linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list

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Message-ID: <20240129142939.GCZbe2U3lb2RPV7VOg@fat_crate.local>
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 15:29:39 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>, x86@...nel.org,
	kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev, linux-mm@...ck.org,
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, jroedel@...e.de,
	thomas.lendacky@....com, hpa@...or.com, ardb@...nel.org,
	pbonzini@...hat.com, seanjc@...gle.com, vkuznets@...hat.com,
	jmattson@...gle.com, luto@...nel.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
	slp@...hat.com, pgonda@...gle.com, peterz@...radead.org,
	srinivas.pandruvada@...ux.intel.com, rientjes@...gle.com,
	tobin@....com, kirill@...temov.name, ak@...ux.intel.com,
	tony.luck@...el.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com,
	alpergun@...gle.com, jarkko@...nel.org, ashish.kalra@....com,
	nikunj.dadhania@....com, pankaj.gupta@....com,
	liam.merwick@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list

On Mon, Jan 29, 2024 at 03:26:29PM +0100, Vlastimil Babka wrote:
> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
> 
> Some minor nitpicks:

Thanks, here's what I have applied:

commit c3875aff4e0739a6af385795470da70d675a7635
Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
Date:   Thu Jan 25 22:11:15 2024 -0600

    x86/sev: Introduce an SNP leaked pages list
    
    Pages are unsafe to be released back to the page-allocator if they
    have been transitioned to firmware/guest state and can't be reclaimed
    or transitioned back to hypervisor/shared state. In this case, add them
    to an internal leaked pages list to ensure that they are not freed or
    touched/accessed to cause fatal page faults.
    
      [ mdr: Relocate to arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c ]
    
    Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
    Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>
    Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@....com>
    Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
    Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126041126.1927228-16-michael.roth@amd.com

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index d3ccb7a0c7e9..435ba9bc4510 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ void snp_dump_hva_rmpentry(unsigned long address);
 int psmash(u64 pfn);
 int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, int asid, bool immutable);
 int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
+void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
 #else
 static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
 static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, int as
 	return -ENODEV;
 }
 static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index f1be56555ee6..901863a842d7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size;
 static struct rmpentry *rmptable __ro_after_init;
 static u64 rmptable_max_pfn __ro_after_init;
 
+static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+
+static unsigned long snp_nr_leaked_pages;
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"SEV-SNP: " fmt
 
@@ -515,3 +520,35 @@ int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level)
 	return rmpupdate(pfn, &state);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rmp_make_shared);
+
+void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages)
+{
+	struct page *page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+
+	pr_warn("Leaking PFN range 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pfn, pfn + npages);
+
+	spin_lock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+	while (npages--) {
+
+		/*
+		 * Reuse the page's buddy list for chaining into the leaked
+		 * pages list. This page should not be on a free list currently
+		 * and is also unsafe to be added to a free list.
+		 */
+		if (likely(!PageCompound(page)) ||
+
+			/*
+			 * Skip inserting tail pages of compound page as
+			 * page->buddy_list of tail pages is not usable.
+			 */
+		    (PageHead(page) && compound_nr(page) <= npages))
+			list_add_tail(&page->buddy_list, &snp_leaked_pages_list);
+
+		dump_rmpentry(pfn);
+		snp_nr_leaked_pages++;
+		pfn++;
+		page++;
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_leak_pages);


-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

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