linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH 11/34] x86/cpu/intel: Prepare MKTME for "address configuration" infrastructure

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Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 13:33:01 +0200
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de, 
	x86@...nel.org, bp@...en8.de
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 11/34] x86/cpu/intel: Prepare MKTME for "address
 configuration" infrastructure

On Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 10:39:41AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> 
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
> 
> Intel also does memory encryption and also fiddles with the physical
> address bits.  This is currently called for *each* CPU, but practically
> only done on the boot CPU because of 'mktme_status'.
> 
> Move it from the "each CPU" ->c_init() function to ->c_bsp_init() where
> the whole thing only gets called once ever.  This also necessitates moving
> detect_tme() and its entourage around in the file.

The state machine around mktme_state doesn't make sense if we only call it
on boot CPU, so detect_tme() can be drastically simplified. I can do it on
top of the patchset.

-- 
  Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov