linux-kernel - [PATCH v7 6/6] KVM: VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS mitigation

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20240204-delay-verw-v7-6-59be2d704cb2@linux.intel.com>
Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2024 23:20:23 -0800
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, tony.luck@...el.com,
	ak@...ux.intel.com, tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
	kvm@...r.kernel.org,
	Alyssa Milburn <alyssa.milburn@...ux.intel.com>,
	Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@...ux.intel.com>,
	antonio.gomez.iglesias@...ux.intel.com,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>, stable@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH  v7 6/6] KVM: VMX: Move VERW closer to VMentry for MDS
 mitigation

During VMentry VERW is executed to mitigate MDS. After VERW, any memory
access like register push onto stack may put host data in MDS affected
CPU buffers. A guest can then use MDS to sample host data.

Although likelihood of secrets surviving in registers at current VERW
callsite is less, but it can't be ruled out. Harden the MDS mitigation
by moving the VERW mitigation late in VMentry path.

Note that VERW for MMIO Stale Data mitigation is unchanged because of
the complexity of per-guest conditional VERW which is not easy to handle
that late in asm with no GPRs available. If the CPU is also affected by
MDS, VERW is unconditionally executed late in asm regardless of guest
having MMIO access.

Cc: stable@...nel.org
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
index ef7cfbad4d57..2bfbf758d061 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 	/* Load guest RAX.  This kills the @regs pointer! */
 	mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
 
+	/* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
+	CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
+
 	/* Check EFLAGS.CF from the VMX_RUN_VMRESUME bit test above. */
 	jnc .Lvmlaunch
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index b551de3ec0bc..0ec71f935ed2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -388,7 +388,16 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 
 static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 {
-	vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
+	/*
+	 * Disable VERW's behavior of clearing CPU buffers for the guest if the
+	 * CPU isn't affected by MDS/TAA, and the host hasn't forcefully enabled
+	 * the mitigation. Disabling the clearing behavior provides a
+	 * performance boost for guests that aren't aware that manually clearing
+	 * CPU buffers is unnecessary, at the cost of MSR accesses on VM-Entry
+	 * and VM-Exit.
+	 */
+	vmx->disable_fb_clear = !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF) &&
+				(host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) &&
 				!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) &&
 				!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
 
@@ -7224,11 +7233,14 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 	guest_state_enter_irqoff();
 
-	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
+	/*
+	 * L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS, but VERW
+	 * mitigation for MDS is done late in VMentry and is still
+	 * executed in spite of L1D Flush. This is because an extra VERW
+	 * should not matter much after the big hammer L1D Flush.
+	 */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
-	else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
 		 kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();

-- 
2.34.1