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Message-ID: <z52bbgqxtr7wpa3yqqgbwurb6vx6i7gpddae2rrbxkjasuhnuk@7zsudlb4tw6s>
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 13:33:01 +0200
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
x86@...nel.org, bp@...en8.de
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 11/34] x86/cpu/intel: Prepare MKTME for "address
configuration" infrastructure
On Thu, Feb 22, 2024 at 10:39:41AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
>
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
>
> Intel also does memory encryption and also fiddles with the physical
> address bits. This is currently called for *each* CPU, but practically
> only done on the boot CPU because of 'mktme_status'.
>
> Move it from the "each CPU" ->c_init() function to ->c_bsp_init() where
> the whole thing only gets called once ever. This also necessitates moving
> detect_tme() and its entourage around in the file.
The state machine around mktme_state doesn't make sense if we only call it
on boot CPU, so detect_tme() can be drastically simplified. I can do it on
top of the patchset.
--
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
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