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Message-ID: <81e7b13f-2e02-466c-87dd-2f3e56c9a4d5@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 14:26:54 -0800
From: ross.philipson@...cle.com
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org, dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com,
tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, bp@...en8.de, hpa@...or.com,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, mjg59@...f.ucam.org,
James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com, peterhuewe@....de,
jarkko@...nel.org, jgg@...pe.ca, luto@...capital.net,
nivedita@...m.mit.edu, herbert@...dor.apana.org.au,
davem@...emloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com, ross.philipson@...cle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 07/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
On 2/15/24 12:29 AM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:32, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com> wrote:
>>
>> The Secure Launch (SL) stub provides the entry point for Intel TXT (and
>> later AMD SKINIT) to vector to during the late launch. The symbol
>> sl_stub_entry is that entry point and its offset into the kernel is
>> conveyed to the launching code using the MLE (Measured Launch
>> Environment) header in the structure named mle_header. The offset of the
>> MLE header is set in the kernel_info. The routine sl_stub contains the
>> very early late launch setup code responsible for setting up the basic
>> environment to allow the normal kernel startup_32 code to proceed. It is
>> also responsible for properly waking and handling the APs on Intel
>> platforms. The routine sl_main which runs after entering 64b mode is
>> responsible for measuring configuration and module information before
>> it is used like the boot params, the kernel command line, the TXT heap,
>> an external initramfs, etc.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>
>> ---
>> Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst | 21 +
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 3 +-
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 34 ++
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S | 34 ++
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c | 582 ++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S | 705 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +
>> arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h | 1 +
>> arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 20 +
>> 9 files changed, 1404 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
>> create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
>> index c513855a54bb..ce6a51c6d4e7 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/boot.rst
>> @@ -482,6 +482,14 @@ Protocol: 2.00+
>> - If 1, KASLR enabled.
>> - If 0, KASLR disabled.
>>
>> + Bit 2 (kernel internal): SLAUNCH_FLAG
>> +
>> + - Used internally by the compressed kernel to communicate
>
> decompressor
Yea or I will switch it to setup kernel to keep it consistent with other
instances.
>
>> + Secure Launch status to kernel proper.
>> +
>> + - If 1, Secure Launch enabled.
>> + - If 0, Secure Launch disabled.
>> +
>> Bit 5 (write): QUIET_FLAG
>>
>> - If 0, print early messages.
>> @@ -1027,6 +1035,19 @@ Offset/size: 0x000c/4
>>
>> This field contains maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs.
>>
>> +============ =================
>> +Field name: mle_header_offset
>> +Offset/size: 0x0010/4
>> +============ =================
>> +
>> + This field contains the offset to the Secure Launch Measured Launch Environment
>> + (MLE) header. This offset is used to locate information needed during a secure
>> + late launch using Intel TXT. If the offset is zero, the kernel does not have
>> + Secure Launch capabilities. The MLE entry point is called from TXT on the BSP
>> + following a success measured launch. The specific state of the processors is
>> + outlined in the TXT Software Development Guide, the latest can be found here:
>> + https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/guides/intel-txt-software-development-guide.pdf__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!LHWSKdqHGtnUNYJyVgZfPeQnsg3uWmOJqKGAFDxrHk040zu928199hWhzHehPJzI9IkV4InNQZI5yIX4$
>> +
>>
>> The Image Checksum
>> ==================
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
>> index a1b018eb9801..012f7ca780c3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
>> @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI) += $(obj)/efi.o
>> vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_mixed.o
>> vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) += $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
>>
>> -vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o
>> +vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/early_sha1.o $(obj)/early_sha256.o \
>> + $(obj)/sl_main.o $(obj)/sl_stub.o
>>
>> $(obj)/vmlinux: $(vmlinux-objs-y) FORCE
>> $(call if_changed,ld)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>> index bf4a10a5794f..6fa5bb87195b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
>> @@ -415,6 +415,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64)
>> pushq $0
>> popfq
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> + pushq %rsi >> +
> > This push and the associated pop are no longer needed.
Hmm, I thought I got rid of that when I saw boot params had been moved
to r15. Will fix.
>
>> + /* Ensure the relocation region coverd by a PMR */
>
> 'is covered'
Ack
>
>> + movq %rbx, %rdi
>> + movl $(_bss - startup_32), %esi
>> + callq sl_check_region
>> +
>> + popq %rsi
>> +#endif
>> +
>> /*
>> * Copy the compressed kernel to the end of our buffer
>> * where decompression in place becomes safe.
>> @@ -457,6 +468,29 @@ SYM_FUNC_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(.Lrelocated)
>> shrq $3, %rcx
>> rep stosq
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> + /*
>> + * Have to do the final early sl stub work in 64b area.
>> + *
>> + * *********** NOTE ***********
>> + *
>> + * Several boot params get used before we get a chance to measure
>> + * them in this call. This is a known issue and we currently don't
>> + * have a solution. The scratch field doesn't matter. There is no
>> + * obvious way to do anything about the use of kernel_alignment or
>> + * init_size though these seem low risk with all the PMR and overlap
>> + * checks in place.
>> + */
>> + movq %r15, %rdi
>> + callq sl_main
>> +
>> + /* Ensure the decompression location is coverd by a PMR */
>
> covered
Ack
>
>> + movq %rbp, %rdi
>> + movq output_len(%rip), %rsi
>> + callq sl_check_region
>> +#endif
>> +
>> + pushq %rsi
>> call load_stage2_idt
>>
>> /* Pass boot_params to initialize_identity_maps() */
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>> index c18f07181dd5..e199b87764e9 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kernel_info.S
>> @@ -28,6 +28,40 @@ SYM_DATA_START(kernel_info)
>> /* Maximal allowed type for setup_data and setup_indirect structs. */
>> .long SETUP_TYPE_MAX
>>
>> + /* Offset to the MLE header structure */
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
>> + .long rva(mle_header)
>> +#else
>> + .long 0
>> +#endif
>> +
>> kernel_info_var_len_data:
>> /* Empty for time being... */
>> SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(kernel_info, SYM_L_LOCAL, kernel_info_end)
>> +
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)
>> + /*
>> + * The MLE Header per the TXT Specification, section 2.1
>> + * MLE capabilities, see table 4. Capabilities set:
>> + * bit 0: Support for GETSEC[WAKEUP] for RLP wakeup
>> + * bit 1: Support for RLP wakeup using MONITOR address
>> + * bit 2: The ECX register will contain the pointer to the MLE page table
>> + * bit 5: TPM 1.2 family: Details/authorities PCR usage support
>> + * bit 9: Supported format of TPM 2.0 event log - TCG compliant
>> + */
>> +SYM_DATA_START(mle_header)
>> + .long 0x9082ac5a /* UUID0 */
>> + .long 0x74a7476f /* UUID1 */
>> + .long 0xa2555c0f /* UUID2 */
>> + .long 0x42b651cb /* UUID3 */
>> + .long 0x00000034 /* MLE header size */
>> + .long 0x00020002 /* MLE version 2.2 */
>> + .long rva(sl_stub_entry) /* Linear entry point of MLE (virt. address) */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* First valid page of MLE */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* Offset within binary of first byte of MLE */
>> + .long rva(_edata) /* Offset within binary of last byte + 1 of MLE */
>> + .long 0x00000227 /* Bit vector of MLE-supported capabilities */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* Starting linear address of command line (unused) */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* Ending linear address of command line (unused) */
>> +SYM_DATA_END(mle_header)
>> +#endif
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..cd9e5c1f1719
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_main.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,582 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>> +/*
>> + * Secure Launch early measurement and validation routines.
