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Date: Thu, 07 Mar 2024 09:15:44 +0100
From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, paul@...l-moore.com,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, keescook@...omium.org,
john.johansen@...onical.com, penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
mic@...ikod.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v39 04/42] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs
On Wed, 2024-03-06 at 09:04 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 3/6/2024 2:09 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > On Fri, 2023-12-15 at 14:15 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> > > Integrity measurement may filter on security module information
> > > and needs to be clear in the case of multiple active security
> > > modules which applies. Provide a boot option ima_rules_lsm= to
> > > allow the user to specify an active security module to apply
> > > filters to. If not specified, use the first registered module
> > > that supports the audit_rule_match() LSM hook. Allow the user
> > > to specify in the IMA policy an lsm= option to specify the
> > > security module to use for a particular rule.
> > I was hoping somehow that we can rely on the concept of default LSM
> > from the LSM infrastructure, so that the extra option would not be
> > needed.
>
> What is the "default LSM"? The first "major LSM"? If you never, ever,
> under any circumstances want to allow the rules to match an LSM other
> than that, sure, we can eliminate the option. I'll bet a refreshing
> beverage that BPF is going to want the option on a system that also
> has SELinux. Nonetheless, if IMA doesn't want the option I'm willing
> to leave it out.
I was more thinking that for existing IMA policies, that would be the
behavior. New policies would always specify lsm=.
If we want to provide more flexibility, I'm fine with that.
Roberto
> >
> > Roberto
> >
> > > This requires adding the LSM of interest as a parameter
> > > to three of the audit hooks.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
> > > To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> > > To: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
> > > To: audit@...r.kernel.org
> > > ---
> > > Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 8 +++-
> > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 7 +--
> > > include/linux/security.h | 26 +++++++---
> > > security/apparmor/audit.c | 15 ++++--
> > > security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 7 +--
> > > security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> > > security/security.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++----
> > > security/selinux/include/audit.h | 10 ++--
> > > security/selinux/ss/services.c | 15 ++++--
> > > security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 ++++-
> > > 10 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > > index c2385183826c..a59291b97c24 100644
> > > --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > > +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
> > > @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Description:
> > > [uid=] [euid=] [gid=] [egid=]
> > > [fowner=] [fgroup=]]
> > > lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
> > > - [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
> > > + [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=] [lsm=]]
> > > option: [digest_type=] [template=] [permit_directio]
> > > [appraise_type=] [appraise_flag=]
> > > [appraise_algos=] [keyrings=]
> > > @@ -138,6 +138,12 @@ Description:
> > >
> > > measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
> > >
> > > + It is possible to explicitly specify which security
> > > + module a rule applies to using lsm=. If the security
> > > + module specified is not active on the system the rule
> > > + will be rejected. If lsm= is not specified the first
> > > + security module registered on the system will be assumed.
> > > +
> > > Example of measure rules using alternate PCRs::
> > >
> > > measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK pcr=4
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > index c925a0d26edf..2159013890aa 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> > > @@ -392,10 +392,11 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, key_getsecurity, struct key *key, char **buffer)
> > >
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> > > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> > > - void **lsmrule)
> > > + void **lsmrule, int lsmid)
> > > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule)
> > > -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> > > -LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)
> > > +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> > > + int lsmid)
> > > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule, int lsmid)
> > > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> > >
> > > #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> > > index d4103b6cd3fc..2320ed78c4de 100644
> > > --- a/include/linux/security.h
> > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> > > @@ -286,6 +286,8 @@ int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
> > > extern int security_init(void);
> > > extern int early_security_init(void);
> > > extern u64 lsm_name_to_attr(const char *name);
> > > +extern u64 lsm_name_to_id(const char *name);
> > > +extern const char *lsm_id_to_name(u64 id);
> > >
> > > /* Security operations */
> > > int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr);
> > > @@ -536,6 +538,16 @@ static inline u64 lsm_name_to_attr(const char *name)
> > > return LSM_ATTR_UNDEF;
> > > }
> > >
> > > +static inline u64 lsm_name_to_id(const char *name)
> > > +{
> > > + return LSM_ID_UNDEF;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +static inline const char *lsm_id_to_name(u64 id)
> > > +{
> > > + return NULL;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts)
> > > {
> > > }
> > > @@ -2030,25 +2042,27 @@ static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> > > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> > >
> > > #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY)
