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Message-ID: <000000000000cbb7860611f61147@google.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 02:40:18 -0800
From: syzbot <syzbot+5b415c07907a2990d1a3@...kaller.appspotmail.com>
To: dhowells@...hat.com, jarkko@...nel.org, jmorris@...ei.org,
keyrings@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com, serge@...lyn.com,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: [syzbot] [keyrings?] [lsm?] KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in
key_task_permission (2)
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: ced590523156 Merge tag 'driver-core-6.8-rc5' of git://git...
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=141f44b4180000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=caa42dd2796e3ac1
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5b415c07907a2990d1a3
compiler: Debian clang version 15.0.6, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40
userspace arch: i386
Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/b9d2a78bf6dc/disk-ced59052.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/ebca9790f4fc/vmlinux-ced59052.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/f8c19c4f852d/bzImage-ced59052.xz
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+5b415c07907a2990d1a3@...kaller.appspotmail.com
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission+0x3eb/0x4f0 security/keys/permission.c:54
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801e9cc5e0 by task syz-executor.0/3778
CPU: 1 PID: 3778 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00388-gced590523156 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x167/0x540 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x142/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
key_task_permission+0x3eb/0x4f0 security/keys/permission.c:54
search_nested_keyrings+0x94d/0x1190 security/keys/keyring.c:793
keyring_search_rcu+0x198/0x290 security/keys/keyring.c:922
search_cred_keyrings_rcu+0x4a1/0x600 security/keys/process_keys.c:501
search_process_keyrings_rcu+0x1e/0x2b0 security/keys/process_keys.c:544
request_key_and_link+0x5a6/0x19c0 security/keys/request_key.c:618
__do_sys_request_key security/keys/keyctl.c:222 [inline]
__se_sys_request_key+0x271/0x3b0 security/keys/keyctl.c:167
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xbd/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:321
do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:346
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x7c/0x86
RIP: 0023:0xf72d9579
Code: b8 01 10 06 03 74 b4 01 10 07 03 74 b0 01 10 08 03 74 d8 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 51 52 55 89 e5 0f 34 cd 80 <5d> 5a 59 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 002b:00000000f5ed35ac EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000011f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000100 RCX: 0000000020000240
RDX: 0000000020000300 RSI: 00000000fffffffc RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 3659:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:372 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:389
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x22e/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline]
tomoyo_encode2 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45 [inline]
tomoyo_encode+0x26f/0x540 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80
tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x59e/0x5e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283
tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline]
tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x255/0x500 security/tomoyo/file.c:771
security_file_open+0x69/0x570 security/security.c:2933
do_dentry_open+0x327/0x15a0 fs/open.c:940
do_open fs/namei.c:3641 [inline]
path_openat+0x285f/0x3240 fs/namei.c:3798
do_filp_open+0x234/0x490 fs/namei.c:3825
do_sys_openat2+0x13e/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1404
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1419 [inline]
__do_compat_sys_openat fs/open.c:1479 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_openat fs/open.c:1477 [inline]
__ia32_compat_sys_openat+0x23f/0x290 fs/open.c:1477
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xbd/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:321
do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:346
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x7c/0x86
Freed by task 3659:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_free_info+0x4e/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640
poison_slab_object+0xa6/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:241
__kasan_slab_free+0x34/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:257
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:4299 [inline]
kfree+0x14a/0x380 mm/slub.c:4409
tomoyo_check_open_permission+0x376/0x500 security/tomoyo/file.c:786
security_file_open+0x69/0x570 security/security.c:2933
do_dentry_open+0x327/0x15a0 fs/open.c:940
do_open fs/namei.c:3641 [inline]
path_openat+0x285f/0x3240 fs/namei.c:3798
do_filp_open+0x234/0x490 fs/namei.c:3825
do_sys_openat2+0x13e/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1404
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1419 [inline]