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (c) 2022, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/init.h>
>> +#include <linux/string.h>
>> +#include <linux/linkage.h>
>> +#include <asm/segment.h>
>> +#include <asm/boot.h>
>> +#include <asm/msr.h>
>> +#include <asm/mtrr.h>
>> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>> +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
>> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
>> +#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
>> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
>> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>> +#include <crypto/sha1.h>
>> +#include <crypto/sha2.h>
>> +
>> +#define CAPS_VARIABLE_MTRR_COUNT_MASK 0xff
>> +
>> +#define SL_TPM12_LOG 1
>> +#define SL_TPM20_LOG 2
>> +
>> +#define SL_TPM20_MAX_ALGS 2
>> +
>> +#define SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA 64
>> +#define SL_TPM12_LOG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + \
>> + SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA)
>> +#define SL_TPM20_LOG_SIZE (sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head) + \
>> + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + \
>> + sizeof(struct tcg_event_field) + \
>> + SL_MAX_EVENT_DATA)
>> +
>> +static void *evtlog_base;
>> +static u32 evtlog_size;
>> +static struct txt_heap_event_log_pointer2_1_element *log20_elem;
>> +static u32 tpm_log_ver = SL_TPM12_LOG;
>> +static struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs tpm_algs[SL_TPM20_MAX_ALGS] = {0};
>> +
>> +extern u32 sl_cpu_type;
>> +extern u32 sl_mle_start;
>> +
>> +static u64 sl_txt_read(u32 reg)
>> +{
>> + return readq((void *)(u64)(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + reg));
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_txt_write(u32 reg, u64 val)
>> +{
>> + writeq(val, (void *)(u64)(TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + reg));
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void __noreturn sl_txt_reset(u64 error)
>> +{
>> + /* Reading the E2STS register acts as a barrier for TXT registers */
>> + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_ERRORCODE, error);
>> + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_E2STS);
>> + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG, 1);
>> + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_E2STS);
>> + sl_txt_write(TXT_CR_CMD_RESET, 1);
>> +
>> + for ( ; ; )
>> + asm volatile ("hlt");
>> +
>> + unreachable();
>> +}
>> +
>> +static u64 sl_rdmsr(u32 reg)
>> +{
>> + u64 lo, hi;
>> +
>> + asm volatile ("rdmsr" : "=a" (lo), "=d" (hi) : "c" (reg));
>> +
>
> No need for volatile.
Ok.
Thanks
Ross
>
>> + return (hi << 32) | lo;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static struct slr_table *sl_locate_and_validate_slrt(void)
>> +{
>> + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data;
>> + struct slr_table *slrt;
>> + void *txt_heap;
>> +
>> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
>> + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
>> +
>> + if (!os_mle_data->slrt)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT);
>> +
>> + slrt = (struct slr_table *)os_mle_data->slrt;
>> +
>> + if (slrt->magic != SLR_TABLE_MAGIC)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT);
>> +
>> + if (slrt->architecture != SLR_INTEL_TXT)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INVALID_SLRT);
>> +
>> + return slrt;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_check_pmr_coverage(void *base, u32 size, bool allow_hi)
>> +{
>> + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
>> + void *end = base + size;
>> + void *txt_heap;
>> +
>> + if (!(sl_cpu_type & SL_CPU_INTEL))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
>> + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
>> +
>> + if ((end >= (void *)0x100000000ULL) && (base < (void *)0x100000000ULL))
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_REGION_STRADDLE_4GB);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Note that the late stub code validates that the hi PMR covers
>> + * all memory above 4G. At this point the code can only check that
>> + * regions are within the hi PMR but that is sufficient.
>> + */
>> + if ((end > (void *)0x100000000ULL) && (base >= (void *)0x100000000ULL)) {
>> + if (allow_hi) {
>> + if (end >= (void *)(os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_hi_base +
>> + os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_hi_size))
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR);
>> + } else {
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_REGION_ABOVE_4GB);
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (end >= (void *)os_sinit_data->vtd_pmr_lo_size)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR);
>> +}
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Some MSRs are modified by the pre-launch code including the MTRRs.
>> + * The early MLE code has to restore these values. This code validates
>> + * the values after they are measured.
>> + */
>> +static void sl_txt_validate_msrs(struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data)
>> +{
>> + struct slr_txt_mtrr_state *saved_bsp_mtrrs;
>> + u64 mtrr_caps, mtrr_def_type, mtrr_var;
>> + struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info;
>> + u64 misc_en_msr;
>> + u32 vcnt, i;
>> +
>> + txt_info = (struct slr_entry_intel_info *)os_mle_data->txt_info;
>> + saved_bsp_mtrrs = &txt_info->saved_bsp_mtrrs;
>> +
>> + mtrr_caps = sl_rdmsr(MSR_MTRRcap);
>> + vcnt = (u32)(mtrr_caps & CAPS_VARIABLE_MTRR_COUNT_MASK);
>> +
>> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt > vcnt)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_VCNT);
>> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt > TXT_OS_MLE_MAX_VARIABLE_MTRRS)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_VCNT);
>> +
>> + mtrr_def_type = sl_rdmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType);
>> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->default_mem_type != mtrr_def_type)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_DEF_TYPE);
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_vcnt; i++) {
>> + mtrr_var = sl_rdmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(i));
>> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_pair[i].mtrr_physbase != mtrr_var)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_BASE);
>> + mtrr_var = sl_rdmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(i));
>> + if (saved_bsp_mtrrs->mtrr_pair[i].mtrr_physmask != mtrr_var)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MTRR_INV_MASK);
>> + }
>> +
>> + misc_en_msr = sl_rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE);
>> + if (txt_info->saved_misc_enable_msr != misc_en_msr)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MSR_INV_MISC_EN);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_find_drtm_event_log(struct slr_table *slrt)
>> +{
>> + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
>> + struct slr_entry_log_info *log_info;
>> + void *txt_heap;
>> +
>> + log_info = (struct slr_entry_log_info *)
>> + slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_LOG_INFO);
>> + if (!log_info)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY);
>> +
>> + evtlog_base = (void *)log_info->addr;
>> + evtlog_size = log_info->size;
>> +
>> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * For TPM 2.0, the event log 2.1 extended data structure has to also
>> + * be located and fixed up.
