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Message-ID: <CAC_iWjLXNBJz2RgRb3vbM_hetnw3hoWpG+sKM1gfiGo=z6tLxA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 15:19:31 +0200
From: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@...aro.org>
To: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-efi@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] efi/libstub: Add get_event_log() support for CC platforms

On Sat, 24 Feb 2024 at 09:31, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 2/23/24 5:24 AM, Ilias Apalodimas wrote:
> > Apologies for the late reply,
> >
> >
> > On Mon, 19 Feb 2024 at 09:34, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
> > <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> >> Hi Ilias,
> >>
> >> On 2/18/24 11:03 PM, Ilias Apalodimas wrote:
> >>> On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 at 05:02, Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan
> >>> <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> >>>> To allow event log info access after boot, EFI boot stub extracts
> >>>> the event log information and installs it in an EFI configuration
> >>>> table. Currently, EFI boot stub only supports installation of event
> >>>> log only for TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 protocols. Extend the same support
> >>>> for CC protocol. Since CC platform also uses TCG2 format, reuse TPM2
> >>>> support code as much as possible.
> >>>>
> >>>> Link: https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#efi-cc-measurement-protocol [1]
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>
> >>> [...]
> >>>
> >>>> +void efi_retrieve_eventlog(void)
> >>>> +{
> >>>> +       efi_physical_addr_t log_location = 0, log_last_entry = 0;
> >>>> +       efi_guid_t cc_guid = EFI_CC_MEASUREMENT_PROTOCOL_GUID;
> >>>> +       efi_guid_t tpm2_guid = EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID;
> >>>> +       int version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2;
> >>>> +       efi_tcg2_protocol_t *tpm2 = NULL;
> >>>> +       efi_cc_protocol_t *cc = NULL;
> >>>> +       efi_bool_t truncated;
> >>>> +       efi_status_t status;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +       status = efi_bs_call(locate_protocol, &tpm2_guid, NULL, (void **)&tpm2);
> >>>> +       if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
> >>>> +               status = efi_call_proto(tpm2, get_event_log, version, &log_location,
> >>>> +                                       &log_last_entry, &truncated);
> >>>> +
> >>>> +               if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location) {
> >>>> +                       version = EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2;
> >>>> +                       status = efi_call_proto(tpm2, get_event_log, version,
> >>>> +                                               &log_location, &log_last_entry,
> >>>> +                                               &truncated);
> >>>> +                       if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location)
> >>>> +                               return;
> >>>> +               }
> >>>> +
> >>>> +               efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(version, log_location, log_last_entry,
> >>>> +                                          truncated);
> >>>> +               return;
> >>>> +       }
> >>>> +
> >>>> +       status = efi_bs_call(locate_protocol, &cc_guid, NULL, (void **)&cc);
> >>>> +       if (status == EFI_SUCCESS) {
> >>>> +               version = EFI_CC_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2;
> >>>> +               status = efi_call_proto(cc, get_event_log, version, &log_location,
> >>>> +                                       &log_last_entry, &truncated);
> >>>> +               if (status != EFI_SUCCESS || !log_location)
> >>>> +                       return;
> >>>> +
> >>>> +               efi_retrieve_tcg2_eventlog(version, log_location, log_last_entry,
> >>>> +                                          truncated);
> >>>> +               return;
> >>>> +       }
> >>>> +}
> >>> [...]
> >>>
> >>> I haven't looked into CC measurements much, but do we always want to
> >>> prioritize the tcg2 protocol? IOW if you have firmware that implements
> >>> both, shouldn't we prefer the CC protocol for VMs?
> >> According the UEFI specification, sec "Conidential computing", if a firmware implements
> >> the TPM, then it should be used and CC interfaces should not be published. So I think
> >> we should check for TPM first, if it does not exist then try for CC.
> > Ok thanks, that makes sense. That document also says the services
> > should be implemented on a virtual firmware.
> > I am unsure at the moment though if it's worth checking that and
> > reporting an error otherwise. Thoughts?
>
> IMO, it is not fatal for the firmware to implement both protocols. Although, it
> violates the specification, does it makes sense to return error and skip
> measurements? I think for such case, we can add a warning and proceed
> with TPM if it exists.

If you have a TPM, the current code wouldn't even look for CC (which
we agreed is correct).
The question is, should we care if a firmware exposes the CC protocol,
but isn't virtualized

Thanks
/Ilias
>
> >
> > Thanks
> > /Ilias
> >> https://uefi.org/specs/UEFI/2.10/38_Confidential_Computing.html#confidential-computing
> >>
> >>> Thanks
> >>> /Ilias
> >> --
> >> Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
> >> Linux Kernel Developer
> >>
> --
> Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
> Linux Kernel Developer
>

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