[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20240313164223.615640-26-sashal@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 12:41:32 -0400
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Jason Xing <kernelxing@...cent.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 25/76] netrom: Fix a data-race around sysctl_netrom_routing_control
From: Jason Xing <kernelxing@...cent.com>
[ Upstream commit b5dffcb8f71bdd02a4e5799985b51b12f4eeaf76 ]
We need to protect the reader reading the sysctl value because the
value can be changed concurrently.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing@...cent.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
net/netrom/nr_route.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_route.c b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
index e5d24462d5100..56bec5b5b37c7 100644
--- a/net/netrom/nr_route.c
+++ b/net/netrom/nr_route.c
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ int nr_route_frame(struct sk_buff *skb, ax25_cb *ax25)
return ret;
}
- if (!sysctl_netrom_routing_control && ax25 != NULL)
+ if (!READ_ONCE(sysctl_netrom_routing_control) && ax25 != NULL)
return 0;
/* Its Time-To-Live has expired */
--
2.43.0
Powered by blists - more mailing lists