[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <78fe4fdefa4f427b3fb1b6968d8799035c0c4124.camel@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 19:19:27 +0000
From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: "petr@...arici.cz" <petr@...arici.cz>
CC: "Xu, Pengfei" <pengfei.xu@...el.com>, "tglx@...utronix.de"
<tglx@...utronix.de>, "luto@...nel.org" <luto@...nel.org>,
"kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
"brgerst@...il.com" <brgerst@...il.com>, "jgg@...pe.ca" <jgg@...pe.ca>,
"corbet@....net" <corbet@....net>, "Li, Xin3" <xin3.li@...el.com>,
"roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com" <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com" <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>,
"dwmw@...zon.co.uk" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>, "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
"rppt@...nel.org" <rppt@...nel.org>, "arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>,
"mhiramat@...nel.org" <mhiramat@...nel.org>, "oleg@...hat.com"
<oleg@...hat.com>, "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>, "Huang,
Kai" <kai.huang@...el.com>, "jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com"
<jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>, "zegao2021@...il.com" <zegao2021@...il.com>,
"hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>, "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
"jpoimboe@...nel.org" <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, "Rodel, Jorg" <jroedel@...e.de>,
"Zhang, Tina" <tina.zhang@...el.com>, "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
"linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
"akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"petrtesarik@...weicloud.com" <petrtesarik@...weicloud.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks
On Wed, 2024-02-14 at 19:32 +0100, Petr Tesařík wrote:
> > What use case needs to have the sandbox both protected from the
> > kernel
> > (trusted operations) and non-privileged (the kernel protected from
> > it
> > via CPL3)? It seems like opposite things.
>
> I think I have mentioned one: parsing keys for the trusted keyring.
> The
> parser is complex enough to be potentially buggy, but the security
> folks have already dismissed the idea to run it as a user mode
> helper.
Ah, I didn't realize the kernel needed to be protected from the key
parsing part because you called it out as a trusted operation. So on
the protect-the-kernel-side it's similar to the microkernel security
reasoning.
Did I get the other part wrong - that you want to protect the sandbox
from the rest of kernel as well?
Powered by blists - more mailing lists