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Message-ID: <CAHmME9owdbHzfb66xisoWmvWeT_-hkxCu7tR2=Rbye_ik1JgQQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 20:53:07 +0100
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, 
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, 
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, 
	"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, 
	Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>, 
	"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@...el.com>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, 
	"Kalra, Ashish" <ashish.kalra@....com>, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, 
	"linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev" <linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev>, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/random: Retry on RDSEED failure

Hi Kirill,

On Sat, Feb 3, 2024 at 11:12 AM Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> wrote:
> Yea, actually, I had a pretty similar idea for something like that
> that's very non-invasive, where none of this even touches the RDRAND
> core code, much less random.c. Specifically, we consider "adding some
> extra RDRAND to the pool" like any other driver that wants to add some
> of its own seeds to the pool, with add_device_randomness(), a call that
> lives in various driver code, doesn't influence any entropy readiness
> aspects of random.c, and can safely be sprinkled in any device or
> platform driver.
>
> Specifically what I'm thinking about is something like:
>
> void coco_main_boottime_init_function_somewhere_deep_in_arch_code(void)
> {
>   // [...]
>   // bring up primary CoCo nuts
>   // [...]
>
>   /* CoCo requires an explicit RDRAND seed, because the host can make the
>    * rest of the system deterministic.
>    */
>   unsigned long seed[32 / sizeof(long)];
>   size_t i, longs;
>   for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(seed); i += longs) {
>     longs = arch_get_random_longs(&seed[i], ARRAY_SIZE(seed) - i);
>     /* If RDRAND is being DoS'd, panic, because we can't ensure
>      * confidentiality.
>      */
>     BUG_ON(!longs);
>   }
>   add_device_randomness(seed, sizeof(seed));
>   memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
>
>   // [...]
>   // do other CoCo things
>   // [...]
> }
>
> I would have no objection to the CoCo people adding something like this
> and would give it my Ack, but more importantly, my Ack for that doesn't
> even matter, because add_device_randomness() is pretty innocuous.
>
> So Kirill, if nobody else here objects to that approach, and you want to
> implement it in some super minimal way like that, that would be fine
> with me. Or maybe we want to wait for that internal inquiry at Intel to
> return some answers first. But either way, this might be an easy
> approach that doesn't add too much complexity.

I went ahead and implemented this just to have something concrete out there:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240209164946.4164052-1-Jason@zx2c4.com/

I probably screwed up some x86 platform conventions/details, but
that's the general idea I had in mind.

Jason

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