Message-ID: <MW4PR11MB587206CAE997B3FD894A43A58C742@MW4PR11MB5872.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 01:22:07 +0000
From: "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@...el.com>
To: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@...el.com>, "Williams, Dan J"
	<dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Qinkun Bao <qinkun@...gle.com>, Samuel Ortiz
	<sameo@...osinc.com>, "Lu, Ken" <ken.lu@...el.com>
CC: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
	"linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "Yao, Jiewen"
	<jiewen.yao@...el.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] tsm: Allow for mapping RTMRs to TCG TPM PCRs



> -----Original Message-----
> From: Xing, Cedric <cedric.xing@...el.com>
> Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2024 5:59 AM
> To: Williams, Dan J <dan.j.williams@...el.com>; Yao, Jiewen
> <jiewen.yao@...el.com>; Qinkun Bao <qinkun@...gle.com>; Samuel Ortiz
> <sameo@...osinc.com>; Lu, Ken <ken.lu@...el.com>
> Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
> <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>; linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev;
> linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] tsm: Allow for mapping RTMRs to TCG TPM PCRs
> 
> 
> 
> On 1/22/2024 12:10 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> > Yao, Jiewen wrote:
> >> Comment below:
> >>
> >>> -----Original Message-----
> >>> From: Qinkun Bao <qinkun@...gle.com>
> >>> Sent: Monday, January 22, 2024 10:13 AM
> >>> To: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com>; Yao, Jiewen
> <jiewen.yao@...el.com>;
> >>> Lu, Ken <ken.lu@...el.com>
> >>> Cc: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
> >>> <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>; Williams, Dan J
> >>> <dan.j.williams@...el.com>; linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev; linux-
> >>> kernel@...r.kernel.org
> >>> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 3/4] tsm: Allow for mapping RTMRs to TCG TPM
> PCRs
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> On Jan 21, 2024, at 8:31 AM, Samuel Ortiz <sameo@...osinc.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> On Tue, Jan 16, 2024 at 07:35:30PM -0800, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> On 1/16/24 5:24 PM, Dan Williams wrote:
> >>>>>> Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan wrote:
> >>>>>>> On 1/14/24 2:35 PM, Samuel Ortiz wrote:
> >>>>>>>> Many user space and internal kernel subsystems (e.g. the Linux IMA)
> >>>>>>>> expect a Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) that allows for extending
> >>>>>>>> and reading measurement registers that are compatible with the TCG
> TPM
> >>>>>>>> PCRs layout, e.g. a TPM. In order to allow those components to
> >>>>>>>> alternatively use a platform TSM as their RTS, a TVM could map the
> >>>>>>>> available RTMRs to one or more TCG TPM PCRs. Once configured,
> those
> >>> PCR
> >>>>>>>> to RTMR mappings give the kernel TSM layer all the necessary
> information
> >>>>>>>> to be a RTS for e.g. the Linux IMA or any other components that
> expects
> >>>>>>>> a TCG compliant TPM PCRs layout.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> TPM PCR mappings are configured through configfs:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> // Create and configure 2 RTMRs
> >>>>>>>> mkdir /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0
> >>>>>>>> mkdir /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1
> >>>>>>>> echo 0 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0/index
> >>>>>>>> echo 1 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1/index
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> // Map RTMR 0 to PCRs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
> >>>>>>>> echo 4-8 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr0/tcg_map
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> // Map RTMR 1 to PCRs 16, 17 and 18
> >>>>>>>> echo 16-18 > /sys/kernel/config/tsm/rtmrs/rtmr1/tcg_map
> >>>>>>> Any information on how this mapping will be used by TPM or IMA ?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> RTMR to PCR mapping is fixed by design, right? If yes, why allow
> >>>>>>> user to configure it. We can let vendor drivers to configure it, right?
> >>>>>> I assume the "vendor driver", that publishes the RTMR to the tsm-core,
> >>>>>> has no idea whether they will be used for PCR emulation, or not. The TPM
> >>>>>> proxy layer sitting on top of this would know the mapping of which RTMRs
> >>>>>> are recording a transcript of which PCR extend events.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> My thinking is, since this mapping is ARCH-specific information
> >>>>> and fixed by design, it makes more sense to hide this detail in the
> >>>>> vendor driver than letting userspace configure it. If we allow users to
> >>>>> configure it, there is a chance for incorrect mapping.
> >>>>
> >>>> I think I agree with the fact that letting users configure that mapping
> >>>> may be error prone. But I'm not sure this is an architecture specific
> >>>> mapping, but rather a platform specific one. I'd expect the guest firmware
> >>>> to provide it through e.g. the MapPcrToMrIndex EFI CC protocol.
> >>>>
> >>>> So I agree I should remove the user interface for setting that mapping,
> >>>> and pass it from the provider capabilities instead. It is then up to the
> >>>> provider to choose how it'd build that information (hard coded, from
> >>>> EFI, etc).
> >>>
> >>> The UEFI specification has defined the mapping relationship between the
> >>> TDX RTMR and TPM PCRs (See
> >>> https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#intel-
> trust-
> >>> domain-extension). The current RTMR implementation in the boot loader
> >>> is “hooked” in the implementation for the TPM.
> >>>
> >>> When the bootloader needs to extend the PCR value, it calls
> >>> `map_pcr_to_mr_index`  to retrieve the corresponding RTMR index and
> >>> then extends the RTMR. Considering this behavior, I don’t think we should
> >>> allow users to configure the mappings between the PCR and RTMR. (See
> >>> https://github.com/rhboot/shim/pull/485/files).
> >>>
> >>> Add Jiewen (owner of the RTMR changes in the firmware) and Ken (
> >>> owner of the RTMR changes in the boot loader) for the visibility.
> >>
> >> I think the mapping should be static and determined by the hardware
> architecture.
> >>
> >> Allowing user to configure the mapping just adds complexity and
> >> confusing. For example, the user must understand clearly on what is
> >> Intel-TDX/AMD-SEV/ARM-CCA/RISCV-CoVE, how many registers they have,
> >> what is the best way to map it.
> >>
> >> It also adds complexity to the verifier. For example, the verifier
> >> must understand how a user configure the mapping, then get the
> >> expected measurement register value.
> >
> > I agree with this, what I have a problem with is that this:
> >
> > https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#intel-trust-
> domain-extension
> >
> > ...is vendor specific, especially when the kernel enabling is being
> > targeted as cross-vendor.
> >
> 
> I have the same concern.

May I know what the definition of "targeted as cross-vendor"?
And what exactly the concern or problem is?
Please enlighten me on that.

> 
> > So, yes, the mapping should be allowed to specified by the low-level
> > driver, but at the same time every vendor should not reinvent their own
> > enumeration method when we have EFI for that.
> >
> 
> Given PCR->RTMR mapping is static, I just wonder why it needs to be kept
> in kernel. Given that PCRs can never be 1:1 mapped to RTMRs, and that
> TDX quotes are never TPM quotes, applications used to extend PCRs would
> have to be changed/recompiled. Then wouldn't it suffice to define the
> mappings as macros in an architecture specific header file?

My comment is "Please don’t let user application (ring 3) indicate the mapping". It will cause big problem if different user applications use different mapping. I see no benefit but confusion.
I have no comment on how kernel module (ring 0) indicates the mapping. It can be static in kernel or by a driver. I don’t have strong opinion here.

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