linux-kernel - [RFC 1/5] sbm: x86: fix SBM error entry path

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Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2024 14:12:26 +0100
From: Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@...weicloud.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Petr Tesařík <petr@...arici.cz>,
	Petr Tesarik <petrtesarik@...weicloud.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
	"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <x86@...nel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
	Xin Li <xin3.li@...el.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	"Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@...el.com>,
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	Ze Gao <zegao2021@...il.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
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	David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
	Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@...nel.org>,
	Tina Zhang <tina.zhang@...el.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
	"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>,
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	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
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	apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
Subject: [RFC 1/5] sbm: x86: fix SBM error entry path

From: Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>

Normal interrupt entry from SBM should be generally treated as entry from
kernel mode (no swapgs, no speculation mitigations), but since there is a
CPL change, the interrupt handler runs on the trampoline stack, which may
get reused if the current task is re-scheduled.

Make sure to switch to the SBM exception stack.

Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <petr.tesarik1@...wei-partners.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 4ba3eea38102..96830591302d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1062,14 +1062,20 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry)
 	/*
 	 * If sandbox mode was active, adjust the saved CS,
 	 * unconditionally switch to kernel CR3 and continue
-	 * as if the interrupt was from kernel space.
+	 * as if the interrupt was from kernel space, but
+	 * switch away from the trampoline stack.
 	 */
 	movq	x86_sbm_state + SBM_kernel_cr3, %rcx
 	jrcxz	.Lerror_swapgs
 
 	andb	$~3, CS+8(%rsp)
 	movq	%rcx, %cr3
-	jmp	.Lerror_entry_done_lfence
+
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+	CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
+	leaq	8(%rsp), %rdi
+	/* Put us onto the SBM exception stack. */
+	jmp	sync_regs
 #endif
 
 .Lerror_swapgs:
-- 
2.34.1