>> + */
>> + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Only support version 6 and later that properly handle the
>> + * list of ExtDataElements in the OS-SINIT structure.
>> + */
>> + if (os_sinit_data->version < 6)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_OS_SINIT_BAD_VERSION);
>> +
>> + /* Find the TPM2.0 logging extended heap element */
>> + log20_elem = tpm20_find_log2_1_element(os_sinit_data);
>> +
>> + /* If found, this implies TPM20 log and family */
>> + if (log20_elem)
>> + tpm_log_ver = SL_TPM20_LOG;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_validate_event_log_buffer(void)
>> +{
>> + struct txt_os_sinit_data *os_sinit_data;
>> + void *txt_heap, *txt_end;
>> + void *mle_base, *mle_end;
>> + void *evtlog_end;
>> +
>> + if ((u64)evtlog_size > (LLONG_MAX - (u64)evtlog_base))
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_INTEGER_OVERFLOW);
>> + evtlog_end = evtlog_base + evtlog_size;
>> +
>> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
>> + txt_end = txt_heap + sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_SIZE);
>> + os_sinit_data = txt_os_sinit_data_start(txt_heap);
>> +
>> + mle_base = (void *)(u64)sl_mle_start;
>> + mle_end = mle_base + os_sinit_data->mle_size;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * This check is to ensure the event log buffer does not overlap with
>> + * the MLE image.
>> + */
>> + if (evtlog_base >= mle_end && evtlog_end > mle_end)
>> + goto pmr_check; /* above */
>> +
>> + if (evtlog_end <= mle_base && evtlog_base < mle_base)
>> + goto pmr_check; /* below */
>> +
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_MLE_BUFFER_OVERLAP);
>> +
>> +pmr_check:
>> + /*
>> + * The TXT heap is protected by the DPR. If the TPM event log is
>> + * inside the TXT heap, there is no need for a PMR check.
>> + */
>> + if (evtlog_base > txt_heap && evtlog_end < txt_end)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + sl_check_pmr_coverage(evtlog_base, evtlog_size, true);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_find_event_log_algorithms(void)
>> +{
>> + struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *efi_head =
>> + (struct tcg_efi_specid_event_head *)(evtlog_base +
>> + log20_elem->first_record_offset +
>> + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event));
>> +
>> + if (efi_head->num_algs == 0 || efi_head->num_algs > 2)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_NUMBER_ALGS);
>> +
>> + memcpy(&tpm_algs[0], &efi_head->digest_sizes[0],
>> + sizeof(struct tcg_efi_specid_event_algs) * efi_head->num_algs);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_tpm12_log_event(u32 pcr, u32 event_type,
>> + const u8 *data, u32 length,
>> + const u8 *event_data, u32 event_size)
>> +{
>> + u8 sha1_hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
>> + u8 log_buf[SL_TPM12_LOG_SIZE] = {0};
>> + struct tcg_pcr_event *pcr_event;
>> + u32 total_size;
>> +
>> + pcr_event = (struct tcg_pcr_event *)log_buf;
>> + pcr_event->pcr_idx = pcr;
>> + pcr_event->event_type = event_type;
>> + if (length > 0) {
>> + sha1(data, length, &sha1_hash[0]);
>> + memcpy(&pcr_event->digest[0], &sha1_hash[0], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> + }
>> + pcr_event->event_size = event_size;
>> + if (event_size > 0)
>> + memcpy((u8 *)pcr_event + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event),
>> + event_data, event_size);
>> +
>> + total_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event) + event_size;
>> +
>> + if (tpm12_log_event(evtlog_base, evtlog_size, total_size, pcr_event))
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_LOGGING_FAILED);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_tpm20_log_event(u32 pcr, u32 event_type,
>> + const u8 *data, u32 length,
>> + const u8 *event_data, u32 event_size)
>> +{
>> + u8 sha256_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
>> + u8 sha1_hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE] = {0};
>> + u8 log_buf[SL_TPM20_LOG_SIZE] = {0};
>> + struct sha256_state sctx256 = {0};
>> + struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *head;
>> + struct tcg_event_field *event;
>> + u32 total_size;
>> + u16 *alg_ptr;
>> + u8 *dgst_ptr;
>> +
>> + head = (struct tcg_pcr_event2_head *)log_buf;
>> + head->pcr_idx = pcr;
>> + head->event_type = event_type;
>> + total_size = sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head);
>> + alg_ptr = (u16 *)(log_buf + sizeof(struct tcg_pcr_event2_head));
>> +
>> + for ( ; head->count < 2; head->count++) {
>> + if (!tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id)
>> + break;
>> +
>> + *alg_ptr = tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id;
>> + dgst_ptr = (u8 *)alg_ptr + sizeof(u16);
>> +
>> + if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA256 &&
>> + length) {
>> + sha256_init(&sctx256);
>> + sha256_update(&sctx256, data, length);
>> + sha256_final(&sctx256, &sha256_hash[0]);
>> + } else if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA1 &&
>> + length) {
>> + sha1(data, length, &sha1_hash[0]);
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA256) {
>> + memcpy(dgst_ptr, &sha256_hash[0], SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> + total_size += SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16);
>> + alg_ptr = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_ptr + SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16));
>> + } else if (tpm_algs[head->count].alg_id == TPM_ALG_SHA1) {
>> + memcpy(dgst_ptr, &sha1_hash[0], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
>> + total_size += SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16);
>> + alg_ptr = (u16 *)((u8 *)alg_ptr + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + sizeof(u16));
>> + } else {
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> + event = (struct tcg_event_field *)(log_buf + total_size);
>> + event->event_size = event_size;
>> + if (event_size > 0)
>> + memcpy((u8 *)event + sizeof(struct tcg_event_field), event_data, event_size);
>> + total_size += sizeof(struct tcg_event_field) + event_size;
>> +
>> + if (tpm20_log_event(log20_elem, evtlog_base, evtlog_size, total_size, &log_buf[0]))
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_TPM_LOGGING_FAILED);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(u32 pcr, u32 type,
>> + const u8 *data, u32 length, const char *desc)
>> +{
>> + if (tpm_log_ver == SL_TPM20_LOG)
>> + sl_tpm20_log_event(pcr, type, data, length,
>> + (const u8 *)desc, strlen(desc));
>> + else
>> + sl_tpm12_log_event(pcr, type, data, length,
>> + (const u8 *)desc, strlen(desc));
>> +}
>> +
>> +static struct setup_data *sl_handle_setup_data(struct setup_data *curr,
>> + struct slr_policy_entry *entry)
>> +{
>> + struct setup_indirect *ind;
>> + struct setup_data *next;
>> +
>> + if (!curr)
>> + return NULL;
>> +
>> + next = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)curr->next;
>> +
>> + /* SETUP_INDIRECT instances have to be handled differently */
>> + if (curr->type == SETUP_INDIRECT) {
>> + ind = (struct setup_indirect *)((u8 *)curr + offsetof(struct setup_data, data));
>> +
>> + sl_check_pmr_coverage((void *)ind->addr, ind->len, true);
>> +
>> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
>> + (void *)ind->addr, ind->len,
>> + entry->evt_info);
>> +
>> + return next;
>> + }
>> +
>> + sl_check_pmr_coverage(((u8 *)curr) + sizeof(struct setup_data),
>> + curr->len, true);
>> +
>> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
>> + ((u8 *)curr) + sizeof(struct setup_data),
>> + curr->len,
>> + entry->evt_info);
>> +
>> + return next;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_extend_setup_data(struct slr_policy_entry *entry)
>> +{
>> + struct setup_data *data;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Measuring the boot params measured the fixed e820 memory map.
