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Message-ID: <CAAH4kHaX8T01wrA1XUUK5bJGKHHTw7GSY9ua0bVvo-6MkODUOw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 16:59:46 -0800
From: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/11] x86/sev: Perform PVALIDATE using the SVSM when not
at VMPL0
On Fri, Jan 26, 2024 at 2:18 PM Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com> wrote:
>
> The PVALIDATE instruction can only be performed at VMPL0. An SVSM will
> be present when running at VMPL1 or a lower privilege level.
>
> When an SVSM is present, use the SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE call to perform
> memory validation instead of issuing the PVALIDATE instruction directly.
>
> The validation of a single 4K page is now explicitly identified as such
> in the function name, pvalidate_4k_page(). The pvalidate_pages() function
> is used for validating 1 or more pages at either 4K or 2M in size. Each
> function, however, determines whether it can issue the PVALIDATE directly
> or whether the SVSM needs to be invoked.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
> ---
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 42 +++++++-
> arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 22 +++++
> arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 176 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 25 +++--
> 4 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> index 5d2403914ceb..3fbb614c31e0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
> @@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ static u8 vmpl __section(".data");
> static u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa __section(".data");
> static struct svsm_ca *boot_svsm_caa __section(".data");
>
> +static struct svsm_ca *__svsm_get_caa(void)
> +{
> + return boot_svsm_caa;
> +}
> +
> +static u64 __svsm_get_caa_pa(void)
> +{
> + return boot_svsm_caa_pa;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Copy a version of this function here - insn-eval.c can't be used in
> * pre-decompression code.
> @@ -135,6 +145,24 @@ static bool fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address)
> /* Include code for early handlers */
> #include "../../kernel/sev-shared.c"
>
> +static int svsm_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
> +{
> + struct ghcb *ghcb;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (boot_ghcb)
> + ghcb = boot_ghcb;
> + else
> + ghcb = NULL;
> +
> + do {
> + ret = ghcb ? __svsm_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
> + : __svsm_msr_protocol(call);
> + } while (ret == SVSM_ERR_BUSY);
Should this loop forever or eventually give up and panic?
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> bool sev_snp_enabled(void)
> {
> return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED;
> @@ -151,8 +179,8 @@ static void __page_state_change(unsigned long paddr, enum psc_op op)
> * If private -> shared then invalidate the page before requesting the
> * state change in the RMP table.
> */
> - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED && pvalidate(paddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 0))
> - sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
> + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
> + pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, paddr, 0);
>
> /* Issue VMGEXIT to change the page state in RMP table. */
> sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op));
> @@ -167,8 +195,8 @@ static void __page_state_change(unsigned long paddr, enum psc_op op)
> * Now that page state is changed in the RMP table, validate it so that it is
> * consistent with the RMP entry.
> */
> - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE && pvalidate(paddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
> - sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
> + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
> + pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, paddr, 1);
> }
>
> void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr)
> @@ -261,6 +289,12 @@ void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void)
> if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features())
> error("SEV-ES CPU Features missing.");
>
> + /*
> + * Ensure that the boot GHCB isn't used for the PVALIDATE when running
Why the definite article? Which PVALIDATE is this referring to?
> + * under an SVSM.
> + */
> + boot_ghcb = NULL;
> +
> /*
> * GHCB Page must be flushed from the cache and mapped encrypted again.
