Message-ID: <4611bcf2-44d0-4c34-9b84-17406f881003@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 12:40:08 +0100
From: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...nel.org>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@...utronix.de>,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, boqun.feng@...il.com, bristot@...hat.com,
 bsegall@...gle.com, dietmar.eggemann@....com, jstultz@...gle.com,
 juri.lelli@...hat.com, longman@...hat.com, mgorman@...e.de,
 mingo@...hat.com, rostedt@...dmis.org, swood@...hat.com,
 vincent.guittot@...aro.org, vschneid@...hat.com, will@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 7/7] locking/rtmutex: Acquire the hb lock via trylock
 after wait-proxylock.

On 15. 09. 23, 17:19, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 15, 2023 at 02:58:35PM +0200, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> 
>> I spent quite some time to convince myself that this is correct. I was
>> not able to poke a hole into it. So that really should be safe to
>> do. Famous last words ...
> 
> IKR :-/
> 
> Something like so then...
> 
> ---
> Subject: futex/pi: Fix recursive rt_mutex waiter state

So this breaks some random test in APR:

 From 
https://build.opensuse.org/package/live_build_log/openSUSE:Factory:Staging:G/apr/standard/x86_64:
testprocmutex       :  Line 122: child did not terminate with success

The child in fact terminates on 
https://github.com/apache/apr/blob/trunk/test/testprocmutex.c#L93:
                 while ((rv = apr_proc_mutex_timedlock(proc_lock, 1))) {
                     if (!APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(rv))
                         exit(1); <----- here

The test creates 6 children and does some 
pthread_mutex_timedlock/unlock() repeatedly (200 times) in parallel 
while sleeping 1 us inside the lock. The timeout is 1 us above. And the 
test expects all them to fail (to time out). But the time out does not 
always happen in 6.7 (it's racy, so the failure is semi-random: like 1 
of 1000 attempts is bad).

If I revert this patch (commit fbeb558b0dd0d), the test works.

I know, the test could be broken too, but I have no idea, really. The 
testsuite is sort of hairy and I could not come up with a simple repro.

Note APR sets up PTHREAD_PROCESS_SHARED, _ROBUST, and _PRIO_INHERIT 
attrs for the mutex.

Anyway:
downstream report: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1218801
APR report: https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=68481

Any idea if this patch should cause the above (or even is a desired 
behavior)?

Thanks.