>> + * Measure any setup_data entries including e820 extended entries.
>> + */
>> + data = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)entry->entity;
>> + while (data)
>> + data = sl_handle_setup_data(data, entry);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_extend_slrt(struct slr_policy_entry *entry)
>> +{
>> + struct slr_table *slrt = (struct slr_table *)entry->entity;
>> + struct slr_entry_intel_info *intel_info;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * In revision one of the SLRT, the only table that needs to be
>> + * measured is the Intel info table. Everything else is meta-data,
>> + * addresses and sizes. Note the size of what to measure is not set.
>> + * The flag SLR_POLICY_IMPLICIT_SIZE leaves it to the measuring code
>> + * to sort out.
>> + */
>> + if (slrt->revision == 1) {
>> + intel_info = (struct slr_entry_intel_info *)slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO);
>> + if (!intel_info)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY);
>> +
>> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
>> + (void *)entry->entity, sizeof(struct slr_entry_intel_info),
>> + entry->evt_info);
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_extend_txt_os2mle(struct slr_policy_entry *entry)
>> +{
>> + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data;
>> + void *txt_heap;
>> +
>> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
>> + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Version 1 of the OS-MLE heap structure has no fields to measure. It just
>> + * has addresses and sizes and a scratch buffer.
>> + */
>> + if (os_mle_data->version == 1)
>> + return;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_process_extend_policy(struct slr_table *slrt)
>> +{
>> + struct slr_entry_policy *policy;
>> + struct slr_policy_entry *entry;
>> + u16 i;
>> +
>> + policy = (struct slr_entry_policy *)slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY);
>> + if (!policy)
>> + sl_txt_reset(SL_ERROR_SLRT_MISSING_ENTRY);
>> +
>> + entry = (struct slr_policy_entry *)((u8 *)policy + sizeof(*policy));
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++, entry++) {
>> + switch (entry->entity_type) {
>> + case SLR_ET_SETUP_DATA:
>> + sl_extend_setup_data(entry);
>> + break;
>> + case SLR_ET_SLRT:
>> + sl_extend_slrt(entry);
>> + break;
>> + case SLR_ET_TXT_OS2MLE:
>> + sl_extend_txt_os2mle(entry);
>> + break;
>> + case SLR_ET_UNUSED:
>> + continue;
>> + default:
>> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
>> + (void *)entry->entity, entry->size,
>> + entry->evt_info);
>> + }
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +static void sl_process_extend_uefi_config(struct slr_table *slrt)
>> +{
>> + struct slr_entry_uefi_config *uefi_config;
>> + struct slr_uefi_cfg_entry *uefi_entry;
>> + u64 i;
>> +
>> + uefi_config =(struct slr_entry_uefi_config *)slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_UEFI_CONFIG);
>> +
>> + /* Optionally here depending on how SL kernel was booted */
>> + if (!uefi_config)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + uefi_entry = (struct slr_uefi_cfg_entry *)((u8 *)uefi_config + sizeof(*uefi_config));
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < uefi_config->nr_entries; i++, uefi_entry++) {
>> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(uefi_entry->pcr, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH,
>> + (void *)uefi_entry->cfg, uefi_entry->size,
>> + uefi_entry->evt_info);
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage __visible void sl_check_region(void *base, u32 size)
>> +{
>> + sl_check_pmr_coverage(base, size, false);
>> +}
>> +
>> +asmlinkage __visible void sl_main(void *bootparams)
>> +{
>> + struct boot_params *bp = (struct boot_params *)bootparams;
>> + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle_data;
>> + struct slr_table *slrt;
>> + void *txt_heap;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Ensure loadflags do not indicate a secure launch was done
>> + * unless it really was.
>> + */
>> + bp->hdr.loadflags &= ~SLAUNCH_FLAG;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Currently only Intel TXT is supported for Secure Launch. Testing
>> + * this value also indicates that the kernel was booted successfully
>> + * through the Secure Launch entry point and is in SMX mode.
>> + */
>> + if (!(sl_cpu_type & SL_CPU_INTEL))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + slrt = sl_locate_and_validate_slrt();
>> +
>> + /* Locate the TPM event log. */
>> + sl_find_drtm_event_log(slrt);
>> +
>> + /* Validate the location of the event log buffer before using it */
>> + sl_validate_event_log_buffer();
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Find the TPM hash algorithms used by the ACM and recorded in the
>> + * event log.
>> + */
>> + if (tpm_log_ver == SL_TPM20_LOG)
>> + sl_find_event_log_algorithms();
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Sanitize them before measuring. Set the SLAUNCH_FLAG early since if
>> + * anything fails, the system will reset anyway.
>> + */
>> + sanitize_boot_params(bp);
>> + bp->hdr.loadflags |= SLAUNCH_FLAG;
>> +
>> + sl_check_pmr_coverage(bootparams, PAGE_SIZE, false);
>> +
>> + /* Place event log SL specific tags before and after measurements */
>> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(17, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_START, NULL, 0, "");
>> +
>> + /* Process all policy entries and extend the measurements to the evtlog */
>> + sl_process_extend_policy(slrt);
>> +
>> + /* Process all EFI config entries and extend the measurements to the evtlog */
>> + sl_process_extend_uefi_config(slrt);
>> +
>> + sl_tpm_extend_evtlog(17, TXT_EVTYPE_SLAUNCH_END, NULL, 0, "");
>> +
>> + /* No PMR check is needed, the TXT heap is covered by the DPR */
>> + txt_heap = (void *)sl_txt_read(TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE);
>> + os_mle_data = txt_os_mle_data_start(txt_heap);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Now that the OS-MLE data is measured, ensure the MTRR and
>> + * misc enable MSRs are what we expect.
>> + */
>> + sl_txt_validate_msrs(os_mle_data);
>> +}
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..42a7436cf2ee
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sl_stub.S
>> @@ -0,0 +1,705 @@
>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * Secure Launch protected mode entry point.
