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Message-Id: <20240116144340.17902-1-dmastykin@astralinux.ru>
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 17:43:41 +0300
From: Dmitry Mastykin <dmastykin@...ralinux.ru>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
	Dmitry Mastykin <dmastykin@...ralinux.ru>
Subject: preventing executable stack with file_mprotect hook

Hello all,

I use the file_mprotect hook to prevent executable stack. It's called from mprotect syscall and prevents linkage with execstack-flagged libraries.
But I don't see it called when I execute a simple execstack-flagged binary:

int main() {
	char shell[100] = "\xb0\x01" // mov al, 1
			  "\x31\xdb" // xor ebx, ebx
			  "\xcd\x80" ; // int 0x80
	((void(*)())shell)();
	return 0;
}

I'm thinking about a patch like one in the end of this message.
I would be glad to have a feedback, if someone find this reasonable.
Thank you!

Kind regards
Dmitry Mastykin

diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index cebfe15bbad8..0288f14f11b2 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
@@ -759,6 +760,7 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma = bprm->vma;
 	struct vm_area_struct *prev = NULL;
 	unsigned long vm_flags;
+	unsigned long prot = 0;
 	unsigned long stack_base;
 	unsigned long stack_size;
 	unsigned long stack_expand;
@@ -811,16 +813,19 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	 * EXSTACK_ENABLE_X, disable for EXSTACK_DISABLE_X and leave alone
 	 * (arch default) otherwise.
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(executable_stack == EXSTACK_ENABLE_X))
+	if (unlikely(executable_stack == EXSTACK_ENABLE_X)) {
+		prot |= PROT_EXEC;
 		vm_flags |= VM_EXEC;
-	else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
+	} else if (executable_stack == EXSTACK_DISABLE_X)
 		vm_flags &= ~VM_EXEC;
 	vm_flags |= mm->def_flags;
 	vm_flags |= VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP;
 
 	tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm);
-	ret = mprotect_fixup(&tlb, vma, &prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
-			vm_flags);
+	ret = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot, prot);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = mprotect_fixup(&tlb, vma, &prev,
+				     vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vm_flags);
 	tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb);
 
 	if (ret)

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