> From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
> Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 13:17:11 +0200
> 
> Some new assertions pointed out that the existing code has nested rt_mutex wait
> state in the futex code.
> 
> Specifically, the futex_lock_pi() cancel case uses spin_lock() while there
> still is a rt_waiter enqueued for this task, resulting in a state where there
> are two waiters for the same task (and task_struct::pi_blocked_on gets
> scrambled).
> 
> The reason to take hb->lock at this point is to avoid the wake_futex_pi()
> EAGAIN case.
> 
> This happens when futex_top_waiter() and rt_mutex_top_waiter() state becomes
> inconsistent. The current rules are such that this inconsistency will not be
> observed.
> 
> Notably the case that needs to be avoided is where futex_lock_pi() and
> futex_unlock_pi() interleave such that unlock will fail to observe a new
> waiter.
> 
> *However* the case at hand is where a waiter is leaving, in this case the race
> means a waiter that is going away is not observed -- which is harmless,
> provided this race is explicitly handled.
> 
> This is a somewhat dangerous proposition because the converse race is not
> observing a new waiter, which must absolutely not happen. But since the race is
> valid this cannot be asserted.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@...radead.org>
> ---
>   pi.c      |   76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
>   requeue.c |    6 +++-
>   2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
> 
> Index: linux-2.6/kernel/futex/pi.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-2.6.orig/kernel/futex/pi.c
> +++ linux-2.6/kernel/futex/pi.c
> @@ -610,29 +610,16 @@ int futex_lock_pi_atomic(u32 __user *uad
>   /*
>    * Caller must hold a reference on @pi_state.
>    */
> -static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_pi_state *pi_state)
> +static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
> +			 struct futex_pi_state *pi_state,
> +			 struct rt_mutex_waiter *top_waiter)
>   {
> -	struct rt_mutex_waiter *top_waiter;
>   	struct task_struct *new_owner;
>   	bool postunlock = false;
>   	DEFINE_RT_WAKE_Q(wqh);
>   	u32 curval, newval;
>   	int ret = 0;
>   
> -	top_waiter = rt_mutex_top_waiter(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
> -	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!top_waiter)) {
> -		/*
> -		 * As per the comment in futex_unlock_pi() this should not happen.
> -		 *
> -		 * When this happens, give up our locks and try again, giving
> -		 * the futex_lock_pi() instance time to complete, either by
> -		 * waiting on the rtmutex or removing itself from the futex
> -		 * queue.
> -		 */
> -		ret = -EAGAIN;
> -		goto out_unlock;
> -	}
> -
>   	new_owner = top_waiter->task;
>   
>   	/*
> @@ -1039,19 +1026,33 @@ retry_private:
>   	ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
>   
>   cleanup:
> -	spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
>   	/*
>   	 * If we failed to acquire the lock (deadlock/signal/timeout), we must
> -	 * first acquire the hb->lock before removing the lock from the
> -	 * rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex wait
> -	 * lists consistent.
> +	 * must unwind the above, however we canont lock hb->lock because
> +	 * rt_mutex already has a waiter enqueued and hb->lock can itself try
> +	 * and enqueue an rt_waiter through rtlock.
> +	 *
> +	 * Doing the cleanup without holding hb->lock can cause inconsistent
> +	 * state between hb and pi_state, but only in the direction of not
> +	 * seeing a waiter that is leaving.
> +	 *
> +	 * See futex_unlock_pi(), it deals with this inconsistency.
> +	 *
> +	 * There be dragons here, since we must deal with the inconsistency on
> +	 * the way out (here), it is impossible to detect/warn about the race
> +	 * the other way around (missing an incoming waiter).
>   	 *
> -	 * In particular; it is important that futex_unlock_pi() can not
> -	 * observe this inconsistency.
> +	 * What could possibly go wrong...
>   	 */
>   	if (ret && !rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter))
>   		ret = 0;
>   
> +	/*
> +	 * Now that the rt_waiter has been dequeued, it is safe to use
> +	 * spinlock/rtlock (which might enqueue its own rt_waiter) and fix up
> +	 * the
> +	 */
> +	spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
>   no_block:
>   	/*
>   	 * Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
> @@ -1132,6 +1133,7 @@ retry:
>   	top_waiter = futex_top_waiter(hb, &key);
>   	if (top_waiter) {
>   		struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = top_waiter->pi_state;
> +		struct rt_mutex_waiter *rt_waiter;
>   
>   		ret = -EINVAL;
>   		if (!pi_state)
> @@ -1144,22 +1146,39 @@ retry:
>   		if (pi_state->owner != current)
>   			goto out_unlock;
>   
> -		get_pi_state(pi_state);
>   		/*
>   		 * By taking wait_lock while still holding hb->lock, we ensure
> -		 * there is no point where we hold neither; and therefore
> -		 * wake_futex_p() must observe a state consistent with what we
> -		 * observed.
> +		 * there is no point where we hold neither; and thereby
> +		 * wake_futex_pi() must observe any new waiters.
> +		 *
> +		 * Since the cleanup: case in futex_lock_pi() removes the
> +		 * rt_waiter without holding hb->lock, it is possible for
> +		 * wake_futex_pi() to not find a waiter while the above does,
> +		 * in this case the waiter is on the way out and it can be
> +		 * ignored.
>   		 *
>   		 * In particular; this forces __rt_mutex_start_proxy() to
>   		 * complete such that we're guaranteed to observe the
> -		 * rt_waiter. Also see the WARN in wake_futex_pi().
> +		 * rt_waiter.
>   		 */
>   		raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * Futex vs rt_mutex waiter state -- if there are no rt_mutex
> +		 * waiters even though futex thinks there are, then the waiter
> +		 * is leaving and the uncontended path is safe to take.
> +		 */
> +		rt_waiter = rt_mutex_top_waiter(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
> +		if (!rt_waiter) {
> +			raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
> +			goto do_uncontended;
> +		}
> +
> +		get_pi_state(pi_state);
>   		spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
>   
>   		/* drops pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock */
> -		ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, pi_state);
> +		ret = wake_futex_pi(uaddr, uval, pi_state, rt_waiter);
>   
>   		put_pi_state(pi_state);
>   
> @@ -1187,6 +1206,7 @@ retry:
>   		return ret;
>   	}
>   
> +do_uncontended:
>   	/*
>   	 * We have no kernel internal state, i.e. no waiters in the
>   	 * kernel. Waiters which are about to queue themselves are stuck
> Index: linux-2.6/kernel/futex/requeue.c
> ===================================================================
> --- linux-2.6.orig/kernel/futex/requeue.c
> +++ linux-2.6/kernel/futex/requeue.c
> @@ -850,11 +850,13 @@ int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *ua
>   		pi_mutex = &q.pi_state->pi_mutex;
>   		ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
>   
> -		/* Current is not longer pi_blocked_on */
> -		spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
> +		/*
> +		 * See futex_unlock_pi()'s cleanup: comment.
> +		 */
>   		if (ret && !rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(pi_mutex, &rt_waiter))
>   			ret = 0;
>   
> +		spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
>   		debug_rt_mutex_free_waiter(&rt_waiter);
>   		/*
>   		 * Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
> 

-- 
js
suse labs

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