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Message-ID: <CALNs47uDaD05oD8TtZoSqUBc4SaRig80u2_1P0qMCXtE3H9_Vw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 23:06:17 -0500
From: Trevor Gross <tmgross@...ch.edu>
To: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@...gle.com>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>, Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>, 
	Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@...il.com>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>, Gary Guo <gary@...yguo.net>, 
	Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com>, 
	Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>, Andreas Hindborg <a.hindborg@...sung.com>, 
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, 
	Arve Hjønnevåg <arve@...roid.com>, 
	Todd Kjos <tkjos@...roid.com>, Martijn Coenen <maco@...roid.com>, 
	Joel Fernandes <joel@...lfernandes.org>, Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@...gle.com>, 
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, linux-mm@...ck.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, rust-for-linux@...r.kernel.org, 
	Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] rust: add userspace pointers

On Wed, Jan 24, 2024 at 6:21 AM Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@...gle.com> wrote:
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/rust/kernel/user_ptr.rs
> @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +//! User pointers.
> +//!
> +//! C header: [`include/linux/uaccess.h`](../../../../include/linux/uaccess.h)
> +
> +// Comparison with MAX_USER_OP_LEN triggers this lint on platforms
> +// where `c_ulong == usize`.
> +#![allow(clippy::absurd_extreme_comparisons)]
> +
> +use crate::{bindings, error::code::*, error::Result};
> +use alloc::vec::Vec;
> +use core::ffi::{c_ulong, c_void};
> +
> +/// The maximum length of a operation using `copy_[from|to]_user`.
> +///
> +/// If a usize is not greater than this constant, then casting it to `c_ulong`
> +/// is guaranteed to be lossless.
> +const MAX_USER_OP_LEN: usize = c_ulong::MAX as usize;
> +
> +/// A pointer to an area in userspace memory, which can be either read-only or
> +/// read-write.
> +///
> +/// All methods on this struct are safe: invalid pointers return `EFAULT`.

Maybe

    ... attempting to read or write invalid pointers will return `EFAULT`.

> +/// Concurrent access, *including data races to/from userspace memory*, is
> +/// permitted, because fundamentally another userspace thread/process could
> +/// always be modifying memory at the same time (in the same way that userspace
> +/// Rust's [`std::io`] permits data races with the contents of files on disk).
> +/// In the presence of a race, the exact byte values read/written are
> +/// unspecified but the operation is well-defined. Kernelspace code should
> +/// validate its copy of data after completing a read, and not expect that
> +/// multiple reads of the same address will return the same value.
> +///
> +/// These APIs are designed to make it difficult to accidentally write TOCTOU
> +/// bugs. Every time you read from a memory location, the pointer is advanced by
> +/// the length so that you cannot use that reader to read the same memory
> +/// location twice. Preventing double-fetches avoids TOCTOU bugs. This is
> +/// accomplished by taking `self` by value to prevent obtaining multiple readers
> +/// on a given [`UserSlicePtr`], and the readers only permitting forward reads.
> +/// If double-fetching a memory location is necessary for some reason, then that
> +/// is done by creating multiple readers to the same memory location, e.g. using
> +/// [`clone_reader`].

Maybe something like

    Every time a memory location is read, the reader's position is advanced by
    the read length and the next read will start from there. This helps prevent
    accidentally reading the same location twice and causing a TOCTOU bug.

    Creating a [`UserSlicePtrReader`] and/or [`UserSlicePtrWriter`]
    consumes the `UserSlicePtr`, helping ensure that there aren't multiple
    readers or writers to the same location.

    If double fetching a memory location...

> +///
> +/// Constructing a [`UserSlicePtr`] performs no checks on the provided address
> +/// and length, it can safely be constructed inside a kernel thread with no
> +/// current userspace process. Reads and writes wrap the kernel APIs

Maybe some of this is better documented on `new` rather than the type?

> +/// `copy_from_user` and `copy_to_user`, which check the memory map of the
> +/// current process and enforce that the address range is within the user range
> +/// (no additional calls to `access_ok` are needed).
> +///
> +/// [`std::io`]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/io/index.html
> +/// [`clone_reader`]: UserSlicePtrReader::clone_reader
> +pub struct UserSlicePtr(*mut c_void, usize);

I think just `UserSlice` could work for the name here, since
`SlicePtr` is a bit redundant (slices automatically containing a
pointer). Also makes the Reader/Writer types a bit less wordy. Though
I understand wanting to make it discoverable for C users.

