[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20240129062132.mec3koljujmhvtoo@yy-desk-7060>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 14:21:32 +0800
From: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@...ux.intel.com>
To: isaku.yamahata@...el.com
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
isaku.yamahata@...il.com, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
erdemaktas@...gle.com, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
Sagi Shahar <sagis@...gle.com>, Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>,
chen.bo@...el.com, hang.yuan@...el.com, tina.zhang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 000/121] KVM TDX basic feature support
On Mon, Jan 22, 2024 at 03:52:36PM -0800, isaku.yamahata@...el.com wrote:
..
> The below layers are chosen so that the device model, for example, qemu can
> exercise each layering step by step. Check if TDX is supported, create TD VM,
> create TD vcpu, allow vcpu running, populate TD guest private memory, and handle
> vcpu exits/hypercalls/interrupts to run TD fully.
>
> TDX vcpu
> interrupt/exits/hypercall<------------\
> ^ |
> | |
> TD finalization |
> ^ |
> | |
> TDX EPT violation<------------\ |
> ^ | |
> | | |
> TD vcpu enter/exit | |
> ^ | |
> | | |
> TD vcpu creation/destruction | \-------KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
> ^ | ^
> | | |
> TD VM creation/destruction \---------------KVM TDP MMU hooks
> ^ ^
> | |
> TDX architectural definitions KVM TDP refactoring for TDX
> ^ ^
> | |
> TDX, VMX <--------TDX host kernel KVM MMU GPA stolen bits
> coexistence support
>
>
> The followings are explanations of each layer. Each layer has a dummy commit
> that starts with [MARKER] in subject. It is intended to help to identify where
> each layer starts.
>
> TDX host kernel support:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@intel.com/
> The guts of system-wide initialization of TDX module. There is an
> independent patch series for host x86. TDX KVM patches call functions
> this patch series provides to initialize the TDX module.
>
> TDX, VMX coexistence:
> Infrastructure to allow TDX to coexist with VMX and trigger the
> initialization of the TDX module.
> This layer starts with
> "KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX"
> TDX architectural definitions:
> Add TDX architectural definitions and helper functions
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions".
> TD VM creation/destruction:
> Guest TD creation/destroy allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
> and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
> measurement.
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction".
> TD vcpu creation/destruction:
> guest TD creation/destroy Allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
> and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
> measurement.
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction"
> TDX EPT violation:
> Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. Handle
> secure EPT violations to populate guest pages with TDX SEAMCALLs.
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation"
> TD vcpu enter/exit:
> Allow TDX vcpu to enter into TD and exit from TD. Save CPU state before
> entering into TD. Restore CPU state after exiting from TD.
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit"
> TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:
> Handle various exits/hypercalls and allow interrupts to be injected so
> that TD vcpu can continue running.
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls"
>
> KVM MMU GPA shared bit:
> Introduce framework to handle shared bit repurposed bit of GPA TDX
> repurposed a bit of GPA to indicate shared or private. If it's shared,
How about:
Introduce framework to handle shared bit which is repurposed GPA bit to indicate
shared or private.
> it's the same as the conventional VMX EPT case. VMM can access shared
> guest pages. If it's private, it's handled by Secure-EPT and the guest
> page is encrypted.
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bits"
> KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:
> TDX Secure EPT requires different constants. e.g. initial value EPT
> entry value etc. Various refactoring for those differences.
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX"
> KVM TDP MMU hooks:
> Introduce framework to TDP MMU to add hooks in addition to direct EPT
> access TDX added Secure EPT which is an enhancement to VMX EPT. Unlike
> conventional VMX EPT, CPU can't directly read/write Secure EPT. Instead,
> use TDX SEAMCALLs to operate on Secure EPT.
> This layer starts with
> "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks"
..
> Several VMX control structures (such as Shared EPT and Posted interrupt
> descriptor) are directly managed and accessed by the host VMM. These control
> structures are pointed to by fields in the TD VMCS.
>
> The above means that 1) KVM needs to allocate different data structures for TDs,
> 2) KVM can reuse the existing code for TDs for some operations, 3) it needs to
> define TD-specific handling for others. 3) Redirect operations to . 3)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
unnecessary duplication.
> Redirect operations to the TDX specific callbacks, like "if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
> tdx_callback() else vmx_callback();".