> > > -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
> > > -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
> > > -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> > > +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> > > + int lsmid);
> > > +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> > > + int lsmid);
> > > +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmid);
> > >
> > > #else
> > >
> > > static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
> > > - void **lsmrule)
> > > + void **lsmrule, int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> > > - void *lsmrule)
> > > + void *lsmrule, int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> > > +static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmid)
> > > { }
> > >
> > > #endif /* defined(CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY) */
> > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
> > > index 45beb1c5f747..0a9f0019355a 100644
> > > --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
> > > +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
> > > @@ -206,10 +206,12 @@ struct aa_audit_rule {
> > > struct aa_label *label;
> > > };
> > >
> > > -void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
> > > +void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule, int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
> > >
> > > + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_APPARMOR)
> > > + return;
> > > if (rule) {
> > > if (!IS_ERR(rule->label))
> > > aa_put_label(rule->label);
> > > @@ -217,10 +219,13 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
> > > }
> > > }
> > >
> > > -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
> > > +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
> > > + int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
> > >
> > > + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_APPARMOR)
> > > + return 0;
> > > switch (field) {
> > > case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
> > > if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
> > > @@ -240,7 +245,7 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
> > > GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
> > > if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
> > > int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
> > > - aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
> > > + aa_audit_rule_free(rule, LSM_ID_APPARMOR);
> > > return err;
> > > }
> > >
> > > @@ -264,12 +269,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
> > > +int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
> > > struct aa_label *label;
> > > int found = 0;
> > >
> > > + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_APPARMOR)
> > > + return 0;
> > > label = aa_secid_to_label(sid);
> > >
> > > if (!label)
> > > diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
> > > index acbb03b9bd25..a75c45dd059f 100644
> > > --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
> > > +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
> > > @@ -199,9 +199,10 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
> > > return error;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
> > > -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
> > > +void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule, int lsmid);
> > > +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
> > > + int lsmid);
> > > int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
> > > -int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
> > > +int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, int lsmid);
> > >
> > > #endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
> > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > index f69062617754..a563e0478cc6 100644
> > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> > > @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
> > > void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
> > > char *args_p; /* audit value */
> > > int type; /* audit type */
> > > + int lsm_id; /* which LSM rule applies to */
> > > + bool lsm_specific; /* true if lsm is specified */
> > > } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
> > > char *fsname;
> > > struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings; /* Measure keys added to these keyrings */
> > > @@ -309,6 +311,25 @@ static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
> > > }
> > > __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
> > >
> > > +static int default_rules_lsm __ro_after_init = LSM_ID_UNDEF;
> > > +
> > > +static int __init ima_rules_lsm_init(char *str)
> > > +{
> > > + int newdrl;
> > > +
> > > + newdrl = lsm_name_to_id(str);
> > > + if (newdrl >= 0) {
> > > + default_rules_lsm = newdrl;
> > > + return 1;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > + pr_err("default ima rule lsm \"%s\" not registered, value unchanged",
> > > + str);
> > > +
> > > + return 1;
> > > +}
> > > +__setup("ima_rules_lsm=", ima_rules_lsm_init);
> > > +
> > > static struct ima_rule_opt_list *ima_alloc_rule_opt_list(const substring_t *src)
> > > {
> > > struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list;
> > > @@ -380,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > > int i;
> > >
> > > for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> > > - ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
> > > + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule,
> > > + entry->lsm[i].lsm_id);
> > > kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
> > > }
> > > }
> > > @@ -425,7 +447,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > >
> > > ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
> > > nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
> > > - &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
> > > + &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
> > > + entry->lsm[i].lsm_id);
> > > if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
> > > pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> > > nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
> > > @@ -451,7 +474,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > > * be owned by nentry.
