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Message-ID: <5de7d665-7047-497b-94fb-76ec2af3c9e2@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 10:03:03 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: Petr Tesařík <petr@...arici.cz>
Cc: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@...weicloud.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
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"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
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linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 4/5] sbm: fix up calls to dynamic memory allocators
On 2/22/24 09:57, Petr Tesařík wrote:
> * Hardware designers are adding (other) hardware security defenses to
> ring-0 that are not applied to ring-3.
>
> Could you give an example of these other security defenses, please?
Here's one example:
> https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/data-dependent-prefetcher.html
"DDP is neither trained by nor triggered by supervisor-mode accesses."
But seriously, this is going to be my last message on this topic. I
appreciate your enthusiasm, but I don't see any viable way forward for
this approach.
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