__do_compat_sys_openat fs/open.c:1479 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_openat fs/open.c:1477 [inline]
__ia32_compat_sys_openat+0x23f/0x290 fs/open.c:1477
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xbd/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:321
do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:346
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x7c/0x86
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e9cc580
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32
The buggy address is located 64 bytes to the right of
allocated 32-byte region [ffff88801e9cc580, ffff88801e9cc5a0)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea00007a7300 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1e9cc
anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41500 ffffea0001e6a540 dead000000000005
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112c40(GFP_NOFS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 5090, tgid 5090 (syz-executor.4), ts 103426494498, free_ts 103421611023
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
__alloc_pages+0x255/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4567
__alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2190
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2354 [inline]
new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2407
___slab_alloc+0xd17/0x13e0 mm/slub.c:3540
__slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3625 [inline]
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3678 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3850 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x2e0/0x490 mm/slub.c:3994
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:594 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:711 [inline]
tomoyo_encode2 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:45 [inline]
tomoyo_encode+0x26f/0x540 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:80
tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0x59e/0x5e0 security/tomoyo/realpath.c:283
tomoyo_get_realpath security/tomoyo/file.c:151 [inline]
tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x23a/0x880 security/tomoyo/file.c:723
security_file_ioctl_compat+0x75/0xb0 security/security.c:2744
__do_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:923 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_ioctl+0xd6/0xbf0 fs/ioctl.c:914
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xbd/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:321
do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:346
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x7c/0x86
page last free pid 6815 tgid 6813 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline]
free_unref_page_prepare+0x968/0xa90 mm/page_alloc.c:2346
free_unref_page+0x37/0x3f0 mm/page_alloc.c:2486
tlb_batch_list_free mm/mmu_gather.c:114 [inline]
tlb_finish_mmu+0x11f/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:395
exit_mmap+0x4b6/0xd40 mm/mmap.c:3292
__mmput+0x115/0x3c0 kernel/fork.c:1343
exit_mm+0x21f/0x310 kernel/exit.c:569
do_exit+0x9af/0x2740 kernel/exit.c:858
do_group_exit+0x206/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1020
get_signal+0x176d/0x1850 kernel/signal.c:2893
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x96/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:105 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:201 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc8/0x370 kernel/entry/common.c:212
__do_fast_syscall_32+0xcf/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:324
do_fast_syscall_32+0x33/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:346
entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x7c/0x86
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88801e9cc480: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88801e9cc500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88801e9cc580: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88801e9cc600: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88801e9cc680: fa fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess), 2 bytes skipped:
0: 10 06 adc %al,(%rsi)
2: 03 74 b4 01 add 0x1(%rsp,%rsi,4),%esi
6: 10 07 adc %al,(%rdi)
8: 03 74 b0 01 add 0x1(%rax,%rsi,4),%esi
c: 10 08 adc %cl,(%rax)
e: 03 74 d8 01 add 0x1(%rax,%rbx,8),%esi
1e: 00 51 52 add %dl,0x52(%rcx)
21: 55 push %rbp
22: 89 e5 mov %esp,%ebp
24: 0f 34 sysenter
26: cd 80 int $0x80
* 28: 5d pop %rbp <-- trapping instruction
29: 5a pop %rdx
2a: 59 pop %rcx
2b: c3 ret
2c: 90 nop
2d: 90 nop
2e: 90 nop
2f: 90 nop
30: 90 nop
31: 90 nop
32: 90 nop
33: 90 nop
34: 90 nop
35: 90 nop
36: 90 nop
37: 90 nop
38: 90 nop
39: 90 nop
3a: 90 nop
3b: 90 nop
3c: 90 nop
3d: 90 nop
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@...glegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
If the report is already addressed, let syzbot know by replying with:
#syz fix: exact-commit-title
If you want to overwrite report's subsystems, reply with:
#syz set subsystems: new-subsystem
(See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard)
If the report is a duplicate of another one, reply with:
#syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report
If you want to undo deduplication, reply with:
#syz undup
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