> > > */
> > > for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> > > - ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule);
> > > + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule,
> > > + entry->lsm[i].lsm_id);
> > > kfree(entry);
> > >
> > > return 0;
> > > @@ -650,14 +674,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> > > security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
> > > rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
> > > Audit_equal,
> > > - lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
> > > + lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule,
> > > + lsm_rule->lsm[i].lsm_id);
> > > break;
> > > case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
> > > case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
> > > case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> > > rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
> > > Audit_equal,
> > > - lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
> > > + lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule,
> > > + lsm_rule->lsm[i].lsm_id);
> > > break;
> > > default:
> > > break;
> > > @@ -680,7 +706,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> > > out:
> > > if (rule_reinitialized) {
> > > for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> > > - ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
> > > + ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule,
> > > + lsm_rule->lsm[i].lsm_id);
> > > kfree(lsm_rule);
> > > }
> > > return result;
> > > @@ -1073,7 +1100,7 @@ enum policy_opt {
> > > Opt_digest_type,
> > > Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_appraise_algos,
> > > Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings,
> > > - Opt_label, Opt_err
> > > + Opt_lsm, Opt_label, Opt_err
> > > };
> > >
> > > static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> > > @@ -1121,6 +1148,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
> > > {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
> > > {Opt_template, "template=%s"},
> > > {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"},
> > > + {Opt_lsm, "lsm=%s"},
> > > {Opt_label, "label=%s"},
> > > {Opt_err, NULL}
> > > };
> > > @@ -1140,7 +1168,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
> > > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
> > > result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
> > > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
> > > - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
> > > + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
> > > + entry->lsm[lsm_rule].lsm_id);
> > > if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
> > > pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
> > > entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
> > > @@ -1878,6 +1907,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> > > &(template_desc->num_fields));
> > > entry->template = template_desc;
> > > break;
> > > + case Opt_lsm: {
> > > + int i;
> > > +
> > > + result = lsm_name_to_id(args[0].from);
> > > + if (result < 0) {
> > > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
> > > + entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL;
> > > + result = -EINVAL;
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> > > + entry->lsm[i].lsm_id = result;
> > > + entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific = true;
> > > + }
> > > + result = 0;
> > > + break;
> > > + }
> > > case Opt_err:
> > > ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
> > > result = -EINVAL;
> > > @@ -1923,6 +1969,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
> > > struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
> > > ssize_t result, len;
> > > int audit_info = 0;
> > > + int i;
> > >
> > > p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
> > > len = strlen(p) + 1;
> > > @@ -1940,6 +1987,11 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
> > >
> > > INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
> > >
> > > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
> > > + entry->lsm[i].lsm_id = default_rules_lsm;
> > > + entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific = false;
> > > + }
> > > +
> > > result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
> > > if (result) {
> > > ima_free_rule(entry);
> > > @@ -2251,6 +2303,9 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> > > entry->lsm[i].args_p);
> > > break;
> > > }
> > > + if (entry->lsm[i].lsm_specific)
> > > + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_lsm),
> > > + lsm_id_to_name(entry->lsm[i].lsm_id));
> > > seq_puts(m, " ");
> > > }
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> > > index 0a51e3d23570..cdf9ee12b064 100644
> > > --- a/security/security.c
> > > +++ b/security/security.c
> > > @@ -271,6 +271,46 @@ static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
> > > u32 lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init;
> > > const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[LSM_CONFIG_COUNT];
> > >
> > > +/**
> > > + * lsm_name_to_id - get the LSM ID for a registered LSM
> > > + * @name: the name of the LSM
> > > + *
> > > + * Returns the LSM ID associated with the named LSM or
> > > + * LSM_ID_UNDEF if the name isn't recongnized.
> > > + */
> > > +u64 lsm_name_to_id(const char *name)
> > > +{
> > > + int i;
> > > +
> > > + for (i = 0; i < LSM_CONFIG_COUNT; i++) {
> > > + if (!lsm_idlist[i]->name)
> > > + return LSM_ID_UNDEF;
> > > + if (!strcmp(name, lsm_idlist[i]->name))
> > > + return lsm_idlist[i]->id;
> > > + }
> > > + return LSM_ID_UNDEF;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > +/**
> > > + * lsm_id_to_name - get the LSM name for a registered LSM ID
> > > + * @id: the ID of the LSM
> > > + *
> > > + * Returns the LSM name associated with the LSM ID or
> > > + * NULL if the ID isn't recongnized.
> > > + */
> > > +const char *lsm_id_to_name(u64 id)
> > > +{
> > > + int i;
> > > +
> > > + for (i = 0; i < LSM_CONFIG_COUNT; i++) {
> > > + if (!lsm_idlist[i]->name)
> > > + return NULL;
> > > + if (id == lsm_idlist[i]->id)
> > > + return lsm_idlist[i]->name;
> > > + }
> > > + return NULL;
> > > +}
> > > +
> > > /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
> > > static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
> > > {
> > > @@ -5336,7 +5376,8 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer)
> > > */
> > > int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> > > {
> > > - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> > > + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule,
> > > + LSM_ID_UNDEF);
> > > }
> > >
> > > /**
> > > @@ -5362,7 +5403,7 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> > > */
> > > void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> > > {
> > > - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> > > + call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule, LSM_ID_UNDEF);
> > > }
> > >
> > > /**
> > > @@ -5380,7 +5421,8 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> > > */
> > > int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> > > {
> > > - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> > > + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
> > > + LSM_ID_UNDEF);
> > > }
> > > #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> > >
> > > @@ -5389,19 +5431,23 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> > > * The integrity subsystem uses the same hooks as
> > > * the audit subsystem.
