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Message-ID: <b01f92b3-65ea-474b-8dc9-f2e1ca6ae0af@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 08:22:16 -0800
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
x86@...nel.org, bp@...en8.de
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 11/34] x86/cpu/intel: Prepare MKTME for "address
configuration" infrastructure
On 2/23/24 03:33, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 10:39:41AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
>>
>> Intel also does memory encryption and also fiddles with the physical
>> address bits. This is currently called for *each* CPU, but practically
>> only done on the boot CPU because of 'mktme_status'.
>>
>> Move it from the "each CPU" ->c_init() function to ->c_bsp_init() where
>> the whole thing only gets called once ever. This also necessitates moving
>> detect_tme() and its entourage around in the file.
> The state machine around mktme_state doesn't make sense if we only call it
> on boot CPU, so detect_tme() can be drastically simplified. I can do it on
> top of the patchset.
That would be great. Looking at it again, the (tme_activate !=
tme_activate_cpu0) block is total cruft now. It probably just needs to
get moved to secondary CPU startup.
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