linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v14 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQ90Z9HbSJWxNoH20_b92m6_5QWJAJ9ZkSR_1PWUAvCsw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2024 20:14:17 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com>
Cc: corbet@....net, zohar@...ux.ibm.com, jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, 
	tytso@....edu, ebiggers@...nel.org, axboe@...nel.dk, agk@...hat.com, 
	snitzer@...nel.org, eparis@...hat.com, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-fscrypt@...r.kernel.org, linux-block@...r.kernel.org, 
	dm-devel@...ts.linux.dev, audit@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v14 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE)

On Wed, Mar 6, 2024 at 6:34 PM Fan Wu <wufan@...ux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> Overview:
> ---------
>
> IPE is a Linux Security Module which takes a complimentary approach to
> access control. Whereas existing mandatory access control mechanisms
> base their decisions on labels and paths, IPE instead determines
> whether or not an operation should be allowed based on immutable
> security properties of the system component the operation is being
> performed on.
>
> IPE itself does not mandate how the security property should be
> evaluated, but relies on an extensible set of external property providers
> to evaluate the component. IPE makes its decision based on reference
> values for the selected properties, specified in the IPE policy.
>
> The reference values represent the value that the policy writer and the
> local system administrator (based on the policy signature) trust for the
> system to accomplish the desired tasks.
>
> One such provider is for example dm-verity, which is able to represent
> the integrity property of a partition (its immutable state) with a digest.
>
> IPE is compiled under CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE.

All of this looks reasonable to me, I see there have been some minor
spelling/grammar corrections made, but nothing too serious.  If we can
get ACKs from the fsverity and device-mapper folks I can merge this
once the upcoming merge window closes in a few weeks.

-- 
paul-moore.com