> > > */
> > > -int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
> > > +int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
> > > + int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> > > + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule,
> > > + lsmid);
> > > }
> > >
> > > -void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> > > +void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule, int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > - call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
> > > + call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule, lsmid);
> > > }
> > >
> > > -int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
> > > +int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
> > > + int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
> > > + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
> > > + lsmid);
> > > }
> > > #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
> > >
> > > diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
> > > index d5495134a5b9..59468baf0c91 100644
> > > --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
> > > +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
> > > @@ -21,21 +21,24 @@
> > > * @op: the operator the rule uses
> > > * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
> > > * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
> > > + * @lsmid: the relevant LSM
> > > *
> > > * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
> > > * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
> > > * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
> > > */
> > > -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
> > > +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule,
> > > + int lsmid);
> > >
> > > /**
> > > * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
> > > * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
> > > + * @lsmid: which LSM this rule relates to
> > > *
> > > * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
> > > * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
> > > */
> > > -void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
> > > +void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule, int lsmid);
> > >
> > > /**
> > > * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
> > > @@ -43,11 +46,12 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
> > > * @field: the field this rule refers to
> > > * @op: the operator the rule uses
> > > * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
> > > + * @lsmid: the relevant LSM
> > > *
> > > * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
> > > * -errno on failure.
> > > */
> > > -int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
> > > +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule, int lsmid);
> > >
> > > /**
> > > * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
> > > diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > > index 1eeffc66ea7d..a9fe8d85acae 100644
> > > --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > > +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> > > @@ -3487,17 +3487,20 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule {
> > > struct context au_ctxt;
> > > };
> > >
> > > -void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
> > > +void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule, int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
> > >
> > > + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SELINUX)
> > > + return;
> > > if (rule) {
> > > context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
> > > kfree(rule);
> > > }
> > > }
> > >
> > > -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
> > > +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
> > > + int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
> > > struct selinux_policy *policy;
> > > @@ -3511,6 +3514,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
> > >
> > > *rule = NULL;
> > >
> > > + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SELINUX)
> > > + return 0;
> > > if (!selinux_initialized())
> > > return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > >
> > > @@ -3592,7 +3597,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
> > >
> > > err:
> > > rcu_read_unlock();
> > > - selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
> > > + selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule, LSM_ID_SELINUX);
> > > *rule = NULL;
> > > return rc;
> > > }
> > > @@ -3622,7 +3627,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
> > > return 0;
> > > }
> > >
> > > -int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
> > > +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
> > > struct selinux_policy *policy;
> > > @@ -3631,6 +3636,8 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
> > > struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
> > > int match = 0;
> > >
> > > + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SELINUX)
> > > + return 0;
> > > if (unlikely(!rule)) {
> > > WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
> > > return -ENOENT;
> > > diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > > index cd44f7f3f393..4342947f51d8 100644
> > > --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > > +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> > > @@ -4672,16 +4672,20 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
> > > * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
> > > * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
> > > * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
> > > + * @lsmid: the relevant LSM
> > > *
> > > * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
> > > * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
> > > */
> > > -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
> > > +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
> > > + int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > struct smack_known *skp;
> > > char **rule = (char **)vrule;
> > > *rule = NULL;
> > >
> > > + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SMACK)
> > > + return 0;
> > > if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
> > > return -EINVAL;
> > >
> > > @@ -4726,15 +4730,19 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> > > * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
> > > * @op: required testing operator
> > > * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
> > > + * @lsmid: the relevant LSM
> > > *
> > > * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
> > > * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
> > > */
> > > -static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
> > > +static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
> > > + int lsmid)
> > > {
> > > struct smack_known *skp;
> > > char *rule = vrule;
> > >
> > > + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF || lsmid != LSM_ID_SMACK)
> > > + return 0;
> > > if (unlikely(!rule)) {
> > > WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
> > > return -ENOENT;
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