>
> *TD Private Memory
> TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU
> using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption
> keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a
> Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the
> encryption keys.
>
> In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by
> allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical
> address. The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME
> accesses and private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared
> HKID on the host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.
>
> During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified
> as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest
> Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT
> (Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in host
> VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same as
> with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data exchange
> needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current EPT
> functionality even for TDs.
>
> * Secure EPT and Minoring using the TDP code
> The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT
> pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private
> key. Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX
> interface functions, and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT (why
> "subset"). Since execution of such interface functions takes much longer time
> than accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to minor the
> Secure EPT for the TD.
>
> This way, we can effectively walk Secure EPT without using the TDX interface
> functions.
>
> * VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
> The userspace VMM, such as QEMU, needs to build and treat TDs differently. For
> example, a TD needs to boot in private memory, and the host software cannot copy
> the initial image to private memory.
>
> * TSC Virtualization
> The TDX module helps TDs maintain reliable TSC (Time Stamp Counter) values
> (e.g. consistent among the TD VCPUs) and the virtual TSC frequency is determined
> by TD configuration, i.e. when the TD is created, not per VCPU. The current KVM
> owns TSC virtualization for VMs, but the TDX module does for TDs.
>
> * MCE support for TDs
> The TDX module doesn't allow VMM to inject MCE. Instead PV way is needed for TD
> to communicate with VMM. For now, KVM silently ignores MCE request by VMM. MSRs
> related to MCE (e.g, MCE bank registers) can be naturally emulated by
> paravirtualizing MSR access.
>
> [1] For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are
> available.
>
> * Restrictions or future work
> Some features are not included to reduce patch size. Those features are
> addressed as future independent patch series.
> - large page (2M, 1G)
> - qemu gdb stub
> - guest PMU
> - and more
>
> * Prerequisites
> It's required to load the TDX module and initialize it. It's out of the scope
> of this patch series. Another independent patch for the common x86 code is
> planned. It defines CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST and this patch series uses
> CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST. It's assumed that With CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=y, the TDX
> module is initialized and ready for KVM to use the TDX module APIs for TDX guest
> life cycle like tdh.mng.init are ready to use.
>
> Concretely Global initialization, LP (Logical Processor) initialization, global
> configuration, the key configuration, and TDMR and PAMT initialization are done.
> The state of the TDX module is SYS_READY. Please refer to the TDX module
> specification, the chapter Intel TDX Module Lifecycle State Machine
>
> ** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
> TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability
> and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID
> (HKID) assigned to guest TD.
> The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
> - const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
> Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX
> isn't initialized.
> - int tdx_enable(void);
> Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
> - extern u32 tdx_global_keyid __read_mostly;
> global host key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
> - u32 tdx_get_num_keyid(void);
> return the number of available TDX private host key id.
> - int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
> Allocate HKID for guest TD.
> - void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
> Free HKID for guest TD.
>
> (****)
> * TDX KVM high-level design
> - Host key ID management
> Host Key ID (HKID) needs to be assigned to each TDX guest for memory encryption.
> It is assumed The TDX host patch series implements necessary functions,
> u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void), int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) and,
> void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid).
>
> - Data structures and VM type
> Because TDX is different from VMX, define its own VM/VCPU structures, struct
> kvm_tdx and struct vcpu_tdx instead of struct kvm_vmx and struct vcpu_vmx. To
> identify the VM, introduce VM-type to specify which VM type, VMX (default) or
> TDX, is used.
>
> - VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
> Re-purpose the existing KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to add TDX specific operations.
> New commands are used to get the TDX system parameters, set TDX specific VM/VCPU
> parameters, set initial guest memory and measurement.
>
> The creation of TDX VM requires five additional operations in addition to the
> conventional VM creation.
> - Get KVM system capability to check if TDX VM type is supported
> - VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM)
> - New: Get the TDX specific system parameters. KVM_TDX_GET_CAPABILITY.
> - New: Set TDX specific VM parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
> - VCPU creation (KVM_CREATE_VCPU)
> - New: Set TDX specific VCPU parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU.
> - New: Initialize guest memory as boot state and extend the measurement with
> the memory. KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
> - New: Finalize VM. KVM_TDX_FINALIZE. Complete measurement of the initial
> TDX VM contents.