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (c) 2022, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
>> + */
>> + .code32
>> + .text
>> +#include <linux/linkage.h>
>> +#include <asm/segment.h>
>> +#include <asm/msr.h>
>> +#include <asm/apicdef.h>
>> +#include <asm/trapnr.h>
>> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
>> +#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
>> +#include <asm/bootparam.h>
>> +#include <asm/page_types.h>
>> +#include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
>> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
>> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>> +
>> +/* CPUID: leaf 1, ECX, SMX feature bit */
>> +#define X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX (1 << 6)
>> +
>> +#define IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS 0
>> +#define IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS 6
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * See the comment in head_64.S for detailed information on what this macro
>> + * and others like it are used for. The comment appears right at the top of
>> + * the file.
>> + */
>> +#define rva(X) ((X) - sl_stub_entry)
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * The GETSEC op code is open coded because older versions of
>> + * GCC do not support the getsec mnemonic.
>> + */
>> +.macro GETSEC leaf
>> + pushl %ebx
>> + xorl %ebx, %ebx /* Must be zero for SMCTRL */
>> + movl \leaf, %eax /* Leaf function */
>> + .byte 0x0f, 0x37 /* GETSEC opcode */
>> + popl %ebx
>> +.endm
>> +
>> +.macro TXT_RESET error
>> + /*
>> + * Set a sticky error value and reset. Note the movs to %eax act as
>> + * TXT register barriers.
>> + */
>> + movl \error, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ERRORCODE)
>> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
>> + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_NO_SECRETS)
>> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
>> + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_UNLOCK_MEM_CONFIG)
>> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_E2STS), %eax
>> + movl $1, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_CMD_RESET)
>> +1:
>> + hlt
>> + jmp 1b
>> +.endm
>> +
>> + .code32
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_stub_entry)
>> + cli
>> + cld
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * On entry, %ebx has the entry abs offset to sl_stub_entry. This
>> + * will be correctly scaled using the rva macro and avoid causing
>> + * relocations. Only %cs and %ds segments are known good.
>> + */
>> +
>> + /* Load GDT, set segment regs and lret to __SL32_CS */
>> + leal rva(sl_gdt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
>> + addl %eax, 2(%eax)
>> + lgdt (%eax)
>> +
>> + movl $(__SL32_DS), %eax
>> + movw %ax, %ds
>> + movw %ax, %es
>> + movw %ax, %fs
>> + movw %ax, %gs
>> + movw %ax, %ss
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Now that %ss is known good, take the first stack for the BSP. The
>> + * AP stacks are only used on Intel.
>> + */
>> + leal rva(sl_stacks_end)(%ebx), %esp
>> +
>> + leal rva(.Lsl_cs)(%ebx), %eax
>> + pushl $(__SL32_CS)
>> + pushl %eax
>> + lret
>> +
>> +.Lsl_cs:
>> + /* Save our base pointer reg and page table for MLE */
>> + pushl %ebx
>> + pushl %ecx
>> +
>> + /* See if SMX feature is supported. */
>> + movl $1, %eax
>> + cpuid
>> + testl $(X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX), %ecx
>> + jz .Ldo_unknown_cpu
>> +
>> + popl %ecx
>> + popl %ebx
>> +
>> + /* Know it is Intel */
>> + movl $(SL_CPU_INTEL), rva(sl_cpu_type)(%ebx)
>> +
>> + /* Locate the base of the MLE using the page tables in %ecx */
>> + call sl_find_mle_base
>> +
>> + /* Increment CPU count for BSP */
>> + incl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx)
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] which were disabled by SENTER.
>> + * NMIs were also disabled by SENTER. Since there is no IDT for the BSP,
>> + * allow the mainline kernel re-enable them in the normal course of
>> + * booting.
>> + */
>> + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL)
>> +
>> + /* Clear the TXT error registers for a clean start of day */
>> + movl $0, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ERRORCODE)
>> + movl $0xffffffff, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_ESTS)
>> +
>> + /* On Intel, the zero page address is passed in the TXT heap */
>> + /* Read physical base of heap into EAX */
>> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
>> + /* Read the size of the BIOS data into ECX (first 8 bytes) */
>> + movl (%eax), %ecx
>> + /* Skip over BIOS data and size of OS to MLE data section */
>> + leal 8(%eax, %ecx), %eax
>> +
>> + /* Need to verify the values in the OS-MLE struct passed in */
>> + call sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Get the boot params address from the heap. Note %esi and %ebx MUST
>> + * be preserved across calls and operations.
>> + */
>> + movl SL_boot_params_addr(%eax), %esi
>> +
>> + /* Save %ebx so the APs can find their way home */
>> + movl %ebx, (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_EBX)(%eax)
>> +
>> + /* Fetch the AP wake code block address from the heap */
>> + movl SL_ap_wake_block(%eax), %edi
>> + movl %edi, rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx)
>> +
>> + /* Store the offset in the AP wake block to the jmp address */
>> + movl $(sl_ap_jmp_offset - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \
>> + (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_JMP_OFFSET)(%eax)
>> +
>> + /* Store the offset in the AP wake block to the AP stacks block */
>> + movl $(sl_stacks - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \
>> + (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_STACKS_OFFSET)(%eax)
>> +
>> + /* %eax still is the base of the OS-MLE block, save it */
>> + pushl %eax
>> +
>> + /* Relocate the AP wake code to the safe block */
>> + call sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Wake up all APs that are blocked in the ACM and wait for them to
>> + * halt. This should be done before restoring the MTRRs so the ACM is
>> + * still properly in WB memory.
>> + */
>> + call sl_txt_wake_aps
>> +
>> + /* Restore OS-MLE in %eax */
>> + popl %eax
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * %edi is used by this routine to find the MTRRs which are in the SLRT
>> + * in the Intel info.
>> + */
>> + movl SL_txt_info(%eax), %edi
>> + call sl_txt_load_regs
>> +
>> + jmp .Lcpu_setup_done
>> +
>> +.Ldo_unknown_cpu:
>> + /* Non-Intel CPUs are not yet supported */
>> + ud2
>> +
>> +.Lcpu_setup_done:
>> + /*
>> + * Don't enable MCE at this point. The kernel will enable
>> + * it on the BSP later when it is ready.
>> + */
>> +
>> + /* Done, jump to normal 32b pm entry */
>> + jmp startup_32
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_stub_entry)
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_find_mle_base)
>> + /* %ecx has PDPT, get first PD */
>> + movl (%ecx), %eax
>> + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax
>> + /* Get first PT from first PDE */
>> + movl (%eax), %eax
>> + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax
>> + /* Get MLE base from first PTE */
>> + movl (%eax), %eax
>> + andl $(PAGE_MASK), %eax
>> +
>> + movl %eax, rva(sl_mle_start)(%ebx)
>> + ret
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_find_mle_base)
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap)
>> + /* %ecx: buffer begin %edx: buffer end */
>> + /* %ebx: MLE begin %edi: MLE end */
>> +
>> + cmpl %edi, %ecx
>> + jb .Lnext_check
>> + cmpl %edi, %edx
>> + jbe .Lnext_check
>> + jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer above MLE */
>> +
>> +.Lnext_check:
>> + cmpl %ebx, %edx
>> + ja .Linvalid
>> + cmpl %ebx, %ecx
>> + jae .Linvalid
>> + jmp .Lvalid /* Buffer below MLE */
>> +
>> +.Linvalid:
>> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_MLE_BUFFER_OVERLAP)
>> +
>> +.Lvalid:
>> + ret
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap)
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct)
>> + pushl %ebx
>> + /*
>> + * %eax points to the base of the OS-MLE struct. Need to also
>> + * read some values from the OS-SINIT struct too.
