linux-kernel - [PATCH v1 3/8] sbm: x86: map system data structures into the sandbox

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Message-Id: <20240214113516.2307-4-petrtesarik@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 12:35:11 +0100
From: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@...weicloud.com>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	x86@...nel.org (maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)),
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
	Ze Gao <zegao2021@...il.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
	Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
	Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@...el.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
	linux-doc@...r.kernel.org (open list:DOCUMENTATION),
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org (open list)
Cc: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
	petr@...arici.cz,
	Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 3/8] sbm: x86: map system data structures into the sandbox

From: Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>

Map CPU system data structures (GDT, TSS, IDT) read-only into every sandbox
instance. Map interrupt stacks read-write.

The TSS mappings may look confusing. The trick is that TSS pages are mapped
twice in the kernel address space: once read-only and once read-write. The
GDT entry for the TR register uses the read-only address, but since __pa()
does not work for virtual addresses in this range (cpu_entry_area), use the
read-write mapping to get TSS physical address.

Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/sbm/core.c           | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
index 06ef25411d62..62f6e40b3361 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #define	IST_INDEX_DB		2
 #define	IST_INDEX_MCE		3
 #define	IST_INDEX_VC		4
+#define	IST_INDEX_NUM		7
 
 /*
  * Set __PAGE_OFFSET to the most negative possible address +
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sbm/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sbm/core.c
index de6986801148..f3a123d64afc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sbm/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sbm/core.c
@@ -7,9 +7,13 @@
  * SandBox Mode (SBM) implementation for the x86 architecture.
  */
 
+#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/sbm.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/sbm.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
@@ -155,6 +159,72 @@ static int map_kernel(struct x86_sbm_state *state)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/** map_cpu_data() - map CPU system data structures into a sandbox instance
+ * @sbm:  Target sandbox instance.
+ *
+ * Create sandbox page tables for:
+ * * Global Descriptor Table (GDT)
+ * * Task State Segment (TSS)
+ * * Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT).
+ *
+ * Return: Zero on success, negative error code on failure.
+ */
+static int map_cpu_data(struct x86_sbm_state *state)
+{
+	unsigned long off;
+	phys_addr_t paddr;
+	unsigned int ist;
+	void *vaddr;
+	int cpu;
+	int err;
+
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+		struct cpu_entry_area *cea;
+		struct tss_struct *tss;
+
+		err = map_page(state, (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_ro(cpu),
+			       PHYS_PFN(get_cpu_gdt_paddr(cpu)),
+			       PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		cea = get_cpu_entry_area(cpu);
+
+		tss = &cea->tss;
+		paddr = __pa(&per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu));
+		for (off = 0; off < sizeof(cpu_tss_rw); off += PAGE_SIZE) {
+			err = map_page(state, (unsigned long)tss + off,
+				       PHYS_PFN(paddr + off), PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+		}
+
+		paddr = slow_virt_to_phys(&cea->entry_stack_page);
+		err = map_page(state, (unsigned long)&cea->entry_stack_page,
+			       PHYS_PFN(paddr), PAGE_KERNEL);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		for (ist = 0; ist < IST_INDEX_NUM; ++ist) {
+			vaddr = (void *)tss->x86_tss.ist[ist];
+			if (!vaddr)
+				continue;
+
+			for (off = EXCEPTION_STKSZ; off; off -= PAGE_SIZE) {
+				paddr = slow_virt_to_phys(vaddr - off);
+				err = map_page(state, (unsigned long)vaddr - off,
+					       PHYS_PFN(paddr), PAGE_KERNEL);
+				if (err)
+					return err;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	paddr = slow_virt_to_phys((void *)CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT);
+	return map_page(state, CPU_ENTRY_AREA_RO_IDT, PHYS_PFN(paddr),
+			PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+}
+
 int arch_sbm_init(struct sbm *sbm)
 {
 	struct x86_sbm_state *state;
@@ -194,6 +264,10 @@ int arch_sbm_init(struct sbm *sbm)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
+	err = map_cpu_data(state);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1