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Message-ID: <170929679278.398.4143931058196373559.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Fri, 01 Mar 2024 12:39:52 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Uros Bizjak" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@...il.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>,
x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/boot] x86/boot: Use 32-bit XOR to clear registers
The following commit has been merged into the x86/boot branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 721f791ce1cddfa5f2bf524ac14741bfa0f72697
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/721f791ce1cddfa5f2bf524ac14741bfa0f72697
Author: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@...il.com>
AuthorDate: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 11:38:59 +01:00
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CommitterDate: Fri, 01 Mar 2024 12:47:37 +01:00
x86/boot: Use 32-bit XOR to clear registers
x86_64 zero extends 32-bit operations, so for 64-bit operands,
XORL r32,r32 is functionally equal to XORQ r64,r64, but avoids
a REX prefix byte when legacy registers are used.
Slightly smaller code generated, no change in functionality.
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@...il.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124103859.611372-1-ubizjak@gmail.com
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S | 2 +-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index d295bf6..86136a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
/* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */
- xorq %r15, %r15
+ xorl %r15d, %r15d
/*
* Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
movq sme_me_mask, %rax
#else
- xorq %rax, %rax
+ xorl %eax, %eax
#endif
/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
.Llookup_AP:
/* EAX contains the APIC ID of the current CPU */
- xorq %rcx, %rcx
+ xorl %ecx, %ecx
leaq cpuid_to_apicid(%rip), %rbx
.Lfind_cpunr:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S
index 3355e27..1ab65f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(sev_verify_cbit)
* The check failed, prevent any forward progress to prevent ROP
* attacks, invalidate the stack and go into a hlt loop.
*/
- xorq %rsp, %rsp
+ xorl %esp, %esp
subq $0x1000, %rsp
2: hlt
jmp 2b
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