Message-ID: <47439997.XUcTiDjVJD@somecomputer>
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 10:59:56 +0100
From: Richard Weinberger <richard@...ma-star.at>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, James Bottomley <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, upstream@...ma-star.at
Cc: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@...nel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, 
	Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@...gutronix.de>, "kernel@...gutronix.de" <kernel@...gutronix.de>, 
	Fabio Estevam <festevam@...il.com>, NXP Linux Team <linux-imx@....com>, 
	Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>, 
	sigma star Kernel Team <upstream+dcp@...ma-star.at>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, 
	Li Yang <leoyang.li@....com>, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, 
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, 
	"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, 
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>, 
	Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, 
	linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, 
	"linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] DCP as trusted keys backend

Am Montag, 5. Februar 2024, 09:39:07 CET schrieb David Gstir:
> Hi,
> 
> > On 15.12.2023, at 12:06, David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at> wrote:
> > 
> > This is a revival of the previous patch set submitted by Richard Weinberger:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210614201620.30451-1-richard@nod.at/
> > 
> > v4 is here:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20231024162024.51260-1-david@sigma-star.at/
> > 
> > v4 -> v5:
> > - Make Kconfig for trust source check scalable as suggested by Jarkko Sakkinen
> > - Add Acked-By from Herbert Xu to patch #1 - thanks!
> > v3 -> v4:
> > - Split changes on MAINTAINERS and documentation into dedicated patches
> > - Use more concise wording in commit messages as suggested by Jarkko Sakkinen
> > v2 -> v3:
> > - Addressed review comments from Jarkko Sakkinen
> > v1 -> v2:
> > - Revive and rebase to latest version
> > - Include review comments from Ahmad Fatoum
> > 
> > The Data CoProcessor (DCP) is an IP core built into many NXP SoCs such
> > as i.mx6ull.
> > 
> > Similar to the CAAM engine used in more powerful SoCs, DCP can AES-
> > encrypt/decrypt user data using a unique, never-disclosed,
> > device-specific key. Unlike CAAM though, it cannot directly wrap and
> > unwrap blobs in hardware. As DCP offers only the bare minimum feature
> > set and a blob mechanism needs aid from software. A blob in this case
> > is a piece of sensitive data (e.g. a key) that is encrypted and
> > authenticated using the device-specific key so that unwrapping can only
> > be done on the hardware where the blob was wrapped.
> > 
> > This patch series adds a DCP based, trusted-key backend and is similar
> > in spirit to the one by Ahmad Fatoum [0] that does the same for CAAM.
> > It is of interest for similar use cases as the CAAM patch set, but for
> > lower end devices, where CAAM is not available.
> > 
> > Because constructing and parsing the blob has to happen in software,
> > we needed to decide on a blob format and chose the following:
> > 
> > struct dcp_blob_fmt {
> > __u8 fmt_version;
> > __u8 blob_key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> > __u8 nonce[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> > __le32 payload_len;
> > __u8 payload[];
> > } __packed;
> > 
> > The `fmt_version` is currently 1.
> > 
> > The encrypted key is stored in the payload area. It is AES-128-GCM
> > encrypted using `blob_key` and `nonce`, GCM auth tag is attached at
> > the end of the payload (`payload_len` does not include the size of
> > the auth tag).
> > 
> > The `blob_key` itself is encrypted in AES-128-ECB mode by DCP using
> > the OTP or UNIQUE device key. A new `blob_key` and `nonce` are generated
> > randomly, when sealing/exporting the DCP blob.
> > 
> > This patchset was tested with dm-crypt on an i.MX6ULL board.
> > 
> > [0] https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20220513145705.2080323-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de/
> > 
> > David Gstir (6):
> >  crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound keys
> >  KEYS: trusted: improve scalability of trust source config
> >  KEYS: trusted: Introduce NXP DCP-backed trusted keys
> >  MAINTAINERS: add entry for DCP-based trusted keys
> >  docs: document DCP-backed trusted keys kernel params
> >  docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new trust source
> > 
> > .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  13 +
> > .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       |  85 +++++
> > MAINTAINERS                                   |   9 +
> > drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c                      | 104 +++++-
> > include/keys/trusted_dcp.h                    |  11 +
> > include/soc/fsl/dcp.h                         |  17 +
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig            |  18 +-
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile           |   2 +
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c     |   6 +-
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c      | 311 ++++++++++++++++++
> > 10 files changed, 562 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> > create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_dcp.h
> > create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/dcp.h
> > create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_dcp.c
> 
> Jarkko, Mimi, David do you need anything from my side for these patches to get them merged?

Friendly ping also from my side. :-)

Thanks,
//richard

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