[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <CZR5UBHJL9RC.1NA7Q0F10XSJF@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2024 21:16:31 +0200
From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: "Eric Snowberg" <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <dhowells@...hat.com>, <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
<herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, <davem@...emloft.net>, <ardb@...nel.org>,
<paul@...l-moore.com>, <jmorris@...ei.org>, <serge@...lyn.com>,
<zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
<dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>, <mic@...ikod.net>, <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
<stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<keyrings@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
<linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/8] certs: Introduce ability to link to a system
key
On Mon Mar 11, 2024 at 6:11 PM EET, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> Introduce a new function to allow a keyring to link to a key contained
> within one of the system keyrings (builtin, secondary, or platform).
> Depending on how the kernel is built, if the machine keyring is
> available, it will be checked as well, since it is linked to the secondary
> keyring. If the asymmetric key id matches a key within one of these
> system keyrings, the matching key is linked into the passed in
> keyring.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
> ---
> certs/system_keyring.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/keys/system_keyring.h | 7 ++++++-
> 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
> index 9de610bf1f4b..b647be49f6e0 100644
> --- a/certs/system_keyring.c
> +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
> @@ -426,3 +426,32 @@ void __init set_platform_trusted_keys(struct key *keyring)
> platform_trusted_keys = keyring;
> }
> #endif
> +
> +/**
> + * system_key_link - Link to a system key
> + * @keyring: The keyring to link into
> + * @id: The asymmetric key id to look for in the system keyring
> + */
> +int system_key_link(struct key *keyring, struct asymmetric_key_id *id)
> +{
> + struct key *tkey;
I'd suggest to replace this with just 'tkey'. Single obscure character
does not bring any readability value.
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
> + tkey = find_asymmetric_key(secondary_trusted_keys, id, NULL, NULL, false);
> +#else
> + tkey = find_asymmetric_key(builtin_trusted_keys, id, NULL, NULL, false);
> +#endif
I'd have just single call site here and inside ifdef-shenanigans i'd
just set helper "keyring" to point to the appropriate keyring.
> + if (!IS_ERR(tkey))
> + goto found;
> +
> + tkey = find_asymmetric_key(platform_trusted_keys, id, NULL, NULL, false);
> +
Please remove this empty line as the check below is associated with it.
> + if (!IS_ERR(tkey))
> + goto found;
> +
> + return -1;
> +
> +found:
> + key_link(keyring, tkey);
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> index 8365adf842ef..b47ac8e2001a 100644
> --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> #define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H
>
> #include <linux/key.h>
> +struct asymmetric_key_id;
>
> enum blacklist_hash_type {
> /* TBSCertificate hash */
> @@ -28,7 +29,7 @@ int restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin(struct key *dest_keyring,
> const union key_payload *payload,
> struct key *restriction_key);
> extern __init int load_module_cert(struct key *keyring);
> -
> +extern int system_key_link(struct key *keyring, struct asymmetric_key_id *id);
> #else
> #define restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted restrict_link_reject
> #define restrict_link_by_digsig_builtin restrict_link_reject
> @@ -38,6 +39,10 @@ static inline __init int load_module_cert(struct key *keyring)
> return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline int system_key_link(struct key *keyring, struct asymmetric_key_id *id)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> #endif
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
BR, Jarkko
Powered by blists - more mailing lists