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Message-ID: <20240125062739.1339782-15-debug@rivosinc.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 22:21:39 -0800
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Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack
From: Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>
`fork` implements copy on write (COW) by making pages readonly in child
and parent both.
ptep_set_wrprotect and pte_wrprotect clears _PAGE_WRITE in PTE.
Assumption is that page is readable and on fault copy on write happens.
To implement COW on such pages, clearing up W bit makes them XWR = 000.
This will result in wrong PTE setting which says no perms but V=1 and PFN
field pointing to final page. Instead desired behavior is to turn it into
a readable page, take an access (load/store) fault on sspush/sspop
(shadow stack) and then perform COW on such pages. This way regular reads
would still be allowed and not lead to COW maintaining current behavior
of COW on non-shadow stack but writeable memory.
On the other hand it doesn't interfere with existing COW for read-write
memory. Assumption is always that _PAGE_READ must have been set and thus
setting _PAGE_READ is harmless.
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>
---
arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 12 ++++++++++--
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 9477108e727d..9802e8d48616 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ static inline int pte_special(pte_t pte)
static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)
{
- return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~(_PAGE_WRITE));
+ return __pte((pte_val(pte) & ~(_PAGE_WRITE)) | (_PAGE_READ));
}
/* static inline pte_t pte_mkread(pte_t pte) */
@@ -594,7 +594,15 @@ static inline int ptep_test_and_clear_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep)
{
- atomic_long_and(~(unsigned long)_PAGE_WRITE, (atomic_long_t *)ptep);
+ volatile pte_t read_pte = *ptep;
+ /*
+ * ptep_set_wrprotect can be called for shadow stack ranges too.
+ * shadow stack memory is XWR = 010 and thus clearing _PAGE_WRITE will lead to
+ * encoding 000b which is wrong encoding with V = 1. This should lead to page fault
+ * but we dont want this wrong configuration to be set in page tables.
+ */
+ atomic_long_set((atomic_long_t *)ptep,
+ ((pte_val(read_pte) & ~(unsigned long)_PAGE_WRITE) | _PAGE_READ));
}
#define __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_CLEAR_YOUNG_FLUSH
--
2.43.0
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