> * Otherwise the running kernel will see strange cache effects when
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> index 2f1e583769fc..dbd7fd041689 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
> @@ -172,6 +172,27 @@ struct svsm_ca {
> #define SVSM_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER 0x80000005
> #define SVSM_ERR_INVALID_REQUEST 0x80000006
> #define SVSM_ERR_BUSY 0x80000007
> +#define SVSM_PVALIDATE_FAIL_SIZEMISMATCH 0x80001006
> +
> +/*
> + * The SVSM PVALIDATE related structures
> + */
> +struct svsm_pvalidate_entry {
> + u64 page_size : 2,
> + action : 1,
> + ignore_cf : 1,
> + rsvd : 8,
> + pfn : 52;
> +};
> +
> +struct svsm_pvalidate_call {
> + u16 entries;
> + u16 next;
> +
> + u8 rsvd1[4];
> +
> + struct svsm_pvalidate_entry entry[];
> +};
>
> /*
> * SVSM protocol structure
> @@ -192,6 +213,7 @@ struct svsm_call {
>
> #define SVSM_CORE_CALL(x) ((0ULL << 32) | (x))
> #define SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA 0
> +#define SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE 1
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> extern void __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> index 7e9fa5d8889b..f26e872bc5d0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
> @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ static u32 cpuid_std_range_max __ro_after_init;
> static u32 cpuid_hyp_range_max __ro_after_init;
> static u32 cpuid_ext_range_max __ro_after_init;
>
> +static int svsm_protocol(struct svsm_call *call);
> +
> static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)
> {
> if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
> @@ -1181,7 +1183,65 @@ static void __init setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
> }
> }
>
> -static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
> +static int base_pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, bool validate)
> +{
> + return pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate);
> +}
> +
> +static int svsm_pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
> +{
> + struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pvalidate_call;
> + struct svsm_call call = {};
> + u64 pvalidate_call_pa;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + int ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
> + * order to avoid paravirt issues.
> + */
> + flags = native_save_fl();
> + if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
> + native_irq_disable();
> +
> + call.caa = __svsm_get_caa();
> +
> + pvalidate_call = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer;
> + pvalidate_call_pa = __svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
> +
> + pvalidate_call->entries = 1;
> + pvalidate_call->next = 0;
> + pvalidate_call->entry[0].page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
> + pvalidate_call->entry[0].action = validate;
> + pvalidate_call->entry[0].ignore_cf = 0;
> + pvalidate_call->entry[0].pfn = paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +
> + /* Protocol 0, Call ID 1 */
> + call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE);
> + call.rcx = pvalidate_call_pa;
> +
> + ret = svsm_protocol(&call);
> +
> + if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
> + native_irq_enable();
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static void pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = vmpl ? svsm_pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, validate)
> + : base_pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, validate);
> +
> + if (ret) {
> + WARN(1, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", vaddr, ret);
> + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void base_pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
> {
> struct psc_entry *e;
> unsigned long vaddr;
> @@ -1215,6 +1275,120 @@ static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
> }
> }
>
> +static void svsm_pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
> +{
> + struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pvalidate_call;
> + struct svsm_pvalidate_entry *pe;
> + unsigned int call_count, i;
> + struct svsm_call call = {};
> + u64 pvalidate_call_pa;
> + struct psc_entry *e;
> + unsigned long flags;
> + unsigned long vaddr;
> + bool action;
> + int ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
> + * order to avoid paravirt issues.
> + */
> + flags = native_save_fl();
> + if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
> + native_irq_disable();
> +
> + call.caa = __svsm_get_caa();
> +
> + pvalidate_call = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer;
> + pvalidate_call_pa = __svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
> +
> + /* Calculate how many entries the CA buffer can hold */
> + call_count = sizeof(call.caa->svsm_buffer);
> + call_count -= offsetof(struct svsm_pvalidate_call, entry);
> + call_count /= sizeof(pvalidate_call->entry[0]);
> +
> + /* Protocol 0, Call ID 1 */
> + call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE);
> + call.rcx = pvalidate_call_pa;
> +
> + pvalidate_call->entries = 0;
> + pvalidate_call->next = 0;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i <= desc->hdr.end_entry; i++) {
> + e = &desc->entries[i];
> + pe = &pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->entries];
> +
> + pe->page_size = e->pagesize ? RMP_PG_SIZE_2M : RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
> + pe->action = e->operation == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE;
> + pe->ignore_cf = 0;
> + pe->pfn = e->gfn;
> +
> + pvalidate_call->entries++;
> + if (pvalidate_call->entries < call_count && i != desc->hdr.end_entry)
> + continue;
> +
> + ret = svsm_protocol(&call);
> + if (ret == SVSM_PVALIDATE_FAIL_SIZEMISMATCH &&
> + pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->next].page_size == RMP_PG_SIZE_2M) {
> + u64 pfn, pfn_end;
> +
> + /*
> + * The "next" field is the index of the failed entry. Calculate the
> + * index of the entry after the failed entry before the fields are
> + * cleared so that processing can continue on from that point (take
> + * into account the for loop adding 1 to the entry).
