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Message-ID: <ff6aec00-f939-b7ba-c127-b133c4d95ee5@huawei.com> Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2024 10:38:47 +0800 From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@...wei.com> To: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@....com> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <stable@...r.kernel.org>, "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@...el.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] mm: swap: Fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff() On 2024/3/6 17:31, Ryan Roberts wrote: > On 06/03/2024 08:51, Miaohe Lin wrote: >> On 2024/3/6 10:52, Huang, Ying wrote: >>> Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@....com> writes: >>> >>>> There was previously a theoretical window where swapoff() could run and >>>> teardown a swap_info_struct while a call to free_swap_and_cache() was >>>> running in another thread. This could cause, amongst other bad >>>> possibilities, swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() (called by >>>> free_swap_and_cache()) to access the freed memory for swap_map. >>>> >>>> This is a theoretical problem and I haven't been able to provoke it from >>>> a test case. But there has been agreement based on code review that this >>>> is possible (see link below). >>>> >>>> Fix it by using get_swap_device()/put_swap_device(), which will stall >>>> swapoff(). There was an extra check in _swap_info_get() to confirm that >>>> the swap entry was valid. This wasn't present in get_swap_device() so >>>> I've added it. I couldn't find any existing get_swap_device() call sites >>>> where this extra check would cause any false alarms. >>>> >>>> Details of how to provoke one possible issue (thanks to David Hilenbrand >>>> for deriving this): >>>> >>>> --8<----- >>>> >>>> __swap_entry_free() might be the last user and result in >>>> "count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE". >>>> >>>> swapoff->try_to_unuse() will stop as soon as soon as si->inuse_pages==0. >>>> >>>> So the question is: could someone reclaim the folio and turn >>>> si->inuse_pages==0, before we completed swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(). >>>> >>>> Imagine the following: 2 MiB folio in the swapcache. Only 2 subpages are >>>> still references by swap entries. >>>> >>>> Process 1 still references subpage 0 via swap entry. >>>> Process 2 still references subpage 1 via swap entry. >>>> >>>> Process 1 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). >>>> -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE >>>> [then, preempted in the hypervisor etc.] >>>> >>>> Process 2 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). >>>> -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE >>>> >>>> Process 2 goes ahead, passes swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(), and calls >>>> __try_to_reclaim_swap(). >>>> >>>> __try_to_reclaim_swap()->folio_free_swap()->delete_from_swap_cache()-> >>>> put_swap_folio()->free_swap_slot()->swapcache_free_entries()-> >>>> swap_entry_free()->swap_range_free()-> >>>> ... >>>> WRITE_ONCE(si->inuse_pages, si->inuse_pages - nr_entries); >>>> >>>> What stops swapoff to succeed after process 2 reclaimed the swap cache >>>> but before process1 finished its call to swap_page_trans_huge_swapped()? >>>> >>>> --8<----- >>> >>> I think that this can be simplified. Even for a 4K folio, this could >>> happen. >>> >>> CPU0 CPU1 >>> ---- ---- >>> >>> zap_pte_range >>> free_swap_and_cache >>> __swap_entry_free >>> /* swap count become 0 */ >>> swapoff >>> try_to_unuse >>> filemap_get_folio >>> folio_free_swap >>> /* remove swap cache */ >>> /* free si->swap_map[] */ >>> >>> swap_page_trans_huge_swapped <-- access freed si->swap_map !!! >> >> Sorry for jumping the discussion here. IMHO, free_swap_and_cache is called with pte lock held. > > I don't beleive it has the PTL when called by shmem. In the case of shmem, folio_lock is used to guard against the race. > >> So synchronize_rcu (called by swapoff) will wait zap_pte_range to release the pte lock. So this >> theoretical problem can't happen. Or am I miss something? > > For Huang Ying's example, I agree this can't happen because try_to_unuse() will > be waiting for the PTL (see the reply I just sent). Do you mean the below message? " I don't think si->inuse_pages is decremented until __try_to_reclaim_swap() is called (per David, above), which is called after swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() has executed. So in CPU1, try_to_unuse() wouldn't see si->inuse_pages being zero until after CPU0 has completed accessing si->swap_map, so if swapoff starts where you have put it, it would get stalled waiting for the PTL which CPU0 has. " I agree try_to_unuse() will wait for si->inuse_pages being zero. But why will it waits for the PTL? It seems PTL is not used to protect si->inuse_pages. Or am I miss something? > >> >> CPU0 CPU1 >> ---- ---- >> >> zap_pte_range >> pte_offset_map_lock -- spin_lock is held. >> free_swap_and_cache >> __swap_entry_free >> /* swap count become 0 */ >> swapoff >> try_to_unuse >> filemap_get_folio >> folio_free_swap >> /* remove swap cache */ >> percpu_ref_kill(&p->users); >> swap_page_trans_huge_swapped >> pte_unmap_unlock -- spin_lock is released. >> synchronize_rcu(); --> Will wait pte_unmap_unlock to be called? > > Perhaps you can educate me here; I thought that synchronize_rcu() will only wait > for RCU critical sections to complete. The PTL is a spin lock, so why would > synchronize_rcu() wait for the PTL to become unlocked? I assume PTL will always disable preemption which disables a grace period until PTL is released. But this might be fragile and I'm not really sure. I might be wrong. Thanks. > > >> /* free si->swap_map[] */ >> >> Thanks. >> >> > > . >
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