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Message-Id: <CZNRCUVPPQVS.1PWNKLPUW96LW@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2024 21:17:28 +0200
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: "David Gstir" <david@...ma-star.at>, "Mimi Zohar" <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
 "James Bottomley" <jejb@...ux.ibm.com>, "Herbert Xu"
 <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: "Shawn Guo" <shawnguo@...nel.org>, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@....net>,
 "Sascha Hauer" <s.hauer@...gutronix.de>, "Pengutronix Kernel Team"
 <kernel@...gutronix.de>, "Fabio Estevam" <festevam@...il.com>, "NXP Linux
 Team" <linux-imx@....com>, "Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@...gutronix.de>, "sigma
 star Kernel Team" <upstream+dcp@...ma-star.at>, "David Howells"
 <dhowells@...hat.com>, "Li Yang" <leoyang.li@....com>, "Paul Moore"
 <paul@...l-moore.com>, "James Morris" <jmorris@...ei.org>, "Serge E.
 Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>, "Randy
 Dunlap" <rdunlap@...radead.org>, "Catalin Marinas"
 <catalin.marinas@....com>, "Rafael J. Wysocki"
 <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@...nel.org>, "Steven Rostedt
 (Google)" <rostedt@...dmis.org>, <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>,
 <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
 <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
 <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, <linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org>,
 <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, "Richard Weinberger"
 <richard@....at>, "David Oberhollenzer" <david.oberhollenzer@...ma-star.at>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] crypto: mxs-dcp: Add support for hardware-bound
 keys

