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Message-ID: <c65eb8f1-2903-4043-a3ab-945d880043b5@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 2024 07:38:30 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@...weicloud.com>
Cc: Petr Tesařík <petr@...arici.cz>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Ze Gao <zegao2021@...il.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, "Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@...el.com>, Jacob Pan
<jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/8] PGP key parser using SandBox Mode
On 2/16/24 07:24, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> While I started working on my development branch to illustrate how
> SandBox Mode could be enhanced to allow dynamic memory allocation and
> other features necessary to convert some existing code, my colleague
> Roberto Sassu set out and adapted a PGP key parser to run in a sandbox.
>
> Disclaimer:
>
> The code had to be rearranged in order to avoid memory allocations
> and crypto operations in the sandbox. The code might contain errors.
I'm confused by this. The kernel doesn't (appear to) have a PGP parser
today. So are you saying that it *should* have one and it's only
feasible if its confined in a sandbox?
A much more powerful example would be to take something that the kernel
has already and put it in a sandbox. That would show us how difficult
it is to sandbox something versus just doing it _normally_ in the kernel.
As it stands, I fear this was just the largest chunk of sandbox code
that was laying around and it seemed like a good idea to just chuck
~1400 lines of code over the wall at a huge cc list.
I'm not sure I want to see any more SandBox mode filling up my inbox.
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