linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v9 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create

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Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 12:26:07 -0500
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
        brauner@...nel.org, chuck.lever@...cle.com, jlayton@...nel.org,
        neilb@...e.de, kolga@...app.com, Dai.Ngo@...cle.com, tom@...pey.com,
        paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com,
        zohar@...ux.ibm.com, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
        eric.snowberg@...cle.com, dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org,
        stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, eparis@...isplace.org,
        casey@...aufler-ca.com, shuah@...nel.org, mic@...ikod.net
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-nfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        selinux@...r.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
        Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 15/25] security: Introduce inode_post_create_tmpfile
 hook



On 1/15/24 13:17, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> 
> In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
> the inode_post_create_tmpfile hook.
> 
> As temp files can be made persistent, treat new temp files like other new
> files, so that the file hash is calculated and stored in the security
> xattr.
> 
> LSMs could also take some action after temp files have been created.
> 
> The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
> canceled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>

> ---
>   fs/namei.c                    |  1 +
>   include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  2 ++
>   include/linux/security.h      |  6 ++++++
>   security/security.c           | 15 +++++++++++++++
>   4 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index b7f433720b1e..adb3ab27951a 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -3686,6 +3686,7 @@ static int vfs_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
>   		inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE;
>   		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
>   	}
> +	security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
>   	ima_post_create_tmpfile(idmap, inode);
>   	return 0;
>   }
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index e08b9091350d..5f90914d23e0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
>   	 const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode)
>   LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>   	 umode_t mode)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_post_create_tmpfile, struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +	 struct inode *inode)
>   LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_link, struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
>   	 struct dentry *new_dentry)
>   LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_unlink, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 977dd9f7f51a..1cb604282617 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
>   				      const struct qstr *name,
>   				      const struct inode *context_inode);
>   int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
> +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +					struct inode *inode);
>   int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
>   			 struct dentry *new_dentry);
>   int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
> @@ -811,6 +813,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir,
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> +static inline void
> +security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode)
> +{ }
> +
>   static inline int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry,
>   				       struct inode *dir,
>   				       struct dentry *new_dentry)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 750bfe2768d5..5bc7edc22923 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -2013,6 +2013,21 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
>   
> +/**
> + * security_inode_post_create_tmpfile() - Update inode security of new tmpfile
> + * @idmap: idmap of the mount
> + * @inode: inode of the new tmpfile
> + *
> + * Update inode security data after a tmpfile has been created.
> + */
> +void security_inode_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> +					struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
> +		return;
> +	call_void_hook(inode_post_create_tmpfile, idmap, inode);
> +}
> +
>   /**
>    * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed
>    * @old_dentry: existing file