> + */
> + i -= pvalidate_call->entries - pvalidate_call->next;
> + i += 1;
> +
> + action = pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->next].action;
> + pfn = pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->next].pfn;
> + pfn_end = pfn + 511;
> +
> + pvalidate_call->entries = 0;
> + pvalidate_call->next = 0;
> + for (; pfn <= pfn_end; pfn++) {
> + pe = &pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->entries];
> +
> + pe->page_size = RMP_PG_SIZE_4K;
> + pe->action = action;
> + pe->ignore_cf = 0;
> + pe->pfn = pfn;
> +
> + pvalidate_call->entries++;
> + if (pvalidate_call->entries < call_count && pfn != pfn_end)
> + continue;
> +
> + ret = svsm_protocol(&call);
> + if (ret != SVSM_SUCCESS)
> + break;
> +
> + pvalidate_call->entries = 0;
> + pvalidate_call->next = 0;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (ret != SVSM_SUCCESS) {
> + pe = &pvalidate_call->entry[pvalidate_call->next];
> + vaddr = (unsigned long)pfn_to_kaddr(pe->pfn);
> +
> + WARN(1, "Failed to validate address %lx ret=%#x (%d)", vaddr, ret, ret);
> + sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
> + }
> +
> + pvalidate_call->entries = 0;
> + pvalidate_call->next = 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF)
> + native_irq_enable();
> +}
> +
> +static void pvalidate_pages(struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
> +{
> + vmpl ? svsm_pvalidate_pages(desc)
> + : base_pvalidate_pages(desc);
> +}
> +
> static int vmgexit_psc(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct snp_psc_desc *desc)
> {
> int cur_entry, end_entry, ret = 0;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index 3bd7860fbfe1..2fd21090ef6b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -161,6 +161,12 @@ static struct svsm_ca *__svsm_get_caa(void)
> : boot_svsm_caa;
> }
>
> +static u64 __svsm_get_caa_pa(void)
> +{
> + return sev_cfg.cas_initialized ? this_cpu_read(svsm_caa_pa)
> + : boot_svsm_caa_pa;
> +}
> +
> static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
> {
> unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
> @@ -777,7 +783,6 @@ static void early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
> {
> unsigned long paddr_end;
> u64 val;
> - int ret;
>
> vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
>
> @@ -785,12 +790,9 @@ static void early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
> paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
>
> while (paddr < paddr_end) {
> - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED) {
> - /* Page validation must be rescinded before changing to shared */
> - ret = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, false);
> - if (WARN(ret, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", paddr, ret))
> - goto e_term;
> - }
> + /* Page validation must be rescinded before changing to shared */
> + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
> + pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, paddr, false);
>
> /*
> * Use the MSR protocol because this function can be called before
> @@ -812,12 +814,9 @@ static void early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
> paddr, GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val)))
> goto e_term;
>
> - if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE) {
> - /* Page validation must be performed after changing to private */
> - ret = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, true);
> - if (WARN(ret, "Failed to validate address 0x%lx ret %d", paddr, ret))
> - goto e_term;
> - }
> + /* Page validation must be performed after changing to private */
> + if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
> + pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, paddr, true);
>
> vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
> paddr += PAGE_SIZE;
> --
> 2.42.0
>
>
--
-Dionna Glaze, PhD (she/her)
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