linux-kernel - [PATCH V3] kexec: copy only happens before uchunk goes to zero

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Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 17:21:19 +0800
From: "yang.zhang" <gaoshanliukou@....com>
To: ebiederm@...ssion.com
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
	bhe@...hat.com,
	"yang.zhang" <yang.zhang@...intek.com>
Subject: [PATCH V3] kexec: copy only happens before uchunk goes to zero

From: "yang.zhang" <yang.zhang@...intek.com>

When loading segments, ubytes is <= mbytes. When ubytes is exhausted,
there could be remaining mbytes. Then in the while loop, the buf pointer
advancing with mchunk will causing meaningless reading even though it
doesn't harm.

So let's change to make sure that all of the copying and the rest only
happens before uchunk goes to zero.

Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: yang.zhang <yang.zhang@...intek.com>

---
V2 -> V3:
- Add more detailed description in the commit message
v1 -> v2:
- Only copy before uchunk goes to zero

V1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240130101802.23850-1-gaoshanliukou@163.com/
---
 kernel/kexec_core.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c
index d08fc7b5db97..2fc3d0e3715a 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_core.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c
@@ -800,22 +800,24 @@ static int kimage_load_normal_segment(struct kimage *image,
 				PAGE_SIZE - (maddr & ~PAGE_MASK));
 		uchunk = min(ubytes, mchunk);
 
-		/* For file based kexec, source pages are in kernel memory */
-		if (image->file_mode)
-			memcpy(ptr, kbuf, uchunk);
-		else
-			result = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, uchunk);
+		if (uchunk) {
+			/* For file based kexec, source pages are in kernel memory */
+			if (image->file_mode)
+				memcpy(ptr, kbuf, uchunk);
+			else
+				result = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, uchunk);
+			ubytes -= uchunk;
+			if (image->file_mode)
+				kbuf += uchunk;
+			else
+				buf += uchunk;
+		}
 		kunmap_local(ptr);
 		if (result) {
 			result = -EFAULT;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		ubytes -= uchunk;
 		maddr  += mchunk;
-		if (image->file_mode)
-			kbuf += mchunk;
-		else
-			buf += mchunk;
 		mbytes -= mchunk;
 
 		cond_resched();
@@ -866,11 +868,18 @@ static int kimage_load_crash_segment(struct kimage *image,
 			memset(ptr + uchunk, 0, mchunk - uchunk);
 		}
 
-		/* For file based kexec, source pages are in kernel memory */
-		if (image->file_mode)
-			memcpy(ptr, kbuf, uchunk);
-		else
-			result = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, uchunk);
+		if (uchunk) {
+			/* For file based kexec, source pages are in kernel memory */
+			if (image->file_mode)
+				memcpy(ptr, kbuf, uchunk);
+			else
+				result = copy_from_user(ptr, buf, uchunk);
+			ubytes -= uchunk;
+			if (image->file_mode)
+				kbuf += uchunk;
+			else
+				buf += uchunk;
+		}
 		kexec_flush_icache_page(page);
 		kunmap_local(ptr);
 		arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(page_address(page), 1);
@@ -878,12 +887,7 @@ static int kimage_load_crash_segment(struct kimage *image,
 			result = -EFAULT;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		ubytes -= uchunk;
 		maddr  += mchunk;
-		if (image->file_mode)
-			kbuf += mchunk;
-		else
-			buf += mchunk;
 		mbytes -= mchunk;
 
 		cond_resched();
-- 
2.25.1