On Thu Mar 7, 2024 at 5:38 PM EET, David Gstir wrote:
> DCP (Data Co-Processor) is able to derive private keys for a fused
> random seed, which can be referenced by handle but not accessed by
> the CPU. Similarly, DCP is able to store arbitrary keys in four
> dedicated key slots located in its secure memory area (internal SRAM).
> These keys can be used to perform AES encryption.
>
> Expose these derived keys and key slots through the crypto API via their
> handle. The main purpose is to add DCP-backed trusted keys. Other
> use cases are possible too (see similar existing paes implementations),
> but these should carefully be evaluated as e.g. enabling AF_ALG will
> give userspace full access to use keys. In scenarios with untrustworthy
> userspace, this will enable en-/decryption oracles.
>
> Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
> Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@...ma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@...ma-star.at>
> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@...ma-star.at>
> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
> ---
>  drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  include/soc/fsl/dcp.h    |  20 ++++++++
>  2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 include/soc/fsl/dcp.h
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
> index 2b3ebe0db3a6..057d73c370b7 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>  #include <linux/platform_device.h>
>  #include <linux/stmp_device.h>
>  #include <linux/clk.h>
> +#include <soc/fsl/dcp.h>
>  
>  #include <crypto/aes.h>
>  #include <crypto/sha1.h>
> @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ struct dcp_async_ctx {
>  	struct crypto_skcipher		*fallback;
>  	unsigned int			key_len;
>  	uint8_t				key[AES_KEYSIZE_128];
> +	bool				key_referenced;
>  };
>  
>  struct dcp_aes_req_ctx {
> @@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp;
>  #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_TERM		(1 << 13)
>  #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_HASH_INIT		(1 << 12)
>  #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY		(1 << 11)
> +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY		(1 << 10)
>  #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT		(1 << 8)
>  #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_INIT		(1 << 9)
>  #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_HASH		(1 << 6)
> @@ -168,6 +171,8 @@ static struct dcp *global_sdcp;
>  #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_ECB	(0 << 4)
>  #define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_SELECT_AES128	(0 << 0)
>  
> +#define MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT	8
> +
>  static int mxs_dcp_start_dma(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx)
>  {
>  	int dma_err;
> @@ -224,13 +229,16 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx,
>  	struct dcp *sdcp = global_sdcp;
>  	struct dcp_dma_desc *desc = &sdcp->coh->desc[actx->chan];
>  	struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
> +	bool key_referenced = actx->key_referenced;
>  	int ret;
>  
> -	key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key,
> -				  2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -	ret = dma_mapping_error(sdcp->dev, key_phys);
> -	if (ret)
> -		return ret;
> +	if (!key_referenced) {
> +		key_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_key,
> +					  2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> +		ret = dma_mapping_error(sdcp->dev, key_phys);
> +		if (ret)
> +			return ret;
> +	}
>  
>  	src_phys = dma_map_single(sdcp->dev, sdcp->coh->aes_in_buf,
>  				  DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> @@ -255,8 +263,12 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx,
>  		    MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_INTERRUPT |
>  		    MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_ENABLE_CIPHER;
>  
> -	/* Payload contains the key. */
> -	desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY;
> +	if (key_referenced)
> +		/* Set OTP key bit to select the key via KEY_SELECT. */
> +		desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_OTP_KEY;
> +	else
> +		/* Payload contains the key. */
> +		desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_PAYLOAD_KEY;
>  
>  	if (rctx->enc)
>  		desc->control0 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL0_CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
> @@ -270,6 +282,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx,
>  	else
>  		desc->control1 |= MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_CIPHER_MODE_CBC;
>  
> +	if (key_referenced)
> +		desc->control1 |= sdcp->coh->aes_key[0] << MXS_DCP_CONTROL1_KEY_SELECT_SHIFT;
> +
>  	desc->next_cmd_addr = 0;
>  	desc->source = src_phys;
>  	desc->destination = dst_phys;
> @@ -284,9 +299,9 @@ static int mxs_dcp_run_aes(struct dcp_async_ctx *actx,
>  err_dst:
>  	dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, src_phys, DCP_BUF_SZ, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>  err_src:
> -	dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128,
> -			 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> -
> +	if (!key_referenced)
> +		dma_unmap_single(sdcp->dev, key_phys, 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128,
> +				 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> @@ -453,7 +468,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_enqueue(struct skcipher_request *req, int enc, int ecb)
>  	struct dcp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
>  	int ret;
>  
> -	if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128))
> +	if (unlikely(actx->key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && !actx->key_referenced))
>  		return mxs_dcp_block_fallback(req, enc);
>  
>  	rctx->enc = enc;
> @@ -500,6 +515,7 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  	 * there can still be an operation in progress.
>  	 */
>  	actx->key_len = len;
> +	actx->key_referenced = false;
>  	if (len == AES_KEYSIZE_128) {
>  		memcpy(actx->key, key, len);
>  		return 0;
> @@ -516,6 +532,32 @@ static int mxs_dcp_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
>  	return crypto_skcipher_setkey(actx->fallback, key, len);
>  }
>  
> +static int mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
> +				 unsigned int len)
> +{
> +	struct dcp_async_ctx *actx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
> +
> +	if (len != DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	switch (key[0]) {
> +	case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0:
> +	case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1:
> +	case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2:
> +	case DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3:
> +	case DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE:
> +	case DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP:
> +		memcpy(actx->key, key, len);
> +		actx->key_len = len;
> +		actx->key_referenced = true;
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  static int mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
>  {
>  	const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm));
> @@ -539,6 +581,13 @@ static void mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
>  	crypto_free_skcipher(actx->fallback);
>  }
>  
> +static int mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
> +{
> +	crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct dcp_aes_req_ctx));
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * Hashing (SHA1/SHA256)
>   */
> @@ -889,6 +938,39 @@ static struct skcipher_alg dcp_aes_algs[] = {
>  		.ivsize			= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
>  		.init			= mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_init_tfm,
>  		.exit			= mxs_dcp_aes_fallback_exit_tfm,
> +	}, {
> +		.base.cra_name		= "ecb(paes)",
> +		.base.cra_driver_name	= "ecb-paes-dcp",
> +		.base.cra_priority	= 401,
> +		.base.cra_alignmask	= 15,
> +		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
> +		.base.cra_blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
> +		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx),
> +		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
> +
> +		.min_keysize		= DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE,
> +		.max_keysize		= DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE,
> +		.setkey			= mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey,
> +		.encrypt		= mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_encrypt,
> +		.decrypt		= mxs_dcp_aes_ecb_decrypt,
> +		.init			= mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm,
> +	}, {
> +		.base.cra_name		= "cbc(paes)",
> +		.base.cra_driver_name	= "cbc-paes-dcp",
> +		.base.cra_priority	= 401,
> +		.base.cra_alignmask	= 15,
> +		.base.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL,
> +		.base.cra_blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
> +		.base.cra_ctxsize	= sizeof(struct dcp_async_ctx),
> +		.base.cra_module	= THIS_MODULE,
> +
> +		.min_keysize		= DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE,
> +		.max_keysize		= DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE,
> +		.setkey			= mxs_dcp_aes_setrefkey,
> +		.encrypt		= mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_encrypt,
> +		.decrypt		= mxs_dcp_aes_cbc_decrypt,
> +		.ivsize			= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
> +		.init			= mxs_dcp_paes_init_tfm,
>  	},
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h b/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..3ec335d8ca8b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/soc/fsl/dcp.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2021 sigma star gmbh
> + *
> + * Specifies paes key slot handles for NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) to be used
> + * with the crypto_skcipher_setkey().
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef MXS_DCP_H
> +#define MXS_DCP_H
> +
> +#define DCP_PAES_KEYSIZE 1
> +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT0 0x00
> +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT1 0x01
> +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT2 0x02
> +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_SLOT3 0x03
> +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_UNIQUE 0xfe
> +#define DCP_PAES_KEY_OTP 0xff
> +
> +#endif /* MXS_DCP_H */

Looks to good enough to me:

Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>

BR, Jarkko

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