * AMD SME/SEV can avoid cache flushing if HW enforces cache coherence.
>   	 * TDX doesn't have such capability.
> @@ -809,12 +823,25 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
>   static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
>   					 bool enc)
>   {
> +	atomic_inc(&conversions_in_progress);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Check after bumping conversions_in_progress to serialize
> +	 * against tdx_shutdown().
> +	 */
> +	if (!conversion_allowed) {
> +		atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
> +		return -EBUSY;
> +	}

nit: Can you make the inc of conversions_in_progress be done here, this 
eliminated the atomic_dec in case they aren't. Somewhat simplifies the 
logic.
> +
>   	/*
>   	 * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
>   	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
>   	 */
> -	if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
> +	if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) {
> +		atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
>   		return -EIO;
> +	}
>   
>   	return 0;
>   }
> @@ -826,17 +853,102 @@ static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
>   	 * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
>   	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
>   	 */
> -	if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
> +	if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) {
> +		atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
>   		return -EIO;
> +	}
>   
>   	if (enc)
>   		atomic_long_sub(numpages, &nr_shared);
>   	else
>   		atomic_long_add(numpages, &nr_shared);
>   
> +	atomic_dec(&conversions_in_progress);
> +
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> +static void tdx_kexec_stop_conversion(bool crash)
> +{
> +	/* Stop new private<->shared conversions */
> +	conversion_allowed = false;

What's the logic behind this compiler barrier?

> +	barrier();
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Crash kernel reaches here with interrupts disabled: can't wait for
> +	 * conversions to finish.
> +	 *
> +	 * If race happened, just report and proceed.
> +	 */
> +	if (!crash) {
> +		unsigned long timeout;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Wait for in-flight conversions to complete.
> +		 *
> +		 * Do not wait more than 30 seconds.
> +		 */
> +		timeout = 30 * USEC_PER_SEC;
> +		while (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress) && timeout--)
> +			udelay(1);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (atomic_read(&conversions_in_progress))
> +		pr_warn("Failed to finish shared<->private conversions\n");
> +}
> +

<snip>

> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> index c9503fe2d13a..3196ff20a29e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
> @@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct x86_guest {
>   	int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
>   	bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
>   	bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
> +	void (*enc_kexec_stop_conversion)(bool crash);
> +	void (*enc_kexec_unshare_mem)(void);

These are only being initialized in the TDX case, but called in all 
cases when CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT is true, which includes AMD. So it 
would cause a crash, no ? Shouldn't you also introduce noop handlers 
initialized in the default x86_platform struct in 
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c ?

>   };
>   
>   /**
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> index c92d88680dbf..b99bd28ad22f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
>   #include <asm/intel_pt.h>
>   #include <asm/crash.h>
>   #include <asm/cmdline.h>
> +#include <asm/tdx.h>
>   
>   /* Used while preparing memory map entries for second kernel */
>   struct crash_memmap_data {
> @@ -107,6 +108,11 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
>   
>   	crash_smp_send_stop();
>   
> +	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> +		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(true);
> +		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
> +	}
> +
>   	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
>   
>   	/*
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> index 830425e6d38e..16dde83df49a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>   #include <linux/delay.h>
>   #include <linux/objtool.h>
>   #include <linux/pgtable.h>
> +#include <linux/kexec.h>
>   #include <acpi/reboot.h>
>   #include <asm/io.h>
>   #include <asm/apic.h>
> @@ -31,6 +32,7 @@
>   #include <asm/realmode.h>
>   #include <asm/x86_init.h>
>   #include <asm/efi.h>
> +#include <asm/tdx.h>
>   
>   /*
>    * Power off function, if any
> @@ -716,6 +718,14 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_restart(void)
>   
>   void native_machine_shutdown(void)
>   {
> +	/*
> +	 * Call enc_kexec_stop_conversion() while all CPUs are still active and
> +	 * interrupts are enabled. This will allow all in-flight memory
> +	 * conversions to finish cleanly.
> +	 */
> +	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kexec_in_progress)
> +		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion(false);
> +
>   	/* Stop the cpus and apics */
>   #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
>   	/*
> @@ -752,6 +762,9 @@ void native_machine_shutdown(void)
>   #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>   	x86_platform.iommu_shutdown();
>   #endif
> +
> +	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) && kexec_in_progress)
> +		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
>   }
>   
>   static void __machine_emergency_restart(int emergency)

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