Is some sort of `Debug` implementation useful?

> +impl UserSlicePtr {
> +    /// Constructs a user slice from a raw pointer and a length in bytes.
> +    ///
> +    /// Callers must be careful to avoid time-of-check-time-of-use
> +    /// (TOCTOU) issues. The simplest way is to create a single instance of
> +    /// [`UserSlicePtr`] per user memory block as it reads each byte at
> +    /// most once.
> +    pub fn new(ptr: *mut c_void, length: usize) -> Self {
> +        UserSlicePtr(ptr, length)
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Reads the entirety of the user slice.
> +    ///
> +    /// Returns `EFAULT` if the address does not currently point to
> +    /// mapped, readable memory.
> +    pub fn read_all(self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
> +        self.reader().read_all()
> +    }

std::io uses the signature

    fn read_to_end(&mut self, buf: &mut Vec<u8>) -> Result<usize> { ... }

Maybe this could be better here too, since it allows reusing the
vector without going through `read_raw`.

https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/io/trait.Read.html#method.read_to_end

> +    /// Constructs a [`UserSlicePtrReader`].
> +    pub fn reader(self) -> UserSlicePtrReader {
> +        UserSlicePtrReader(self.0, self.1)
> +    }

I wonder if this should be called `into_reader` to note that it is a
consuming method. Indifferent here, since there aren't any non-`self`
variants.

> +
> +    /// Constructs a [`UserSlicePtrWriter`].
> +    pub fn writer(self) -> UserSlicePtrWriter {
> +        UserSlicePtrWriter(self.0, self.1)
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Constructs both a [`UserSlicePtrReader`] and a [`UserSlicePtrWriter`].

Could you add a brief about what is or isn't allowed when you have a
reader and a writer to the same location?

> +    pub fn reader_writer(self) -> (UserSlicePtrReader, UserSlicePtrWriter) {
> +        (
> +            UserSlicePtrReader(self.0, self.1),
> +            UserSlicePtrWriter(self.0, self.1),
> +        )
> +    }
> +}
> +
> +/// A reader for [`UserSlicePtr`].
> +///
> +/// Used to incrementally read from the user slice.
> +pub struct UserSlicePtrReader(*mut c_void, usize);
> +
> +impl UserSlicePtrReader {
> +    /// Skip the provided number of bytes.
> +    ///
> +    /// Returns an error if skipping more than the length of the buffer.
> +    pub fn skip(&mut self, num_skip: usize) -> Result {
> +        // Update `self.1` first since that's the fallible one.
> +        self.1 = self.1.checked_sub(num_skip).ok_or(EFAULT)?;
> +        self.0 = self.0.wrapping_add(num_skip);

I think it would be better to change to named structs to make this more clear.

> +        Ok(())
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Create a reader that can access the same range of data.
> +    ///
> +    /// Reading from the clone does not advance the current reader.
> +    ///
> +    /// The caller should take care to not introduce TOCTOU issues.

Could you add an example of what should be avoided?

> +    pub fn clone_reader(&self) -> UserSlicePtrReader {
> +        UserSlicePtrReader(self.0, self.1)
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Returns the number of bytes left to be read from this.

Remove "from this" or change to "from this reader".

> +    ///
> +    /// Note that even reading less than this number of bytes may fail.> +    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
> +        self.1
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Returns `true` if no data is available in the io buffer.
> +    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
> +        self.1 == 0
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Reads raw data from the user slice into a raw kernel buffer.
> +    ///
> +    /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the read encounters a page fault.

This is raised if the address is invalid right, not just page faults?
Or, are page faults just the only mode of indication that a pointer
isn't valid.

I know this is the same as copy_from_user, but I don't understand that
too well myself. I'm also a bit curious what happens if you pass a
kernel pointer to these methods.