>> + */
>> + movl -8(%eax), %ecx
>> + /* Skip over OS to MLE data section and size of OS-SINIT structure */
>> + leal (%eax, %ecx), %edx
>> +
>> + /* Load MLE image base absolute offset */
>> + movl rva(sl_mle_start)(%ebx), %ebx
>> +
>> + /* Verify the value of the low PMR base. It should always be 0. */
>> + movl SL_vtd_pmr_lo_base(%edx), %esi
>> + cmpl $0, %esi
>> + jz .Lvalid_pmr_base
>> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_LO_PMR_BASE)
>> +
>> +.Lvalid_pmr_base:
>> + /* Grab some values from OS-SINIT structure */
>> + movl SL_mle_size(%edx), %edi
>> + addl %ebx, %edi
>> + jc .Loverflow_detected
>> + movl SL_vtd_pmr_lo_size(%edx), %esi
>> +
>> + /* Check the AP wake block */
>> + movl SL_ap_wake_block(%eax), %ecx
>> + movl SL_ap_wake_block_size(%eax), %edx
>> + addl %ecx, %edx
>> + jc .Loverflow_detected
>> + call sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap
>> + cmpl %esi, %edx
>> + ja .Lbuffer_beyond_pmr
>> +
>> + /* Check the boot params */
>> + movl SL_boot_params_addr(%eax), %ecx
>> + movl $(PAGE_SIZE), %edx
>> + addl %ecx, %edx
>> + jc .Loverflow_detected
>> + call sl_check_buffer_mle_overlap
>> + cmpl %esi, %edx
>> + ja .Lbuffer_beyond_pmr
>> +
>> + /* Check that the AP wake block is big enough */
>> + cmpl $(sl_txt_ap_wake_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), \
>> + SL_ap_wake_block_size(%eax)
>> + jae .Lwake_block_ok
>> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_WAKE_BLOCK_TOO_SMALL)
>> +
>> +.Lwake_block_ok:
>> + popl %ebx
>> + ret
>> +
>> +.Loverflow_detected:
>> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_INTEGER_OVERFLOW)
>> +
>> +.Lbuffer_beyond_pmr:
>> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_BUFFER_BEYOND_PMR)
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_verify_os_mle_struct)
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_ap_entry)
>> + cli
>> + cld
>> + /*
>> + * The %cs and %ds segments are known good after waking the AP.
>> + * First order of business is to find where we are and
>> + * save it in %ebx.
>> + */
>> +
>> + /* Read physical base of heap into EAX */
>> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
>> + /* Read the size of the BIOS data into ECX (first 8 bytes) */
>> + movl (%eax), %ecx
>> + /* Skip over BIOS data and size of OS to MLE data section */
>> + leal 8(%eax, %ecx), %eax
>> +
>> + /* Saved %ebx from the BSP and stash OS-MLE pointer */
>> + movl (SL_mle_scratch + SL_SCRATCH_AP_EBX)(%eax), %ebx
>> +
>> + /* Save TXT info ptr in %edi for call to sl_txt_load_regs */
>> + movl SL_txt_info(%eax), %edi
>> +
>> + /* Lock and get our stack index */
>> + movl $1, %ecx
>> +.Lspin:
>> + xorl %eax, %eax
>> + lock cmpxchgl %ecx, rva(sl_txt_spin_lock)(%ebx)
>> + pause
>> + jnz .Lspin
>> +
>> + /* Increment the stack index and use the next value inside lock */
>> + incl rva(sl_txt_stack_index)(%ebx)
>> + movl rva(sl_txt_stack_index)(%ebx), %eax
>> +
>> + /* Unlock */
>> + movl $0, rva(sl_txt_spin_lock)(%ebx)
>> +
>> + /* Location of the relocated AP wake block */
>> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %ecx
>> +
>> + /* Load reloc GDT, set segment regs and lret to __SL32_CS */
>> + lgdt (sl_ap_gdt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx)
>> +
>> + movl $(__SL32_DS), %edx
>> + movw %dx, %ds
>> + movw %dx, %es
>> + movw %dx, %fs
>> + movw %dx, %gs
>> + movw %dx, %ss
>> +
>> + /* Load our reloc AP stack */
>> + movl $(TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE), %edx
>> + mull %edx
>> + leal (sl_stacks_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx), %esp
>> + subl %eax, %esp
>> +
>> + /* Switch to AP code segment */
>> + leal rva(.Lsl_ap_cs)(%ebx), %eax
>> + pushl $(__SL32_CS)
>> + pushl %eax
>> + lret
>> +
>> +.Lsl_ap_cs:
>> + /* Load the relocated AP IDT */
>> + lidt (sl_ap_idt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx)
>> +
>> + /* Fixup MTRRs and misc enable MSR on APs too */
>> + call sl_txt_load_regs
>> +
>> + /* Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] */
>> + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL)
>> +
>> + /* IRET-to-self can be used to enable NMIs which SENTER disabled */
>> + leal rva(.Lnmi_enabled_ap)(%ebx), %eax
>> + pushfl
>> + pushl $(__SL32_CS)
>> + pushl %eax
>> + iret
>> +
>> +.Lnmi_enabled_ap:
>> + /* Put APs in X2APIC mode like the BSP */
>> + movl $(MSR_IA32_APICBASE), %ecx
>> + rdmsr
>> + orl $(XAPIC_ENABLE | X2APIC_ENABLE), %eax
>> + wrmsr
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Basically done, increment the CPU count and jump off to the AP
>> + * wake block to wait.
>> + */
>> + lock incl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx)
>> +
>> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %eax
>> + jmp *%eax
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_ap_entry)
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake)
>> + /* Save boot params register */
>> + pushl %esi
>> +
>> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %edi
>> +
>> + /* Fixup AP IDT and GDT descriptor before relocating */
>> + leal rva(sl_ap_idt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
>> + addl %edi, 2(%eax)
>> + leal rva(sl_ap_gdt_desc)(%ebx), %eax
>> + addl %edi, 2(%eax)
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Copy the AP wake code and AP GDT/IDT to the protected wake block
>> + * provided by the loader. Destination already in %edi.
