linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness

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Message-ID: <05E12A71-D8A4-4E6D-9C9D-024251C1BDC7@zytor.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 2024 16:25:33 -0800
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
CC: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch@...edance.com>,
        Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@...osinc.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,
        Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@...roup.eu>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>, Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
        Tony Battersby <tonyb@...ernetics.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        y0un9n132@...il.com, x86@...nel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Adjust brk randomness

On February 16, 2024 10:25:42 PM PST, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>Hi,
>
>It was recently pointed out[1] that x86_64 brk entropy was not great,
>and that on all architectures the brk can (when the random offset is 0)
>be immediately adjacent to .bss, leaving no gap that could stop linear
>overflows from the .bss. Address both issues.
>
>-Kees
>
>Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/CA+2EKTVLvc8hDZc+2Yhwmus=dzOUG5E4gV7ayCbu0MPJTZzWkw@mail.gmail.com [1]
>
>Kees Cook (2):
>  x86: Increase brk randomness entropy on x86_64
>  binfmt_elf: Leave a gap between .bss and brk
>
> arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 5 ++++-
> fs/binfmt_elf.c           | 3 +++
> 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>

Why do we even have the brk, or perhaps more importantly, why do we use it? Is there any reason whatsoever why glibc uses brk instead of mmap to her heap memory?

I thought the base of the brk wasn't even known to userspace other than in the form of the image end...