linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH RFT v5 1/7] Documentation: userspace-api: Add shadow stack API documentation

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAKC1njQk7LajEMffAVMb76j6ndrixWyRgHf8XudSL-AzNn4s_g@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 2024 20:08:22 -0800
From: Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
Cc: "Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@....com>, 
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, 
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, 
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, x86@...nel.org, 
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@...hat.com>, 
	Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@...aro.org>, Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@....com>, 
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Ben Segall <bsegall@...gle.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@...e.de>, 
	Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@...hat.com>, Valentin Schneider <vschneid@...hat.com>, 
	Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, 
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, jannh@...gle.com, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-api@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFT v5 1/7] Documentation: userspace-api: Add shadow stack
 API documentation

On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 4:05 PM Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> There are a number of architectures with shadow stack features which we are
> presenting to userspace with as consistent an API as we can (though there
> are some architecture specifics). Especially given that there are some
> important considerations for userspace code interacting directly with the
> feature let's provide some documentation covering the common aspects.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@...nel.org>
> ---
>  Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst        |  1 +
>  Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
> index 09f61bd2ac2e..c142183d9c98 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/index.rst
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ place where this information is gathered.
>     iommufd
>     media/index
>     netlink/index
> +   shadow_stack
>     sysfs-platform_profile
>     vduse
>     futex2
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c6e5ab795b60
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/shadow_stack.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
> +=============
> +Shadow Stacks
> +=============
> +
> +Introduction
> +============
> +
> +Several architectures have features which provide backward edge
> +control flow protection through a hardware maintained stack, only
> +writeable by userspace through very limited operations.  This feature
> +is referred to as shadow stacks on Linux, on x86 it is part of Intel
> +Control Enforcement Technology (CET), on arm64 it is Guarded Control
> +Stacks feature (FEAT_GCS) and for RISC-V it is the Zicfiss extension.
> +It is expected that this feature will normally be managed by the
> +system dynamic linker and libc in ways broadly transparent to
> +application code, this document covers interfaces and considerations
> +
> +
> +Enabling
> +========
> +
> +Shadow stacks default to disabled when a userspace process is
> +executed, they can be enabled for the current thread with a syscall:
> +
> + - For x86 the ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE arch_prctl()
> +
> +It is expected that this will normally be done by the dynamic linker.
> +Any new threads created by a thread with shadow stacks enabled will
> +themsleves have shadow stacks enabled.
> +
> +
> +Enablement considerations
> +=========================
> +
> +- Returning from the function that enables shadow stacks without first
> +  disabling them will cause a shadow stack exception.  This includes
> +  any syscall wrapper or other library functions, the syscall will need
> +  to be inlined.
> +- A lock feature allows userspace to prevent disabling of shadow stacks.
> +- This that change the stack context like longjmp() or use of ucontext
> +  changes on signal return will need support from libc.

For enabling considerations, it will be good to have some words on ss tokens
too, probably along the following lines.

- Shadow stack tokens: During shadow stack switches (either by user mode
or kernel), to prevent inadvertent shadow stack pivoting, it is expected to save
some predefined formatted token during shadow stack save operation and
validating the token during shadow stack restore operation.

>
> --
> 2.30.2
>