Message-ID: <CAJuCfpG584eMNyi659AhVuOdZR3ooNh4ZVpXf6o_w8b=nbvjdg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 16:29:30 -0800
From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>
To: Yang Shi <shy828301@...il.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>, 
	Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...nel.org>, Rik van Riel <riel@...riel.com>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, linux-mm@...ck.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...com, 
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm: align larger anonymous mappings on THP boundaries

On Wed, Jan 17, 2024 at 4:13 PM Yang Shi <shy828301@...il.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jan 17, 2024 at 4:02 PM Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...glecom> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Jan 17, 2024 at 3:32 PM Yang Shi <shy828301@...il.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jan 17, 2024 at 9:40 AM Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 02:30:36PM -0800, Suren Baghdasaryan wrote:
> > > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 2:25 PM Yang Shi <shy828301@...ilcom> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 1:58 PM Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com> wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 12:56 PM Yang Shi <shy828301@...il.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 11:16 AM Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com> wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 4:09 AM Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@...nel.org> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > On 16. 01. 24, 12:53, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > Hi,
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > On 09. 08. 22, 20:24, Rik van Riel wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > >> Align larger anonymous memory mappings on THP boundaries by
> > > > > > > > > > >> going through thp_get_unmapped_area if THPs are enabled for
> > > > > > > > > > >> the current process.
> > > > > > > > > > >>
> > > > > > > > > > >> With this patch, larger anonymous mappings are now THP aligned.
> > > > > > > > > > >> When a malloc library allocates a 2MB or larger arena, that
> > > > > > > > > > >> arena can now be mapped with THPs right from the start, which
> > > > > > > > > > >> can result in better TLB hit rates and execution time.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > This appears to break 32bit processes on x86_64 (at least). In
> > > > > > > > > > > particular, 32bit kernel or firefox builds in our build system.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Reverting this on top of 6.7 makes it work again.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Downstream report:
> > > > > > > > > > >   https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1218841
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > So running:
> > > > > > > > > > > pahole -J --btf_gen_floats -j --lang_exclude=rust
> > > > > > > > > > > --skip_encoding_btf_inconsistent_proto --btf_gen_optimized .tmp_vmlinux.btf
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > crashes or errors out with some random errors:
> > > > > > > > > > > [182671] STRUCT idr's field 'idr_next' offset=128 bit_size=0 type=181346
> > > > > > > > > > > Error emitting field
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > strace shows mmap() fails with ENOMEM right before the errors:
> > > > > > > > > > > 1223  mmap2(NULL, 5783552, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
> > > > > > > > > > > MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0 <unfinished ...>
> > > > > > > > > > > ...
> > > > > > > > > > > 1223  <... mmap2 resumed>)              = -1 ENOMEM (Cannot allocate
> > > > > > > > > > > memory)
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Note the .tmp_vmlinux.btf above can be arbitrary, but likely large
> > > > > > > > > > > enough. For reference, one is available at:
> > > > > > > > > > > https://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/n/btf
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Any ideas?
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > This works around the problem, of course (but is a band-aid, not a fix):
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > --- a/mm/mmap.c
> > > > > > > > > > +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> > > > > > > > > > @@ -1829,7 +1829,7 @@ get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long
> > > > > > > > > > addr, unsigned long len,
> > > > > > > > > >                   */
> > > > > > > > > >                  pgoff = 0;
> > > > > > > > > >                  get_area = shmem_get_unmapped_area;
> > > > > > > > > > -       } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE)) {
> > > > > > > > > > +       } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) &&
> > > > > > > > > > !in_32bit_syscall()) {
> > > > > > > > > >                  /* Ensures that larger anonymous mappings are THP
> > > > > > > > > > aligned. */
> > > > > > > > > >                  get_area = thp_get_unmapped_area;
> > > > > > > > > >          }