>> + */
>> + movl $(sl_txt_ap_wake_end - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %ecx
>> + leal rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ebx), %esi
>> + rep movsb
>> +
>> + /* Setup the IDT for the APs to use in the relocation block */
>> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %ecx
>> + addl $(sl_ap_idt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %ecx
>> + xorl %edx, %edx
>> +
>> + /* Form the default reset vector relocation address */
>> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %esi
>> + addl $(sl_txt_int_reset - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %esi
>> +
>> +1:
>> + cmpw $(NR_VECTORS), %dx
>> + jz .Lap_idt_done
>> +
>> + cmpw $(X86_TRAP_NMI), %dx
>> + jz 2f
>> +
>> + /* Load all other fixed vectors with reset handler */
>> + movl %esi, %eax
>> + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS)(%ecx)
>> + shrl $16, %eax
>> + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS)(%ecx)
>> + jmp 3f
>> +
>> +2:
>> + /* Load single wake NMI IPI vector at the relocation address */
>> + movl rva(sl_txt_ap_wake_block)(%ebx), %eax
>> + addl $(sl_txt_int_nmi - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin), %eax
>> + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_LO_BITS)(%ecx)
>> + shrl $16, %eax
>> + movw %ax, (IDT_VECTOR_HI_BITS)(%ecx)
>> +
>> +3:
>> + incw %dx
>> + addl $8, %ecx
>> + jmp 1b
>> +
>> +.Lap_idt_done:
>> + popl %esi
>> + ret
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_reloc_ap_wake)
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_load_regs)
>> + /* Save base pointer register */
>> + pushl %ebx
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * On Intel, the original variable MTRRs and Misc Enable MSR are
>> + * restored on the BSP at early boot. Each AP will also restore
>> + * its MTRRs and Misc Enable MSR.
>> + */
>> + pushl %edi
>> + addl $(SL_saved_bsp_mtrrs), %edi
>> + movl (%edi), %ebx
>> + pushl %ebx /* default_mem_type lo */
>> + addl $4, %edi
>> + movl (%edi), %ebx
>> + pushl %ebx /* default_mem_type hi */
>> + addl $4, %edi
>> + movl (%edi), %ebx /* mtrr_vcnt lo, don't care about hi part */
>> + addl $8, %edi /* now at MTRR pair array */
>> + /* Write the variable MTRRs */
>> + movl $(MSR_MTRRphysBase0), %ecx
>> +1:
>> + cmpl $0, %ebx
>> + jz 2f
>> +
>> + movl (%edi), %eax /* MTRRphysBaseX lo */
>> + addl $4, %edi
>> + movl (%edi), %edx /* MTRRphysBaseX hi */
>> + wrmsr
>> + addl $4, %edi
>> + incl %ecx
>> + movl (%edi), %eax /* MTRRphysMaskX lo */
>> + addl $4, %edi
>> + movl (%edi), %edx /* MTRRphysMaskX hi */
>> + wrmsr
>> + addl $4, %edi
>> + incl %ecx
>> +
>> + decl %ebx
>> + jmp 1b
>> +2:
>> + /* Write the default MTRR register */
>> + popl %edx
>> + popl %eax
>> + movl $(MSR_MTRRdefType), %ecx
>> + wrmsr
>> +
>> + /* Return to beginning and write the misc enable msr */
>> + popl %edi
>> + addl $(SL_saved_misc_enable_msr), %edi
>> + movl (%edi), %eax /* saved_misc_enable_msr lo */
>> + addl $4, %edi
>> + movl (%edi), %edx /* saved_misc_enable_msr hi */
>> + movl $(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE), %ecx
>> + wrmsr
>> +
>> + popl %ebx
>> + ret
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_load_regs)
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_wake_aps)
>> + /* Save boot params register */
>> + pushl %esi
>> +
>> + /* First setup the MLE join structure and load it into TXT reg */
>> + leal rva(sl_gdt)(%ebx), %eax
>> + leal rva(sl_txt_ap_entry)(%ebx), %ecx
>> + leal rva(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)(%ebx), %edx
>> + movl %eax, SL_rlp_gdt_base(%edx)
>> + movl %ecx, SL_rlp_entry_point(%edx)
>> + movl %edx, (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_MLE_JOIN)
>> +
>> + /* Another TXT heap walk to find various values needed to wake APs */
>> + movl (TXT_PRIV_CONFIG_REGS_BASE + TXT_CR_HEAP_BASE), %eax
>> + /* At BIOS data size, find the number of logical processors */
>> + movl (SL_num_logical_procs + 8)(%eax), %edx
>> + /* Skip over BIOS data */
>> + movl (%eax), %ecx
>> + addl %ecx, %eax
>> + /* Skip over OS to MLE */
>> + movl (%eax), %ecx
>> + addl %ecx, %eax
>> + /* At OS-SNIT size, get capabilities to know how to wake up the APs */
>> + movl (SL_capabilities + 8)(%eax), %esi
>> + /* Skip over OS to SNIT */
>> + movl (%eax), %ecx
>> + addl %ecx, %eax
>> + /* At SINIT-MLE size, get the AP wake MONITOR address */
>> + movl (SL_rlp_wakeup_addr + 8)(%eax), %edi
>> +
>> + /* Determine how to wake up the APs */
>> + testl $(1 << TXT_SINIT_MLE_CAP_WAKE_MONITOR), %esi
>> + jz .Lwake_getsec
>> +
>> + /* Wake using MWAIT MONITOR */
>> + movl $1, (%edi)
>> + jmp .Laps_awake
>> +
>> +.Lwake_getsec:
>> + /* Wake using GETSEC(WAKEUP) */
>> + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_WAKEUP)
>> +
>> +.Laps_awake:
>> + /*
>> + * All of the APs are woken up and rendesvous in the relocated wake
>> + * block starting at sl_txt_ap_wake_begin. Wait for all of them to
>> + * halt.
>> + */
>> + pause
>> + cmpl rva(sl_txt_cpu_count)(%ebx), %edx
>> + jne .Laps_awake
>> +
>> + popl %esi
>> + ret
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_wake_aps)
>> +
>> +/* This is the beginning of the relocated AP wake code block */
>> + .global sl_txt_ap_wake_begin
>> +sl_txt_ap_wake_begin:
>> +
>> + /* Get the LAPIC ID for each AP and stash it on the stack */
>> + movl $(MSR_IA32_X2APIC_APICID), %ecx
>> + rdmsr
>> + pushl %eax
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Get a pointer to the monitor location on this APs stack to test below
>> + * after mwait returns. Currently %esp points to just past the pushed APIC
>> + * ID value.
>> + */
>> + movl %esp, %eax
>> + subl $(TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE - 4), %eax
>> + movl $0, (%eax)
>> +
>> + /* Clear ecx/edx so no invalid extensions or hints are passed to monitor */
>> + xorl %ecx, %ecx
>> + xorl %edx, %edx
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Arm the monitor and wait for it to be poked by he SMP bringup code. The mwait
>> + * instruction can return for a number of reasons. Test to see if it returned
>> + * because the monitor was written to.
