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Message-ID: <919b6370a908bb091779ec2eca7ca5e369d57847.1705631230.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 18:35:47 -0800
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com,
antonio.gomez.iglesias@...ux.intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
sohil.mehta@...el.com, alexander.shishkin@...el.com
Subject: [PATCH] x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases
Intel feature Linear Address Masking (LAM) has a weakness related to
transient execution as described in the SLAM paper[1]. Unless Linear
Address Space Separation (LASS) is enabled this weakness may be
exploitable.
Until kernel adds support for LASS[2], only allow LAM for COMPILE_TEST,
or when speculation mitigations have been disabled at compile time,
otherwise keep LAM disabled.
[1] SLAM: https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf
[2] LASS: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # v6.4+
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 1566748f16c4..794517df8068 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2270,6 +2270,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING
config ADDRESS_MASKING
bool "Linear Address Masking support"
depends on X86_64
+ depends on COMPILE_TEST || !SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS # wait for LASS
help
Linear Address Masking (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied
to 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the
base-commit: 0dd3ee31125508cd67f7e7172247f05b7fd1753a
--
2.34.1
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