linux-kernel - [PATCH 3/5] ima: Reset EVM status upon detecting changes to overlay backing file

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 16:46:18 -0500
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-unionfs@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
        serge@...lyn.com, zohar@...ux.ibm.com, roberto.sassu@...wei.com,
        amir73il@...il.com, miklos@...redi.hu,
        Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] ima: Reset EVM status upon detecting changes to overlay backing file

To avoid caching effects to take effect reset the EVM status upon
detecting changes to the overlay backing files. This prevents a not-yet-
copied-up file on the overlay from executing if for example the
security.evm xattr on the file on the 'lower' layer has been removed.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/evm.h               | 8 ++++++++
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 7 +++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index d8c0343436b8..e7d6742eee9d 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name);
 extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
 				     int buffer_size, char type,
 				     bool canonical_fmt);
+extern void evm_reset_cache_status(struct dentry *dentry,
+				   struct integrity_iint_cache *iint);
 #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
 extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname);
 #else
@@ -189,5 +191,11 @@ static inline int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
+static inline void evm_reset_cache_status(struct dentry *dentry,
+					  struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	return;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_EVM */
 #endif /* LINUX_EVM_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 22a5e26860ea..e96d127b48a2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -721,6 +721,13 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode)
 		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
 }
 
+void evm_reset_cache_status(struct dentry *dentry,
+			    struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
+{
+	if (d_real_inode(dentry) != d_backing_inode(dentry))
+		iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
 /**
  * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary
  * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index cc1217ac2c6f..84bdc6e58329 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/iversion.h>
+#include <linux/evm.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
@@ -295,6 +296,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 		    !inode_eq_iversion(backing_inode, iint->version)) {
 			iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
 			iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
+			evm_reset_cache_status(file_dentry(file), iint);
 		}
 	}
 
-- 
2.43.0