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Message-ID: <20240207172646.3981-7-xin3.li@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 09:26:26 -0800
From: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@...gle.com,
pbonzini@...hat.com,
corbet@....net,
tglx@...utronix.de,
mingo@...hat.com,
bp@...en8.de,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
x86@...nel.org,
hpa@...or.com,
shuah@...nel.org,
vkuznets@...hat.com,
peterz@...radead.org,
ravi.v.shankar@...el.com,
xin@...or.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 06/25] KVM: VMX: Defer enabling FRED MSRs save/load until after set CPUID
Clear FRED VM entry/exit controls when initializing a vCPU, and set
these controls only if FRED is enumerated after set CPUID.
FRED VM entry/exit controls need to be set to establish context
sufficient to support FRED event delivery immediately after VM entry
and exit. However it is not required to save/load FRED MSRs for
a non-FRED guest, which aren't supposed to access FRED MSRs.
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@...el.com>
---
Changes since v1:
* Use kvm_cpu_cap_has() instead of cpu_feature_enabled() (Chao Gao).
* Clear FRED VM entry/exit controls if FRED is not enumerated (Chao Gao).
* Use guest_can_use() to trace FRED enumeration in a vcpu (Chao Gao).
---
arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h b/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h
index ad463b1ed4e4..507ca73e52e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/governed_features.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(PFTHRESHOLD)
KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(VGIF)
KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(VNMI)
KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(LAM)
+KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE(FRED)
#undef KVM_GOVERNED_X86_FEATURE
#undef KVM_GOVERNED_FEATURE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 4023474ea002..34b6676f60d8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4402,6 +4402,9 @@ static u32 vmx_vmentry_ctrl(void)
if (cpu_has_perf_global_ctrl_bug())
vmentry_ctrl &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
+ /* Whether to load guest FRED MSRs is deferred until after set CPUID */
+ vmentry_ctrl &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED;
+
return vmentry_ctrl;
}
@@ -4430,7 +4433,13 @@ static u32 vmx_vmexit_ctrl(void)
static u64 vmx_secondary_vmexit_ctrl(void)
{
- return vmcs_config.secondary_vmexit_ctrl;
+ u64 secondary_vmexit_ctrl = vmcs_config.secondary_vmexit_ctrl;
+
+ /* Whether to save/load FRED MSRs is deferred until after set CPUID */
+ secondary_vmexit_ctrl &= ~(SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
+ SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+
+ return secondary_vmexit_ctrl;
}
static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -7762,10 +7771,31 @@ static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
}
+static void vmx_vcpu_config_fred_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+ kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED);
+
+ if (guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
+ vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+ secondary_vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx,
+ SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
+ SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+ } else {
+ vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+ secondary_vm_exit_controls_clearbit(vmx,
+ SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |
+ SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+ }
+}
+
static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+ vmx_vcpu_config_fred_after_set_cpuid(vcpu);
+
/*
* XSAVES is effectively enabled if and only if XSAVE is also exposed
* to the guest. XSAVES depends on CR4.OSXSAVE, and CR4.OSXSAVE can be
--
2.43.0
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