> - VCPU RUN (KVM_VCPU_RUN)
>
> - Protected guest state
> Because the guest state (CPU state and guest memory) is protected, the KVM VMM
> can't operate on them. For example, accessing CPU registers, injecting
> exceptions, and accessing guest memory. Those operations are handled as
> silently ignored, returning zero or initial reset value when it's requested via
> KVM API ioctls.
>
> VM/VCPU state and callbacks for TDX specific operations.
> Define tdx specific VM state and VCPU state instead of VMX ones. Redirect
> operations to TDX specific callbacks. "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()".
>
> Operations on the CPU state
> silently ignore operations on the guest state. For example, the write to
> CPU registers is ignored and the read from CPU registers returns 0.
>
> . ignore access to CPU registers except for allowed ones.
> . TSC: add a check if tsc is immutable and return an error. Because the KVM
> implementation updates the internal tsc state and it's difficult to back
> out those changes. Instead, skip the logic.
> . dirty logging: add check if dirty logging is supported.
> . exceptions/SMI/MCE/SIPI/INIT: silently ignore
>
> Note: virtual external interrupt and NMI can be injected into TDX guests.
>
> - KVM MMU integration
> One bit of the guest physical address (bit 51 or 47) is repurposed to indicate if
> the guest physical address is private (the bit is cleared) or shared (the bit is
> set). The bits are called stolen bits.
>
> - Stolen bits framework
> systematically tracks which guest physical address, shared or private, is
> used.
>
> - Shared EPT and secure EPT
> There are two EPTs. Shared EPT (the conventional one) and Secure
> EPT(the new one). Shared EPT is handled the same for the stolen
> bit set. Secure EPT points to private guest pages. To resolve
> EPT violation, KVM walks one of two EPTs based on faulted GPA.
> Because it's costly to access secure EPT during walking EPTs with
> SEAMCALLs for the private guest physical address, another private
> EPT is used as a shadow of Secure-EPT with the existing logic at
> the cost of extra memory.
>
> The following depicts the relationship.
>
> KVM | TDX module
> | | |
> -------------+---------- | |
> | | | |
> V V | |
> shared GPA private GPA | |
> CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT pointer
> | | | |
> | | | |
> V V | V
> shared EPT private EPT--------mirror----->Secure EPT
> | | | |
> | \--------------------+------\ |
> | | | |
> V | V V
> shared guest page | private guest page
> |
> |
> non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
> |
>
> - Operating on Secure EPT
> Use the TDX module APIs to operate on Secure EPT. To call the TDX API
> during resolving EPT violation, add hooks to additional operation and wiring
> it to TDX backend.
>
> * References
>
> [1] TDX specification
> https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
> [2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
> https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
> [3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
> https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
> [4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 Specification
> https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-module-1.0-public-spec-v0.931.pdf
> [5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
> https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
> [6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
> https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790
> [7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
> https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.01.pdf
> [8] intel public github
> kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
> TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
> qemu TDX https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx
> [9] TDVF
> https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF
> This was merged into EDK2 main branch. https://github.com/tianocore/edk2
>
> Chao Gao (2):
> KVM: x86/mmu: Assume guest MMIOs are shared
> KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o
> wrmsr
>
> Isaku Yamahata (96):
> KVM: x86: Add is_vm_type_supported callback
> KVM: x86/vmx: initialize loaded_vmcss_on_cpu in vmx_hardware_setup()
> KVM: x86/vmx: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions
> KVM: VMX: Reorder vmx initialization with kvm vendor initialization
> KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel
> module
> KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure
> KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural
> definitions
> KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
> KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module
> KVM: TDX: Retry SEAMCALL on the lack of entropy error
> KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction
> KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key
> id
> KVM: TDX: Add helper function to read TDX metadata in array
> x86/virt/tdx: Get system-wide info about TDX module on initialization
> KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
> KVM: TDX: Make KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS backend specific
> KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
> KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters
> KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case
> KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
> creation/destruction
> KVM: TDX: create/free TDX vcpu structure
> KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits
> KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU
> KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of
> GPA
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for
> TDX
> KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE
> KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to
> shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask
> KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis
> KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA
> KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks
> KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at
> allocation
> KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role
> KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page
> KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Apply mmu notifier callback to only shared GPA
> KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Sprinkle __must_check
> KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation
> KVM: TDX: Add accessors VMX VMCS helpers
> KVM: TDX: Require TDP MMU and mmio caching for TDX
> KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support
> KVM: TDX: MTRR: implement get_mt_mask() for TDX
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization
> KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory
> KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit
> KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path
> KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)
> KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD
> KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs
> [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
> exits/interrupts/hypercalls
> KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit
> KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit
> KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor
> KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched
> behavior
> KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c
> KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection
> KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit
> KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI
> KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit
> KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
> KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit
> KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT
> KVM: TDX: Handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI with MSMI
> KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls
> (TDG.VP.VMCALL)
> KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL
> KVM: TDX: Add KVM Exit for TDX TDG.VP.VMCALL
> KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall
> KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall
> KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall
> KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX
> KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall
> KVM: TDX: Handle MSR MTRRCap and MTRRDefType access
> KVM: TDX: Handle MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR and IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL
> KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall
> KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request
> KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI
> KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state
> KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore guest instruction emulation
> KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore dirty logging
> KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore VMX preemption timer
> KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to TSC
> KVM: TDX: Ignore setting up mce
> KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore for TDX to ignore hypercall patch
> KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore virtual apic related operation
> KVM: TDX: Inhibit APICv for TDX guest
> Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)
> KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU
> KVM: TDX: Add hint TDX ioctl to release Secure-EPT
> RFC: KVM: x86: Add x86 callback to check cpuid
> RFC: KVM: x86, TDX: Add check for KVM_SET_CPUID2
> [MARKER] the end of (the first phase of) TDX KVM patch series
>
> Kai Huang (2):
> x86/virt/tdx: Export TDX KeyID information
> x86/virt/tdx: Export SEAMCALL functions
>
> Sean Christopherson (17):
> KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
> KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes
> KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters
> KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit
> values
> KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed
> SPTE
> KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
> KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases
> KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function
> KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code
> KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX
> KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX
> KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC
> KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced
> KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function
> argument
> KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper
> KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function
> KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall
>
> Yan Zhao (1):
> KVM: x86/mmu: TDX: Do not enable page track for TD guest
>
> Yang Weijiang (1):
> KVM: TDX: Add TSX_CTRL msr into uret_msrs list
>
> Yao Yuan (1):
> KVM: TDX: Handle vmentry failure for INTEL TD guest
>
> Yuan Yao (1):
> KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT
>
> Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 +-
> Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst | 1 +
> Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst | 2 +
> Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst | 362 +++
> Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 443 +++
> arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 18 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 85 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 5 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 14 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 95 +
> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 5 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 7 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 3 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 27 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kvm/irq.c | 3 +
> arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 33 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 +
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 31 +
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 200 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 109 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c | 3 +
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 17 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 27 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 14 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 442 ++-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 7 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/smm.h | 7 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 8 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 166 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1246 ++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 46 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 43 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 13 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 3321 ++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 266 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 277 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 44 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 21 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 408 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 5 +
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 661 ++--
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 52 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 257 ++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 129 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 4 +
> arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S | 4 +
> arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 11 +-
> include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> include/linux/kvm_types.h | 1 +
> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 89 +
> virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 31 +-
> 56 files changed, 8407 insertions(+), 702 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst
> create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
>
>
> base-commit: 6613476e225e090cc9aad49be7fa504e290dd33d
> prerequisite-patch-id: 5e29e9200c65fb7f6213b4aa85254f128a4fc49f
> prerequisite-patch-id: 39908082e873a3828568cc6c626e734d4ccb279a
> prerequisite-patch-id: 01d54029211a041370ee12d58825c42f2255d3f8
> prerequisite-patch-id: ec2e5dc132d37f2ec76f56172fe82e0f30998a50
> prerequisite-patch-id: b9438c767dbd45f4dda5287e104a54fe8f3c516f
> prerequisite-patch-id: ef4b52b28c7459a217b5fc4bd4dc592354fb9a46
> prerequisite-patch-id: bc425a71343a9fed0ad12e5b85a1c614f8eff934
> prerequisite-patch-id: cb538a88ed4c5d7614d3e6fcd10b991cce605a0d
> prerequisite-patch-id: 6019835e0581c2749e8e353f2045a2e94040a2b0
> prerequisite-patch-id: 4dd00540050377ff852c0a939682d5894513444c
> --
> 2.25.1
>
>
Powered by blists - more mailing lists