Message-ID: <MW4PR11MB5872F46A2089C8C2D8EF7A008C752@MW4PR11MB5872.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 02:23:02 +0000
From: "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@...el.com>
To: Qinkun Bao <qinkun@...gle.com>, Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>, "Lu,
 Ken" <ken.lu@...el.com>
CC: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
	"Williams, Dan J" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, "linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev"
	<linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org"
	<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] tsm: Allow for mapping RTMRs to TCG TPM PCRs

Comment below:

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Qinkun Bao <qinkun@...gle.com>
> Sent: Monday, January 22, 2024 10:13 AM
> To: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>; Yao, Jiewen <jiewen.yao@...el.com>;
> Lu, Ken <ken.lu@...el.com>
> Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
> <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>; Williams, Dan J
> <dan.j.williams@...el.com>; linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev; linux-
> kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] tsm: Allow for mapping RTMRs to TCG TPM PCRs
> 
> 
> 
> > On Jan 21, 2024, at 8:31 AM, Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 07:35:30PM -0800, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 1/16/24 5:24 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> >>> Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote:
> >>>> On 1/14/24 2:35 PM, Samuel Ortiz wrote:
> >>>>> Many user space and internal kernel subsystems (e.g. the Linux IMA)
> >>>>> expect a Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) that allows for extending
> >>>>> and reading measurement registers that are compatible with the TCG TPM
> >>>>> PCRs layout, e.g. a TPM. In order to allow those components to
> >>>>> alternatively use a platform TSM as their RTS, a TVM could map the
> >>>>> available RTMRs to one or more TCG TPM PCRs. Once configured, those
> PCR
> >>>>> to RTMR mappings give the kernel TSM layer all the necessary information
> >>>>> to be a RTS for e.g. the Linux IMA or any other components that expects
> >>>>> a TCG compliant TPM PCRs layout.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> TPM PCR mappings are configured through configfs:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> // Create and configure 2 RTMRs
> >>>>> mkdir /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0
> >>>>> mkdir /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1
> >>>>> echo 0 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0/index
> >>>>> echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1/index
> >>>>>
> >>>>> // Map RTMR 0 to PCRs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
> >>>>> echo 4-8 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0/tcg_map
> >>>>>
> >>>>> // Map RTMR 1 to PCRs 16, 17 and 18
> >>>>> echo 16-18 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1/tcg_map
> >>>> Any information on how this mapping will be used by TPM or IMA ?
> >>>>
> >>>> RTMR to PCR mapping is fixed by design, right? If yes, why allow
> >>>> user to configure it. We can let vendor drivers to configure it, right?
> >>> I assume the "vendor driver", that publishes the RTMR to the tsm-core,
> >>> has no idea whether they will be used for PCR emulation, or not. The TPM
> >>> proxy layer sitting on top of this would know the mapping of which RTMRs
> >>> are recording a transcript of which PCR extend events.
> >>
> >> My thinking is, since this mapping is ARCH-specific information
> >> and fixed by design, it makes more sense to hide this detail in the
> >> vendor driver than letting userspace configure it. If we allow users to
> >> configure it, there is a chance for incorrect mapping.
> >
> > I think I agree with the fact that letting users configure that mapping
> > may be error prone. But I'm not sure this is an architecture specific
> > mapping, but rather a platform specific one. I'd expect the guest firmware
> > to provide it through e.g. the MapPcrToMrIndex EFI CC protocol.
> >
> > So I agree I should remove the user interface for setting that mapping,
> > and pass it from the provider capabilities instead. It is then up to the
> > provider to choose how it'd build that information (hard coded, from
> > EFI, etc).
> 
> The UEFI specification has defined the mapping relationship between the
> TDX RTMR and TPM PCRs (See
> https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#intel-trust-
> domain-extension). The current RTMR implementation in the boot loader
> is “hooked” in the implementation for the TPM.
> 
> When the bootloader needs to extend the PCR value, it calls
> `map_pcr_to_mr_index`  to retrieve the corresponding RTMR index and
> then extends the RTMR. Considering this behavior, I don’t think we should
> allow users to configure the mappings between the PCR and RTMR. (See
> https://github.com/rhboot/shim/pull/485/files).
> 
> Add Jiewen (owner of the RTMR changes in the firmware) and Ken (
> owner of the RTMR changes in the boot loader) for the visibility.

I think the mapping should be static and determined by the hardware architecture.

Allowing user to configure the mapping just adds complexity and confusing. For example, the user must understand clearly on what is Intel-TDX/AMD-SEV/ARM-CCA/RISCV-CoVE, how many registers they have, what is the best way to map it.

It also adds complexity to the verifier. For example, the verifier must understand how a user configure the mapping, then get the expected measurement register value.

I believe that hiding detail is a better way to avoid those complexity, and make it easy to use.

Do we have some real use cases that a user MUST configure the mapping?

> 
> >
> >> Regarding the TPM proxy, I am still not clear how it is going to use
> >> this mapping. If we want to provide TPM like feature, it needs a
> >> special kernel TPM driver, right? Even if we enable TPM support
> >> with RTMR, I assume it can only support pcr_extend().
> >
> > Extend and read, yes.
> >
> >> Other TPM
> >> features should be disabled. If yes, since we already have this ABI
> >> for measurement extension, why again support it via TPM or did
> >> I misunderstand the use case.
> >
> > I am not sure the TPM compatibility is always needed, but for subsystems
> > (like e.g. IMA) that look for a TPM as their root of trust for storage,
> > providing the extend+read ABI and the PCR mapping should be sufficient.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Samuel.
> >
> >

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