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Message-ID: <349322E5-5E6C-48D5-BA12-1CF47CE82930@oracle.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 18:14:49 +0000
From: Aruna Ramakrishna <aruna.ramakrishna@...cle.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
CC: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com"
<dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/pkeys: update PKRU to enable pkey 0 before XSAVE
> On Mar 14, 2024, at 10:54 AM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>
> On 3/14/24 10:29, Aruna Ramakrishna wrote:
>> This patch is a workaround for a bug where the PKRU value is not
>> restored to the init value before the signal handler is invoked.
>
> I don't think we should touch this with a ten foot pole without a test
> for it in tools/testing/selftests/mm/protection_keys.c.
I’ll add a test case here.
>
> I'm not sure this is worth the trouble. Protection keys is not a
> security feature. This isn't a regression. It's been the behavior
> since day one. This really is a feature request for a behavioral
> improvement, not a bug fix.
>
> The need for this new feature is highly dependent on the threat model
> that it supports. I'm highly dubious that there's a true need to
> protect against an attacker with arbitrary write access in the same
> address space. We need to have a lot more information there.
I thought the PKRU value being reset in the signal handler was supposed to be the default behavior. In which case, this is a bug.
"Signal Handler Behavior
Each time a signal handler is invoked (including nested signals),
the thread is temporarily given a new, default set of protection
key rights that override the rights from the interrupted context.”
(Ref: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/pkeys.7.html)
I'm not very familiar with protection keys (before I started looking into this issue), so I apologize for misunderstanding.
fpu__clear_user_states() does reset PKRU, but that happens much later in the flow. Before that, the kernel tries to save registers on to the alternate signal stack in setup_rt_frame(), and that fails if the application has explicitly disabled pkey 0 (and the alt stack is protected by pkey 0). This patch attempts to move that reset a little earlier in the flow, so that setup_rt_frame() can succeed.
>
> I haven't even more than glanced at the code. It looks pretty
> unspeakably ugly even at a glance.
I agree with you - no argument there.
But I’m not sure there is a “clean” way to do this. If there is, I’m happy to redo the patch.
Thanks,
Aruna
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