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Message-Id: <20240301013028.2293831-1-zhanggenjian@126.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2024 09:30:19 +0800
From: Genjian <zhanggenjian@....com>
To: stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: axboe@...nel.dk,
stable@...nel.org,
linux-block@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
zhanggenjian123@...il.com,
Genjian Zhang <zhanggenjian@...inos.cn>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19.y 0/9] Fix the UAF issue caused by the loop driver
From: Genjian Zhang <zhanggenjian@...inos.cn>
Hello!
We found that 2035c770bfdb ("loop: Check for overflow while configuring loop") lost a unlock loop_ctl_mutex in loop_get_status(...).
which caused syzbot to report a UAF issue. However, the upstream patch does not have this issue.
So, we revert this patch and directly apply the unmodified upstream patch.
Risk use-after-free as reported by syzbot:
[ 174.437352] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_lock.isra.10+0xbc4/0xc30
[ 174.437772] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880bac49ab8 by task syz-executor.0/13897
[ 174.438205]
[ 174.438306] CPU: 1 PID: 13897 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.306 #1
[ 174.438712] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1kylin1 04/01/2014
[ 174.439236] Call Trace:
[ 174.439392] dump_stack+0x94/0xc7
[ 174.439596] ? __mutex_lock.isra.10+0xbc4/0xc30
[ 174.439881] print_address_description+0x60/0x229
[ 174.440165] ? __mutex_lock.isra.10+0xbc4/0xc30
[ 174.440436] kasan_report.cold.6+0x241/0x2fd
[ 174.440696] __mutex_lock.isra.10+0xbc4/0xc30
[ 174.440959] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[ 174.441272] ? mutex_trylock+0xa0/0xa0
[ 174.441500] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[ 174.441816] ? kobject_get_unless_zero+0x129/0x1c0
[ 174.442106] ? kset_unregister+0x30/0x30
[ 174.442351] ? find_symbol_in_section+0x310/0x310
[ 174.442634] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[ 174.442901] mutex_lock_killable+0xb0/0xf0
[ 174.443149] ? __mutex_lock_killable_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[ 174.443465] ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[ 174.443732] ? _cond_resched+0x10/0x20
[ 174.443966] ? kobject_get+0x54/0xa0
[ 174.444190] lo_open+0x16/0xc0
[ 174.444382] __blkdev_get+0x273/0x10f0
[ 174.444612] ? lo_fallocate.isra.20+0x150/0x150
[ 174.444886] ? bdev_disk_changed+0x190/0x190
[ 174.445146] ? path_init+0x1030/0x1030
[ 174.445371] ? do_syscall_64+0x9a/0x2d0
[ 174.445608] ? deref_stack_reg+0xab/0xe0
[ 174.445852] blkdev_get+0x97/0x880
[ 174.446061] ? walk_component+0x297/0xdc0
[ 174.446303] ? __blkdev_get+0x10f0/0x10f0
[ 174.446547] ? __fsnotify_inode_delete+0x20/0x20
[ 174.446822] blkdev_open+0x1bd/0x240
[ 174.447040] do_dentry_open+0x448/0xf80
[ 174.447274] ? blkdev_get_by_dev+0x60/0x60
[ 174.447522] ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0x1a0/0x1a0
[ 174.447775] ? inode_permission+0x86/0x320
[ 174.448022] path_openat+0xa83/0x3ed0
[ 174.448248] ? path_mountpoint+0xb50/0xb50
[ 174.448495] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
[ 174.448723] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xbc/0x1b0
[ 174.448971] ? getname_flags+0xc4/0x560
[ 174.449203] ? do_sys_open+0x1ce/0x3f0
[ 174.449432] ? do_syscall_64+0x9a/0x2d0
[ 174.449706] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[ 174.450022] ? __d_alloc+0x2a/0xa50
[ 174.450232] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40
[ 174.450510] ? should_fail+0x117/0x6c0
[ 174.450737] ? timespec64_trunc+0xc1/0x150
[ 174.450986] ? inode_init_owner+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 174.451237] ? timespec64_trunc+0xc1/0x150
[ 174.451484] ? inode_init_owner+0x2e0/0x2e0
[ 174.451736] do_filp_open+0x197/0x270
[ 174.451959] ? may_open_dev+0xd0/0xd0
[ 174.452182] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x30/0x40
[ 174.452448] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
[ 174.452672] ? __alloc_fd+0x1a3/0x4b0
[ 174.452895] do_sys_open+0x2c7/0x3f0
[ 174.453114] ? filp_open+0x60/0x60
[ 174.453320] do_syscall_64+0x9a/0x2d0
