lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <fa8f9f3b-e01e-4662-a2d5-77caeeb7b9f5@huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 28 Feb 2024 09:55:24 +0800
From: mawupeng <mawupeng1@...wei.com>
To: <david@...hat.com>, <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, <khlebnikov@...nvz.org>,
	<jaredeh@...il.com>, <linmiaohe@...wei.com>, <hpa@...or.com>
CC: <mawupeng1@...wei.com>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <luto@...nel.org>,
	<tglx@...utronix.de>, <peterz@...radead.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	<x86@...nel.org>, <mingo@...hat.com>, <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
	<bhelgaas@...gle.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>
Subject: Re: [Question] CoW on VM_PFNMAP vma during write fault



On 2024/2/27 21:15, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 27.02.24 14:00, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 27.02.24 13:28, Wupeng Ma wrote:
>>> We find that a warn will be produced during our test, the detail log is
>>> shown in the end.
>>>
>>> The core problem of this warn is that the first pfn of this pfnmap vma is
>>> cleared during memory-failure. Digging into the source we find that this
>>> problem can be triggered as following:
>>>
>>> // mmap with MAP_PRIVATE and specific fd which hook mmap
>>> mmap(MAP_PRIVATE, fd)
>>>     __mmap_region
>>>       remap_pfn_range
>>>       // set vma with pfnmap and the prot of pte is read only
>>>     
>>
>> Okay, so we get a MAP_PRIVATE VM_PFNMAP I assume.
>>
>> What fd is that exactly? Often, we disallow private mappings in the
>> mmap() callback (for a good reason).

just a device fd with device-specify mmap which use remap_pfn_range to assign memory.

>>
>>> // memset this memory with trigger fault
>>> handle_mm_fault
>>>     __handle_mm_fault
>>>       handle_pte_fault
>>>         // write fault and !pte_write(entry)
>>>         do_wp_page
>>>           wp_page_copy // this will alloc a new page with valid page struct
>>>                        // for this pfnmap vma
>>
>> Here we replace the mapped PFNMAP thingy by a proper anon folio.

My problem is can wen replace a pfn with fully functioned page for pfnmap vma? This is not MIXEDMAP vma.

>>
>>>
>>> // inject a hwpoison to the first page of this vma
>>
>> I assume this is an anon folio?

Yes.

>>
>>> madvise_inject_error
>>>     memory_failure
>>>       hwpoison_user_mappings
>>>         try_to_unmap_one
>>>           // mark this pte as invalid (hwpoison)
>>>           mmu_notifier_range_init(&range, MMU_NOTIFY_CLEAR, 0, vma, vma->vm_mm,
>>>                   address, range.end);

If we can replace the mapped PFNMAP thingy by a proper anon folio, we need to make memory_failure to handle
pfnmap vma properly since pfnmap vma shoule not touch its struct page?

Current this page have a valid mapping and can be unmap.

Maybe there is something wrong with my understanding of CoW on a private pfnmap vma.

>>>
>>> // during unmap vma, the first pfn of this pfnmap vma is invalid
>>> vm_mmap_pgoff
>>>     do_mmap
>>>       __do_mmap_mm
>>>         __mmap_region
>>>           __do_munmap
>>>             unmap_region
>>>               unmap_vmas
>>>                 unmap_single_vma
>>>                   untrack_pfn
>>>                     follow_phys // pte is already invalidate, WARN_ON here
>>
>> unmap_single_vma()->...->zap_pte_range() should do the right thing when
>> calling vm_normal_page().
>>
>> untrack_pfn() is the problematic part.

For pfnmap vma, it don't have a valid page for all pfns, so unmap is not expected. In this case, it just
check wheather the first address have a valid pte or not which seems reasonable to me.

>>
>>>
>>> CoW with a valid page for pfnmap vma is weird to us. Can we use
>>> remap_pfn_range for private vma(read only)? Once CoW happens on a pfnmap
>>> vma during write fault, this page is normal(page flag is valid) for most mm
>>> subsystems, such as memory failure in thais case and extra should be done to
>>> handle this special page.
>>>
>>> During unmap, if this vma is pfnmap, unmap shouldn't be done since page
>>> should not be touched for pfnmap vma.
>>>
>>> But the root problem is that can we insert a valid page for pfnmap vma?
>>>
>>> Any thoughts to solve this warn?
>>
>> vm_normal_page() documentation explains how that magic is supposed to
>> work. vm_normal_page() should be able to correctly identify whether we
>> want to look at the struct page for an anon folio that was COWed.

vm_normal_page() can find out a CoW mapping but 

>>
>>
>> untrack_pfn() indeed does not seem to be well prepared for handling
>> MAP_PRIVATE mappings where we end up having anon folios.
>>
>> I think it will already *completely mess up* simply when unmapping the
>> range without the memory failure involved.
>>
>> See, follow_phys() would get the PFN of the anon folio and then
>> untrack_pfn() would do some nonesense with that. Completely broken.
>>
>> The WARN is just a side-effect of the brokenness.
>>
>> In follow_phys(), we'd likely have to call vm_normal_page(). If we get a
>> page back, we'd likely have to fail follow_phys() instead of returning a
>> PFN of an anon folio.
>>
>> Now, how do we fix untrack_pfn() ? I really don't know. In theory, we
>> might no longer have *any* PFNMAP PFN in there after COW'ing everything.
>>
>> Sounds like MAP_PRIVATE VM_PFNMAP + __HAVE_PFNMAP_TRACKING is some
>> broken garbage (sorry). Can we disallow it?
> 
> Staring at track_pfn_copy(), it's maybe similarly broken?
> 
> I think we want to do:
> 
> diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
> index 098356b8805ae..da5d1e37c5534 100644
> --- a/mm/memory.c
> +++ b/mm/memory.c
> @@ -6050,6 +6050,10 @@ int follow_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
>                 goto out;
>         pte = ptep_get(ptep);
>  
> +       /* Never return addresses of COW'ed anon folios. */
> +       if (vm_normal_page(vma, address, pte))
> +               goto unlock;
> +
>         if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !pte_write(pte))
>                 goto unlock;
>  
> 
> And then, just disallow it with PAT involved:
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
> index 0904d7e8e1260..e4d2b2e8c0281 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
> @@ -997,6 +997,15 @@ int track_pfn_remap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, pgprot_t *prot,
>                                 && size == (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start))) {
>                 int ret;
>  
> +               /*
> +                * untrack_pfn() and friends cannot handl regions that suddenly
> +                * contain anon folios after COW. In particular, follow_phys()
> +                * will fail when we have an anon folio at the beginning og the
> +                * VMA.
> +                */
> +               if (vma && is_cow_mapping(vma->vm_flags))
> +                       return -EINVAL;

In this case, anyone use remap_pfn_range can not be cow_maaping which means if VM_MAYWRITE exists, VM_SHARED is
needed for this vma.

This can solve this CoW on private vma problem.

> +
>                 ret = reserve_pfn_range(paddr, size, prot, 0);
>                 if (ret == 0 && vma)
>                         vm_flags_set(vma, VM_PAT);
> 
> 
> I'm afraid that will break something. But well, it's already semi-broken.
> 
> As long as VM_PAT is not involved, it should work as expected.
> 
> In an ideal world, we'd get rid of follow_phys() completely and just
> derive that information from the VMA?
> 

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