Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 10:37:10 +0100
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To: Petr Tesařík <petr@...arici.cz>, "H. Peter Anvin"
	 <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@...or.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Petr
 Tesarik <petrtesarik@...weicloud.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
 Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,  Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
 "maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>, Andy
 Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Peter
 Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>, Arnd Bergmann
 <arnd@...db.de>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Rick Edgecombe
 <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,  Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, "Masami
 Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Pengfei Xu
 <pengfei.xu@...el.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>, Ze Gao
 <zegao2021@...il.com>, "Kirill A. Shutemov"
 <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,  Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, David
 Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,  Jason
 Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, "Mike Rapoport
 (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>, Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@...el.com>, Jacob Pan
 <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>, "open list:DOCUMENTATION"
 <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Petr
 Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/8] x86_64 SandBox Mode arch hooks

On Thu, 2024-02-15 at 10:30 +0100, Petr Tesařík wrote:
> On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 00:16:13 -0800
> "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> wrote:
> 
> > On February 14, 2024 10:59:32 PM PST, "Petr Tesařík" <petr@...arici.cz> wrote:
> > > On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 10:52:47 -0800
> > > Xin Li <xin@...or.com> wrote:
> > >  
> > > > On 2/14/2024 10:22 AM, Petr Tesařík wrote:  
> > > > > On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 06:52:53 -0800
> > > > > Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> > > > >     
> > > > > > On 2/14/24 03:35, Petr Tesarik wrote:    
> > > > > > > This patch series implements x86_64 arch hooks for the generic SandBox
> > > > > > > Mode infrastructure.    
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > I think I'm missing a bit of context here.  What does one _do_ with
> > > > > > SandBox Mode?  Why is it useful?    
> > > > > 
> > > > > I see, I split the patch series into the base infrastructure and the
> > > > > x86_64 implementation, but I forgot to merge the two recipient lists.
> > > > > :-(
> > > > > 
> > > > > Anyway, in the long term I would like to work on gradual decomposition
> > > > > of the kernel into a core part and many self-contained components.
> > > > > Sandbox mode is a useful tool to enforce isolation.
> > > > > 
> > > > > In its current form, sandbox mode is too limited for that, but I'm
> > > > > trying to find some balance between "publish early" and reaching a
> > > > > feature level where some concrete examples can be shown. I'd rather
> > > > > fail fast than maintain hundreds of patches in an out-of-tree branch
> > > > > before submitting (and failing anyway).
> > > > > 
> > > > > Petr T
> > > > >     
> > > > 
> > > > What you're proposing sounds a gigantic thing, which could potentially
> > > > impact all subsystems.  
> > > 
> > > True. Luckily, sandbox mode allows me to move gradually, one component
> > > at a time.
> > >  
> > > >  Unless you prove it has big advantages with real
> > > > world usages, I guess nobody even wants to look into the patches.
> > > > 
> > > > BTW, this seems another attempt to get the idea of micro-kernel into
> > > > Linux.  
> > > 
> > > We know it's not feasible to convert Linux to a micro-kernel. AFAICS
> > > that would require some kind of big switch, affecting all subsystems at
> > > once.
> > > 
> > > But with a growing code base and more or less constant bug-per-LOC rate,
> > > people will continue to come up with some ideas how to limit the
> > > potential impact of each bug. Logically, one of the concepts that come
> > > to mind is decomposition.
> > > 
> > > If my attempt helps to clarify how such decomposition should be done to
> > > be acceptable, it is worthwile. If nothing else, I can summarize the
> > > situation and ask Jonathan if he would kindly accept it as a LWN
> > > article...
> > > 
> > > Petr T
> > >  
> > 
> > I have been thinking more about this, and I'm more than ever convinced that exposing kernel memory to *any* kind of user space is a really, really bad idea. It is not a door we ever want to open; once that line gets muddled, the attack surface opens up dramatically.
> 
> Would you mind elaborating on this a bit more?
> 
> For one thing, sandbox mode is *not* user mode. Sure, my proposed
> x86-64 implementation runs with the same CPU privilege level as user
> mode, but it is isolated from user mode with just as strong mechanisms
> as any two user mode processes are isolated from each other. Are you
> saying that process isolation in Linux is not all that strong after all?
> 
> Don't get me wrong. I'm honestly trying to understand what exactly
> makes the idea so bad. I have apparently not considered something that
> you have, and I would be glad if you could reveal it.
> 
> > And, in fact, we already have a sandbox mode in the kernel – it is called eBPF. 
> 
> Sure. The difference is that eBPF is a platform of its own (with its
> own consistency model, machine code etc.). Rewriting code for eBPF may
> need a bit more effort.
> 
> Besides, Roberto wrote a PGP key parser as an eBPF program at some
> point, and I believe it was rejected for that reason. So, it seems
> there are situations where eBPF is not an alternative.
> 
> Roberto, can you remember and share some details?

eBPF programs are not signed.

And I struggled to have some security bugs fixed, so I gave up.

Roberto

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