[ 174.453541] ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0xf3/0x170
[ 174.453832] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x5c/0xc1
[ 174.454136] RIP: 0033:0x41edee
[ 174.454321] Code: 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 48 48 c7 c0 a4 af 0b 01 8b 00 85 c0 75 69 89 f2 b8 01 01 00 00 48 89 fe bf 9c ff ff ff 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 a6 00 00 00 48 8b 4c 24 28 64 48 33 0c5
[ 174.455404] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2501fbd0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
[ 174.455854] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2501fc90 RCX: 000000000041edee
[ 174.456273] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007ffd2501fcd0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[ 174.456698] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffd2501f9a7
[ 174.457116] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
[ 174.457535] R13: 0000000000565e48 R14: 00007ffd2501fcd0 R15: 0000000000400510
[ 174.457955]
[ 174.458052] Allocated by task 945:
[ 174.458261] kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
[ 174.458478] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xb4/0x1d0
[ 174.458743] copy_process.part.57+0x14b0/0x7010
[ 174.459017] _do_fork+0x197/0x980
[ 174.459218] kernel_thread+0x2f/0x40
[ 174.459438] call_usermodehelper_exec_work+0xa8/0x240
[ 174.459742] process_one_work+0x933/0x13b0
[ 174.459986] worker_thread+0x8c/0x1000
[ 174.460212] kthread+0x343/0x410
[ 174.460408] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 174.460621]
[ 174.460716] Freed by task 22902:
[ 174.460913] __kasan_slab_free+0x125/0x170
[ 174.461159] kmem_cache_free+0x6e/0x1b0
[ 174.461391] __put_task_struct+0x1c4/0x440
[ 174.461636] delayed_put_task_struct+0x135/0x170
[ 174.461915] rcu_process_callbacks+0x578/0x15c0
[ 174.462184] __do_softirq+0x175/0x60e
[ 174.462403]
[ 174.462501] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880bac49a80
[ 174.462501] which belongs to the cache task_struct of size 3264
[ 174.463235] The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of
[ 174.463235] 3264-byte region [ffff8880bac49a80, ffff8880bac4a740)
[ 174.463923] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 174.464210] page:ffffea0002eb1200 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888188ca0a00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 174.464784] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 174.465079] raw: 0100000000008100 ffffea0002eaa400 0000000400000004 ffff888188ca0a00
[ 174.465533] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000090009 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 174.465988] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 174.466321]
[ 174.466322] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 174.466325] ffff8880bac49980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 174.466327] ffff8880bac49a00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 174.466329] >ffff8880bac49a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 174.466329] ^
[ 174.466331] ffff8880bac49b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 174.466333] ffff8880bac49b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 174.466333] ==================================================================
[ 174.466338] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Best regards
Genjian
Genjian Zhang (1):
Revert "loop: Check for overflow while configuring loop"
Holger Hoffstätte (1):
loop: properly observe rotational flag of underlying device
Martijn Coenen (5):
loop: Call loop_config_discard() only after new config is applied
loop: Remove sector_t truncation checks
loop: Factor out setting loop device size
loop: Refactor loop_set_status() size calculation
loop: Factor out configuring loop from status
Siddh Raman Pant (1):
loop: Check for overflow while configuring loop
Zhong Jinghua (1):
loop: loop_set_status_from_info() check before assignment
drivers/block/loop.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 123 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-)
--
2.25.1
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