linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes

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Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2024 11:31:53 +0100
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Adrian Ratiu <adrian.ratiu@...labora.com>, 
	linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, kernel@...labora.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, Guenter Roeck <groeck@...omium.org>, 
	Doug Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, 
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, 
	Mike Frysinger <vapier@...omium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] proc: allow restricting /proc/pid/mem writes

On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 10:37:20AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 11:32:04AM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 02:12:26AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > On Tue, Mar 05, 2024 at 10:58:25AM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > Since the write handler for /proc/<pid>/mem does raise FOLL_FORCE
> > > > unconditionally it likely would implicitly. But I'm not familiar enough
> > > > with FOLL_FORCE to say for sure.
> > > 
> > > I should phrase the question better. :) Is the supervisor writing into
> > > read-only regions of the child process?
> > 
> > Hm... I suspect we don't. Let's take two concrete examples so you can
> > tell me.
> > 
> > Incus intercepts the sysinfo() syscall. It prepares a struct sysinfo
> > with cgroup aware values for the supervised process and then does:
> > 
> > unix.Pwrite(siov.memFd, &sysinfo, sizeof(struct sysinfo), seccomp_data.args[0]))
> > 
> > It also intercepts some bpf system calls attaching bpf programs for the
> > caller. If that fails we update the log buffer for the supervised
> > process:
> > 
> > union bpf_attr attr = {}, new_attr = {};
> > 
> > // read struct bpf_attr from mem_fd
> > ret = pread(mem_fd, &attr, attr_len, req->data.args[1]);
> > if (ret < 0)
> >         return -errno;
> > 
> > // Do stuff with attr. Stuff fails. Update log buffer for supervised process:
> > if ((new_attr.log_size) > 0 && (pwrite(mem_fd, new_attr.log_buf, new_attr.log_size, attr.log_buf) != new_attr.log_size))
> 
> This is almost certainly in writable memory (either stack or .data).
> 
> > But I'm not sure if there are other use-cases that would require this.
> 
> Maybe this option needs to be per-process (like no_new_privs), and with
> a few access levels:
> 
> - as things are now
> - no FOLL_FORCE unless by ptracer
> - no writes unless by ptracer
> - no FOLL_FORCE ever
> - no writes ever
> - no reads unless by ptracer
> - no reads ever

Doing it as a prctl() would be fine.