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > thp_get_unmapped_area() does not take care of the legacy stuff...
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > This change also affects the entropy of allocations. With this patch
> > > > > > > > > Android test [1] started failing and it requires only 8 bits of
> > > > > > > > > entropy. The feedback from our security team:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > 8 bits of entropy is already embarrassingly low, but was necessary for
> > > > > > > > > 32 bit ARM targets with low RAM at the time. It's definitely not
> > > > > > > > > acceptable for 64 bit targets.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Thanks for the report. Is it 32 bit only or 64 bit is also impacted?
> > > > > > > > If I understand the code correctly, it expects the address allocated
> > > > > > > > by malloc() is kind of randomized, right?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Yes, correct, the test expects a certain level of address randomization.
> > > > > > > The test failure was reported while running kernel_virt_x86_64 target
> > > > > > > (Android emulator on x86), so it does impact 64bit targets.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > IIUC this breaks the "expectation" for randomized addresses returned
> > > > > > by malloc(), but it doesn't break any real Android application, right?
> > > > > > So this is a security concern instead of a real regression.
> > > > >
> > > > > How is making a system move vulnerabile not a real regression?
> > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I think we can make this opt-in with a knob. Anyone who outweighs
> > > > > > security could opt this feature out. However I'm wondering whether
> > > > > > Android should implement a general address randomization mechanism
> > > > > > instead of depending on "luck" if you do care about it.
> > > > >
> > > > > This is not depending on luck. This is checking for possible
> > > > > vulnerabilities in the system.
> > > > > I admit I'm not a security expert, so I'm looping in Jeff and Kees to chime in.
> > > >
> > > > Hi!
> > > >
> > > > Just to chime in, but reduction in ASLR entropy is absolutely a
> > > > regression. This is userspace visible (via /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space,
> > > > /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd*_bits) with expectations that it work as
> > > > advertised. So, while 32-bit might be already ASLR-weak, we don't want
> > > > to make things super bad nor break ASLR in compat mode under 64-bit
> > > > systems.
> > > >
> > > > Having an opt-in sounds reasonable, but we need to wire it to the ASLR
> > > > sysctls in some way so nothing lying about the ASLR entropy.
> > >
> > > Thanks for the explanation. IIUC the randomiza_va_space and
> > > mmap_rnd_bits randomize the mmap_base and start_brk for each exec()
> > > call. So the heap allocation is randomized. But it seems the formula
> > > doesn't take into account huge page. ARM64 adjusts the mmap_rnd_bits
> > > based on page size.
> > >
> > > I did a simple test, which conceptually does:
> > > 1. call mmap to allocate 8M heap
> > > 2. print out the allocated address
> > > 3. run the program 1000 times (launch/exit/re-launch)
> > > 4. check how many unique addresses
> > >
> > > With the default config on my arm64 VM (mmap_rnd_bits is 18), I saw
> > > 134 unique addresses. Without the patch, I saw 945 unique addresses.
> > > So I think the test could replicate what your test does.
> > >
> > > When I increased the mmap_rnd_bits to 24, I saw 988 unique addresses
> > > with the patch. x86_64 should have 28 bits by default, it should
> > > randomize the address quite well. I don't know why you still saw this,
> > > or you have a different setting for mmap_rnd_bits?
> >
> > I checked the configuration on our test harness where the test failed:
>
> Thanks, Suren.
>
> >
> > /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits = 32
>
> It is surprising 32 bits still fail. 24 bits on arm64 works for me. Or
> the compat bits is used?

Hmm. Let me verify to exclude that possibility.

>
> > /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits = 16
> >
> > The failure logs are:
> >
> > 10-20 14:37:52.123  7029  7029 V AslrMallocTest: 7 bits of entropy for
> > allocation size 8388608 (minimum 8)
> > 10-20 14:37:52.123  7029  7029 E AslrMallocTest: insufficient entropy
> > for malloc(8388608)
> >
> > which come from here:
> > https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:cts/tests/aslr/src/AslrMallocTest.cpp;l=127
> > So, the allocation size for which this test failed was 2^23.
>
> The patch just tries to align >= 2M allocations. It looks like your
> test allocates 256 bytes, 64K and 8M. So just 8M is impacted.

Correct.

>
>
> >
> >
> > > I'm wondering whether we should take into account huge page alignment
> > > for mmap_rnd_bits. And I think this is a huge page common problem, we
> > > have file mapping huge page aligned as well.
> > >
> > > 32 bit is easy, I think I can just make thp_get_unmapped_area() a
> > > no-op on 32 bit system.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > -Kees
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Kees Cook

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