lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 13:24:02 +0100
From: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org>
To: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mmc@...r.kernel.org, 
	op-tee@...ts.trustedfirmware.org, 
	Shyam Saini <shyamsaini@...ux.microsoft.com>, Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@...aro.org>, 
	Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@...aro.org>, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@...aro.org>, 
	Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@...aro.org>, Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@....org>, 
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, 
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@...el.com>, 
	Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@...aro.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem

Hi Jens,

thanks for your patch!

On Tue, Feb 27, 2024 at 4:31 PM Jens Wiklander
<jens.wiklander@...aro.org> wrote:

> A number of storage technologies support a specialised hardware
> partition designed to be resistant to replay attacks. The underlying
> HW protocols differ but the operations are common. The RPMB partition
> cannot be accessed via standard block layer, but by a set of specific
> RPMB commands: WRITE, READ, GET_WRITE_COUNTER, and PROGRAM_KEY. Such a
> partition provides authenticated and replay protected access, hence
> suitable as a secure storage.
>
> The initial aim of this patch is to provide a simple RPMB driver
> interface which can be accessed by the optee driver to facilitate early
> RPMB access to OP-TEE OS (secure OS) during the boot time.
>
> A TEE device driver can claim the RPMB interface, for example, via
> rpmb_interface_register() or rpmb_dev_find_device(). The RPMB driver
> provides a callback to route RPMB frames to the RPMB device accessible
> via rpmb_route_frames().
>
> The detailed operation of implementing the access is left to the TEE
> device driver itself.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@...el.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@...aro.org>
> Signed-off-by: Shyam Saini <shyamsaini@...ux.microsoft.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>

I would mention in the commit that the subsystem is currently
only used with eMMC but is designed to be used also by UFS
and NVME. Nevertheless, no big deal so:
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@...aro.org>

> +config RPMB
> +       tristate "RPMB partition interface"
> +       depends on MMC

depends on MMC || SCSI_UFSHCD || NVME_CORE
?

Or do we want to hold it off until we implement the backends?

Yours,
Linus Walleij

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