> +    /// # Safety
> +    ///
> +    /// The `out` pointer must be valid for writing `len` bytes.
> +    pub unsafe fn read_raw(&mut self, out: *mut u8, len: usize) -> Result {

What is the motivation for taking raw pointers rather than a slice
here? In which case it could just be called `read`.

> +        if len > self.1 || len > MAX_USER_OP_LEN {
> +            return Err(EFAULT);
> +        }
> +        // SAFETY: The caller promises that `out` is valid for writing `len` bytes.
> +        let res = unsafe { bindings::copy_from_user(out.cast::<c_void>(), self.0, len as c_ulong) };

To me, it would be more clear to `c_ulong::try_from(len).map_err(|_|
EFAULT)?` rather than using MAX_USER_OP_LEN with an `as` cast, since
it makes it immediately clear that the conversion is ok (and is doing
that same comparison)

> +        if res != 0 {
> +            return Err(EFAULT);
> +        }
> +        // Since this is not a pointer to a valid object in our program,
> +        // we cannot use `add`, which has C-style rules for defined
> +        // behavior.
> +        self.0 = self.0.wrapping_add(len);
> +        self.1 -= len;
> +        Ok(())
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Reads all remaining data in the buffer into a vector.
> +    ///
> +    /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the read encounters a page fault.
> +    pub fn read_all(&mut self) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {

Same as the above note about read_to_end

> +        let len = self.len();
> +        let mut data = Vec::<u8>::try_with_capacity(len)?;
> +
> +        // SAFETY: The output buffer is valid for `len` bytes as we just allocated that much space.
> +        unsafe { self.read_raw(data.as_mut_ptr(), len)? };

If making the change above (possibly even if not), going through
https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/vec/struct.Vec.html#method.spare_capacity_mut
can be more clear about uninitialized data.

> +
> +        // SAFETY: Since the call to `read_raw` was successful, the first `len` bytes of the vector
> +        // have been initialized.
> +        unsafe { data.set_len(len) };
> +        Ok(data)
> +    }
> +}
> +
> +/// A writer for [`UserSlicePtr`].
> +///
> +/// Used to incrementally write into the user slice.
> +pub struct UserSlicePtrWriter(*mut c_void, usize);
> +
> +impl UserSlicePtrWriter {
> +    /// Returns the amount of space remaining in this buffer.
> +    ///
> +    /// Note that even writing less than this number of bytes may fail.
> +    pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
> +        self.1
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Returns `true` if no more data can be written to this buffer.
> +    pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
> +        self.1 == 0
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Writes raw data to this user pointer from a raw kernel buffer.
> +    ///
> +    /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the write encounters a page fault.
> +    ///
> +    /// # Safety
> +    ///
> +    /// The `data` pointer must be valid for reading `len` bytes.
> +    pub unsafe fn write_raw(&mut self, data: *const u8, len: usize) -> Result {

Same as for Reader regarding signature

> +        if len > self.1 || len > MAX_USER_OP_LEN {
> +            return Err(EFAULT);
> +        }
> +        let res = unsafe { bindings::copy_to_user(self.0, data.cast::<c_void>(), len as c_ulong) };

Same as for Reader regarding `as` casts.

> +        if res != 0 {
> +            return Err(EFAULT);
> +        }
> +        // Since this is not a pointer to a valid object in our program,
> +        // we cannot use `add`, which has C-style rules for defined
> +        // behavior.
> +        self.0 = self.0.wrapping_add(len);
> +        self.1 -= len;
> +        Ok(())
> +    }
> +
> +    /// Writes the provided slice to this user pointer.
> +    ///
> +    /// Fails with `EFAULT` if the write encounters a page fault.
> +    pub fn write_slice(&mut self, data: &[u8]) -> Result {

This could probably just be called `write`, which would be consistent
with std::io::Write.

> +        let len = data.len();
> +        let ptr = data.as_ptr();
> +        // SAFETY: The pointer originates from a reference to a slice of length
> +        // `len`, so the pointer is valid for reading `len` bytes.
> +        unsafe { self.write_raw(ptr, len) }
> +    }
> +}
>
> --
> 2.43.0.429.g432eaa2c6b-goog

The docs could use usage examples, but I am sure you are planning on
that already :)

- Trevor

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