>> + */
>> + monitor
>> +
>> +1:
>> + mfence
>> + mwait
>> + movl (%eax), %edx
>> + testl %edx, %edx
>> + jz 1b
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * This is the long absolute jump to the 32b Secure Launch protected mode stub
>> + * code in sl_trampoline_start32() in the rmpiggy. The jump address will be
>> + * fixed in the SMP boot code when the first AP is brought up. This whole area
>> + * is provided and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code.
>> + */
>> + .byte 0xea
>> +sl_ap_jmp_offset:
>> + .long 0x00000000
>> + .word __SL32_CS
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_int_nmi)
>> + /* NMI context, just IRET */
>> + iret
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_int_nmi)
>> +
>> +SYM_FUNC_START(sl_txt_int_reset)
>> + TXT_RESET $(SL_ERROR_INV_AP_INTERRUPT)
>> +SYM_FUNC_END(sl_txt_int_reset)
>> +
>> + .balign 8
>> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_idt_desc)
>> + .word sl_ap_idt_end - sl_ap_idt - 1 /* Limit */
>> + .long sl_ap_idt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin /* Base */
>> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_idt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_idt_desc_end)
>> +
>> + .balign 8
>> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_idt)
>> + .rept NR_VECTORS
>> + .word 0x0000 /* Offset 15 to 0 */
>> + .word __SL32_CS /* Segment selector */
>> + .word 0x8e00 /* Present, DPL=0, 32b Vector, Interrupt */
>> + .word 0x0000 /* Offset 31 to 16 */
>> + .endr
>> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_idt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_idt_end)
>> +
>> + .balign 8
>> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_gdt_desc)
>> + .word sl_ap_gdt_end - sl_ap_gdt - 1
>> + .long sl_ap_gdt - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin
>> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_gdt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_gdt_desc_end)
>> +
>> + .balign 8
>> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_ap_gdt)
>> + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL */
>> + .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* __SL32_CS */
>> + .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* __SL32_DS */
>> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_ap_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_ap_gdt_end)
>> +
>> + /* Small stacks for BSP and APs to work with */
>> + .balign 64
>> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_stacks)
>> + .fill (TXT_MAX_CPUS * TXT_BOOT_STACK_SIZE), 1, 0
>> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_stacks, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_stacks_end)
>> +
>> +/* This is the end of the relocated AP wake code block */
>> + .global sl_txt_ap_wake_end
>> +sl_txt_ap_wake_end:
>> +
>> + .data
>> + .balign 8
>> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_gdt_desc)
>> + .word sl_gdt_end - sl_gdt - 1
>> + .long sl_gdt - sl_gdt_desc
>> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_gdt_desc, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_gdt_desc_end)
>> +
>> + .balign 8
>> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_gdt)
>> + .quad 0x0000000000000000 /* NULL */
>> + .quad 0x00cf9a000000ffff /* __SL32_CS */
>> + .quad 0x00cf92000000ffff /* __SL32_DS */
>> +SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(sl_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, sl_gdt_end)
>> +
>> + .balign 8
>> +SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)
>> + .long sl_gdt_end - sl_gdt - 1 /* GDT limit */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* GDT base */
>> + .long __SL32_CS /* Seg Sel - CS (DS, ES, SS = seg_sel+8) */
>> + .long 0x00000000 /* Entry point physical address */
>> +SYM_DATA_END(sl_smx_rlp_mle_join)
>> +
>> +SYM_DATA(sl_cpu_type, .long 0x00000000)
>> +
>> +SYM_DATA(sl_mle_start, .long 0x00000000)
>> +
>> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_spin_lock, .long 0x00000000)
>> +
>> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_stack_index, .long 0x00000000)
>> +
>> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_cpu_count, .long 0x00000000)
>> +
>> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(sl_txt_ap_wake_block, .long 0x00000000)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> index f1bd7b91b3c6..aff899c4b6c3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
>> @@ -323,6 +323,9 @@
>> #define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE 0x00000560
>> #define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK 0x00000561
>>
>> +#define MSR_MTRRphysBase0 0x00000200
>> +#define MSR_MTRRphysMask0 0x00000201
>> +
>> #define MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 0x00000250
>> #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 0x00000258
>> #define MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000 0x00000259
>> @@ -804,6 +807,8 @@
>> #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE (1<<11)
>> #define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12)
>>
>> +#define MSR_IA32_X2APIC_APICID 0x00000802
>> +
>> #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079
>> #define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
>> index 01d19fc22346..74e3e7df491e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h
>> @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
>> /* loadflags */
>> #define LOADED_HIGH (1<<0)
>> #define KASLR_FLAG (1<<1)
>> +#define SLAUNCH_FLAG (1<<2)
>> #define QUIET_FLAG (1<<5)
>> #define KEEP_SEGMENTS (1<<6)
>> #define CAN_USE_HEAP (1<<7)
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> index 6913b372ccf7..c7c4d392b7d3 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
>> #include <linux/hardirq.h>
>> #include <linux/suspend.h>
>> #include <linux/kbuild.h>
>> +#include <linux/slr_table.h>
>> +#include <linux/slaunch.h>
>> #include <asm/processor.h>
>> #include <asm/thread_info.h>
>> #include <asm/sigframe.h>
>> @@ -120,4 +122,22 @@ static void __used common(void)
>> OFFSET(ARIA_CTX_rounds, aria_ctx, rounds);
>> #endif
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH
>> + BLANK();
>> + OFFSET(SL_txt_info, txt_os_mle_data, txt_info);
>> + OFFSET(SL_mle_scratch, txt_os_mle_data, mle_scratch);
>> + OFFSET(SL_boot_params_addr, txt_os_mle_data, boot_params_addr);
>> + OFFSET(SL_ap_wake_block, txt_os_mle_data, ap_wake_block);
>> + OFFSET(SL_ap_wake_block_size, txt_os_mle_data, ap_wake_block_size);
>> + OFFSET(SL_saved_misc_enable_msr, slr_entry_intel_info, saved_misc_enable_msr);
>> + OFFSET(SL_saved_bsp_mtrrs, slr_entry_intel_info, saved_bsp_mtrrs);
>> + OFFSET(SL_num_logical_procs, txt_bios_data, num_logical_procs);
>> + OFFSET(SL_capabilities, txt_os_sinit_data, capabilities);
>> + OFFSET(SL_mle_size, txt_os_sinit_data, mle_size);
>> + OFFSET(SL_vtd_pmr_lo_base, txt_os_sinit_data, vtd_pmr_lo_base);
>> + OFFSET(SL_vtd_pmr_lo_size, txt_os_sinit_data, vtd_pmr_lo_size);
>> + OFFSET(SL_rlp_wakeup_addr, txt_sinit_mle_data, rlp_wakeup_addr);
>> + OFFSET(SL_rlp_gdt_base, smx_rlp_mle_join, rlp_gdt_base);
>> + OFFSET(SL_rlp_entry_point, smx_rlp_mle_join, rlp_entry_point);
>> +#endif
>> }
>> --
>> 2.39.3
>>
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