linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 7/8] sbm: documentation of the x86-64 SandBox Mode implementation

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Message-ID: <eec160a4-fc59-4e7e-885f-0384a7ede4cf@zytor.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 10:37:19 -0800
From: Xin Li <xin@...or.com>
To: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@...weicloud.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
        Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, Ze Gao <zegao2021@...il.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
        Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
        "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
        Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@...el.com>,
        Jacob Pan
 <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
        "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>, petr@...arici.cz,
        Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 7/8] sbm: documentation of the x86-64 SandBox Mode
 implementation

On 2/14/2024 3:35 AM, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> From: Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
> 
> Add a section about the x86-64 implementation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
> ---
>   Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 25 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst b/Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst
> index 4405b8858c4a..84816b6b68de 100644
> --- a/Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/security/sandbox-mode.rst

where is this file?

I assumed it's newly added, but your patch doesn't say so.

> @@ -111,6 +111,31 @@ These hooks must be implemented to select HAVE_ARCH_SBM.
>   		:identifiers: arch_sbm_init arch_sbm_destroy arch_sbm_exec
>   			      arch_sbm_map_readonly arch_sbm_map_writable
>   
> +X86_64 Implementation
> +=====================
> +
> +The x86_64 implementation provides strong isolation and recovery from CPU
> +exceptions.
> +
> +Sandbox mode runs in protection ring 3 (same as user mode). This means that:
> +
> +* sandbox code cannot execute privileged CPU instructions,
> +* memory accesses are treated as user accesses.
> +
> +The thread stack is readable in sandbox mode, because an on-stack data
> +structure is used by call helpers and thunks to pass target function
> +arguments. However, it is not writable, and sandbox code runs on its own
> +stack. The thread stack is not used by interrupt handlers either. Non-IST
> +interrupt handlers run on a separate sandbox exception stack.
> +
> +The interrupt entry path modifies the saved pt_regs to make it appear as
> +coming from kernel mode. The CR3 register is then switched to kernel mode.
> +The interrupt exit path is modified to restore actual pt_regs and switch the
> +CR3 register back to its sandbox mode value, overriding CR3 changes for page
> +table isolation.
> +
> +Support for paravirtualized kernels is not (yet) provided.
> +
>   Current Limitations
>   ===================
>